NOVA SCOTIA COURT OF APPEAL

Citation: *R. v. Munro*, 2026 NSCA 10

Date: 20260205
Docket: CAC 549809
Registry: Halifax

Between:

Robert Munro

Appellant

v.

His Majesty the King

Respondent

Restriction on Publication: ss. 486.4 and 486.5 of the *Criminal Code*

Judge:	Gogan, J.A.
Motion Heard:	January 8, 2026, in Halifax, Nova Scotia in Chambers
Written Decision:	February 5, 2026
Held:	Motion granted
Counsel:	Robert Munro, appellant in person Matthew R. Gourlay and Taylor Wormington (via Teams), for the appellant Erica Koresawa, for the respondent

Order restricting publication — sexual offences

486.4 (1) Subject to subsection (2), the presiding judge or justice may make an order directing that any information that could identify the victim or a witness shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way, in proceedings in respect of

(a) any of the following offences:

(i) an offence under section 151, 152, 153, 153.1, 155, 160, 162, 163.1, 170, 171, 171.1, 172, 172.1, 172.2, 173, 213, 271, 272, 273, 279.01, 279.011, 279.02, 279.03, 280, 281, 286.1, 286.2, 286.3, 346 or 347, or

(ii) any offence under this Act, as it read from time to time before the day on which this subparagraph comes into force, if the conduct alleged would be an offence referred to in subparagraph (i) if it occurred on or after that day; or

(b) two or more offences being dealt with in the same proceeding, at least one of which is an offence referred to in paragraph (a).

Mandatory order on application

(2) In proceedings in respect of the offences referred to in paragraph (1)(a) or (b), the presiding judge or justice shall

(a) at the first reasonable opportunity, inform any witness under the age of eighteen years and the victim of the right to make an application for the order; and

(b) on application made by the victim, the prosecutor or any such witness, make the order.

Victim under 18 — other offences

(2.1) Subject to subsection (2.2), in proceedings in respect of an offence other than an offence referred to in subsection (1), if the victim is under the age of 18 years, the presiding judge or justice may make an order directing that any information that could identify the victim shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way.

Mandatory order on application

(2.2) In proceedings in respect of an offence other than an offence referred to in subsection (1), if the victim is under the age of 18 years, the presiding judge or justice shall

(a) as soon as feasible, inform the victim of their right to make an application for the order; and

(b) on application of the victim or the prosecutor, make the order.

Child pornography

(3) In proceedings in respect of an offence under section 163.1, a judge or justice shall make an order directing that any information that could identify a witness who is under the age of eighteen years, or any person who is the subject of a representation, written material or a recording that constitutes child pornography within the meaning of that section, shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way.

Limitation

(4) An order made under this section does not apply in respect of the disclosure of information in the course of the administration of justice when it is not the purpose of the disclosure to make the information known in the community.

Order restricting publication — victims and witnesses

486.5 (1) Unless an order is made under section 486.4, on application of the prosecutor in respect of a victim or a witness, or on application of a victim or a witness, a judge or justice may make an order directing that any information that could identify the victim or witness shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way if the judge or justice is of the opinion that the order is in the interest of the proper administration of justice.

Chambers Decision:

Overview

[1] On June 24, 2025, Robert Munro was found guilty of sexual assault and sexual interference. On December 15, 2025, Mr. Munro was sentenced to 4.5 years in custody on the charge of sexual interference. A judicial stay was entered on the sexual assault offence.[1] He now appeals his conviction. The appeal will be heard on September 10, 2026.

[2] Mr. Munro applied for bail pending appeal and a hearing was held on January 8, 2026. The application was supported by his affidavit as well as the affidavits of his mother and father as proposed sureties. The Crown cross-examined all deponents. After hearing the evidence and the parties' submissions, I granted a release order with reasons to follow. These are my reasons.

The Trial Judge's Reasons

[3] Mr. Munro was convicted of sexual offences after a trial spanning six days before Judge Mark Heerema of the Provincial Court of Nova Scotia. The charges resulted from an incident in May 2023 when Mr. Munro was caring for the children of friends. One of the children was a four-year-old girl. The child later made statements to various people about Mr. Munro's conduct as he put her to bed.

[4] Judge Heerema heard evidence at trial that the child made an initial disclosure to a friend, overheard by the friend's mother, beginning a series of incremental disclosures to family members. The child was interviewed by police in August 2023. The statement given to police was later introduced at trial through s. 715.1 of the *Criminal Code*. In the statement, the child said Mr. Munro touched her "private parts" on one occasion. She went on to say he put his finger in her vagina and told her not to tell her mom or brother. The trial judge also heard evidence that the child made an additional disclosure to her mother that the penetration resulted in bleeding. When cross-examined at trial, the child confirmed this and said Mr. Munro removed the sheets from her bed and washed them. She said she washed her own underwear. Much of the remaining Crown evidence came from people who testified to receiving the child's various statements about what had happened.

[1] *Kienapple v. R*, [1975] 1 SCR 729.

[5] Mr. Munro testified at trial and denied the allegations made by the child. He recalled caring for her on the night in question and gave evidence about putting her to bed after playing games, reading books, and waiting for her to tire herself out. Mr. Munro was not asked about washing the child's sheets during his initial testimony. This omission became apparent during closing submissions, and the court granted a motion to re-open. When re-examined, Mr. Munro denied removing and washing the sheets but admitted to later bringing sheets to the child's home saying they were a gift from his mother. He could not recall when this latter event occurred.

[6] In his decision, the trial judge began by acknowledging the case turned on the assessment of credibility. He reviewed the evidence offered by the six Crown witnesses and Mr. Munro. He did not find Mr. Munro credible. As he considered the evidence of the young complainant, he cautioned himself about the assessment of such evidence. He rejected the argument her evidence was contaminated but acknowledged there were both internal and external inconsistencies. However, he found her evidence corroborated by other evidence and on this point relied on his finding that Mr. Munro removed the child's sheets and washed them. In the end, he accepted the child's core evidence that Mr. Munro put his finger in her vagina. As a result, he found Mr. Munro guilty.

[7] In his sentencing decision, the judge said Mr. Munro's digital penetration of the complainant was a "significant invasion of bodily integrity" that "caused her to bleed onto her sheets". He averred to the fact Mr. Munro had laundered the sheets. He went on to sentence him to 4.5 years incarceration.

Bail Pending Appeal

The Proposed Plan and Governing Law

[8] Mr. Munro filed a Notice of Appeal on December 29, 2025 and sought bail pending appeal pursuant to s. 679 of the *Criminal Code*. He proposed being released on strict house arrest conditions under the supervision of two sureties, his mother and father. The bail plan essentially proposed a continuation of the conditions of Mr. Munro's pre-conviction release. Mr. Munro had been compliant with the previous release order between August 22, 2025 until his sentencing on December 15, 2025.

[9] The Crown position on the motion was appropriately cautious. It sought clarification on the plan and revisions to the proposed conditions. At the

conclusion of the bail hearing, the Crown opposed Mr. Munro's release on the basis that his bail plan had not satisfied the necessary criteria.

[10] Section 679(3) of the *Code* governs this application and sets out three criteria, requiring the applicant to establish on a balance of probabilities: (1) the appeal is not frivolous, (2) the appellant will surrender himself into custody in accordance with the terms and conditions of the order, and (3) detention is not necessary in the public interest.[2]

[11] The test for bail pending appeal was considered and clarified by the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in *R. v. Oland*, 2017 SCC 17 which focused on the analysis of the third criterion – whether detention is necessary in the public interest. It is the third criterion which proved to be the contentious issue on this application.

[12] I turn now to consider whether Mr. Munro has discharged the burden to obtain bail pending appeal under s. 679(3) of the *Code*.

Analysis

Section 679(3)(a) – Appeal not Frivolous

[13] The first criterion requires Mr. Munro establish his appeal is not frivolous. The threshold is low.[3] Mr. Munro will establish this element "if the proposed grounds of appeal raise arguable issues". He must be able to point to "a viable ground of appeal that would warrant appellate intervention if established".[4]

[14] Mr. Munro provided an extensive Notice of Appeal supported by detailed written and oral argument on his grounds of appeal. The Crown concedes this low threshold has been met. I agree.

Section 679(3)(b) – Surrender as Required

[15] The second statutory consideration is whether Mr. Munro will surrender into custody as required by the Court. I must be satisfied that he is not a flight risk.[5] As argued by the Crown, there are various factors relevant to the assessment of this criterion: (1) the applicant's criminal record, (2) a history of breaches or non-

---

[2] *R. v. Oland*, 2017 SCC 17 at para. 19 [*Oland*].
[3] *Oland* at para. 20.
[4] *R. v. Tang*, 2017 ONCA 775 at para. 7.
[5] *Oland* at para. 21.

compliance with court orders, (3) behaviour while on bail pending trial, (4) means of support, (5) connection to the community, (6) the plan for release, and (7) the length of the sentence imposed which could tempt the applicant to abscond.

[16] Mr. Munro said that he would surrender as required and argued there was no risk of flight. His sureties testified to ensuring this requirement will be met. The Crown submitted the evidence presented lingering concerns that could be alleviated by a sufficient release plan. One of the concerns raised was the lack of detail as to how the proposed sureties would provide the required level of supervision.

[17] Mr. Munro is a dual citizen of Canada and the United States. He also has past work and personal connections to Guatemala. He has already deposited his passports with the Provincial Court of Nova Scotia. He does not have particularly strong ties to Nova Scotia – he has no regular employment, nor does he own property or other assets tying him to the jurisdiction. In the past he has travelled to and been employed in other countries. He has been living in Halifax since 2017, working for himself doing painting and carpentry work.

[18] Mr. Munro is not married and has no children. He says he has good relationships with his extended family. His parents divorced in 1998 but maintain a good relationship, cooperating to ensure compliance with his previous release order. His father and brother live locally, and he has regular contact with them. Since 2020, Mr. Munro has lived with his mother in an apartment in Halifax.

[19] The evidence of both Mr. Munro and his mother displayed a close and mutually supportive relationship. In their current residence they are both named on the lease. Prior to being charged, Mr. Munro was working and contributing to the rent and expenses. Since August 22, 2025, he has been largely confined to their shared residence. He has supported his mother by cooking, cleaning and displaying strict compliance with his conditions. She supported him as his surety and by providing close supervision. Mr. Munro's testimony at the hearing indicated a strong emotional connection to his mother. He acknowledged that his father was also emotionally and financially supportive.

[20] Mr. Munro has no criminal record aside from the conviction under appeal. However, the length of the sentence imposed is significant, especially as his first experience with incarceration. More significant to this application are allegations he breached his release undertaking on six occasions between June 28, 2024 and June 24, 2025. The breach charges are scheduled for trial in January of 2027 and

Mr. Munroe is presumed innocent. After being arrested on those charges, Mr. Munro was released under an order obligating him to house arrest with his mother as a residential surety with both his parents acting as financial sureties. There is no evidence of non-compliance since his parents have been providing supervision.

[21] The evidence provided by Mr. Munro indicated a commitment to compliance with his conditions, an understanding of the consequences of non-compliance, and a desire to avoid putting either of his parents in jeopardy. In my view, the risk of flight is low, and any concerns alleviated by the requirement Mr. Munro reside with his mother under house arrest conditions. I am satisfied both Mr. Munro and his mother appreciated the requirement for strict compliance with all conditions including the requirement to surrender prior to the decision on his appeal.

[22] I am not satisfied with any plan that does not involve Mr. Munro's mother as the residential surety. During the bail hearing, she testified she may be required to leave the country at some point to care for a family member with a serious illness. If this happens, she proposed Mr. Munro's father would take her place, living in her home and supervising in her absence. However, Mr. Munro's father did not readily accept this responsibility. He indicated he was prepared to increase his contact with his son by phone and visit him more frequently if his former wife had to leave the country. When pressed, he said he would live with his son if required. My impression was this offer was made with reluctance. I am not satisfied he would be a suitable alternative to Mr. Munro's mother as a residential surety. My view on this point is based on the release plan proposed at the bail hearing. I express no view on any contingent plan as none was formally presented.

Section 679(3)(c) – Public Interest

[23] The final criterion requires Mr. Munro to establish his detention is not necessary in the public interest. For this purpose, the public interest has two components: (1) public safety, and (2) public confidence in the administration of justice.[6] The first component requires an assessment of risk to the public. Put another way, the inquiry is whether Mr. Munro will commit further offences or pose a risk to others or to the administration of justice if he is released pending his appeal.[7]

---

[6] *R. v. Farinacci* (1993), 86 C.C.C. (3d) 32 (Ont. C.A.) at pp. 47-48 [*Farinacci*].
[7] *R. v. Forcillo*, 2016 ONCA 606 at para. 10.

[24] The second component requires weighing two competing interests: enforceability and reviewability. Public confidence in the administration of justice is enhanced by enforcing judgments and correcting errors. The tension between these principles must be balanced in the public interest. As recognized in *Oland*, this public interest framework has withstood the test of time and remains good law.[8] Further to this point, Justice Moldaver cautioned against viewing public safety and public confidence as discrete considerations.[9] In *R. v. LeBlanc*, Justice Bourgeois reviewed the elements of public confidence as well as the objective nature of the balancing exercise:

> [9] In considering the enforceability interest, the seriousness of the crime, including the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offence, is central. However, other factors can be taken into account where appropriate. "Public safety concerns that fall short of the substantial risk mark—which would preclude a release order—will remain relevant under the public confidence component" (*Oland* at para. 39).
>
> [10] The reviewability interest engages a consideration of the strength of the grounds of appeal. Justice Moldaver explained:
>
>> [45] In the end, appellate judges can be counted on to form their own "preliminary assessment" of the strength of an appeal based upon their knowledge and experience. This assessment, it should be emphasized, is not a matter of guesswork. It will generally be based on material that counsel have provided, including aspects of the record that are pertinent to the grounds of appeal raised, along with relevant authorities. In undertaking this exercise, appellate judges will of course remain mindful that our justice system is not infallible and that a meaningful review process is essential to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice. Thus, there is a broader public interest in reviewability that transcends an individual's interest in any given case.
>
> [11] In balancing the two competing factors, appellate judges "should keep in mind that public confidence is to be measured through the eyes of a reasonable member of the public. This person is someone who is thoughtful, dispassionate, informed of the circumstances of the case and respectful of society's fundamental values" (*Oland* at para. 47).

[25] The Crown raised a general concern under the public interest criterion about the bail plan presented by Mr. Munro: whether the proposed sureties would be providing a level of supervision that could alleviate concerns about public safety both as its own issue and as part of the assessment of public confidence. In the

---

[8] *Oland* at para. 26.
[9] *Oland* at para. 27 and *R. v. LeBlanc*, 2021 NSCA 89 at para. 8.

Crown's view, Mr. Munro's parents are "well-meaning and supportive" but do not offer a satisfactory level of supervision nor promise amounts sufficient to seriously bind them to their responsibilities. In the Crown's submission, the bail plan "isn't quite there" in terms of alleviating the risks and concerns.

[26] In reply, Mr. Munro relied principally on two points: (1) the restrictive nature of the conditions he proposes, and (2) the track record of compliance with his parents as his sureties. These considerations operate together to alleviate risk and allay concerns. As counsel for Mr. Munro argued, the only way to eliminate all risk is detention. I recognize, as did the court in *Oland*, that Parliament did not eliminate bail categorically for certain offenders or offences. The circumstances of each case must be considered against the criteria.[10]

[27] In terms of the assessing the public interest criterion, I must address each of the two components.

[28] First, in terms of public safety and protection, Mr. Munro has no previous criminal record. He has pending breach charges which present a concern. This is alleviated to some degree by the fact Mr. Munro has been compliant with the very strict conditions of the release order made after his arrest on the breach charges. His bail plan pending appeal is to continue the same conditions, with the same sureties, pledging additional amounts. I agree with the Crown that the level of assurance in Mr. Munro's plan is grounded firmly in the commitment of the sureties. If Mr. Munro abides by the proposed conditions, the public safety risk is low as he would be confined to his residence except in limited circumstances and then only in the presence of one of his two sureties.

[29] The second public interest component involves balancing enforceability with reviewability to ensure public confidence in the administration of justice. Underscoring the enforceability side of the equation, Mr. Munro has been convicted of a serious offence with a high degree of moral culpability. It is without question that sexual offences against children are especially grave.[11] The serious nature of the offence makes enforceability a weighty consideration in this case.

[30] Maintaining public confidence recognizes that our justice system is not infallible and meaningful review is an essential aspect of its integrity. On the reviewability side of the scale, I must assess the strength of the appeal. The assessment is not a determination of the "prospects of success" but rather a

---

[10] *Oland* at para. 66.
[11] *R. v. Freisen*, 2020 SCC 9 at paras. 5, 51, 63, 64 and 76, and *R. v. W.B.G.*, 2023 NSCA 49 at paras. 45-47.

"preliminary assessment" of legal plausibility of the grounds of appeal based on the record, counsel's arguments and the authorities provided.[12] The inquiry is whether the grounds of appeal "clearly surpass the minimal standard required" under s. 679(3)(a).[13]

[31] On this point, the Crown concedes some of the grounds of appeal clearly surpass the "not frivolous" standard. I agree with this assessment. Although the trial judge is entitled to deferential review of his credibility assessment, arguable grounds have been raised. In terms of the final balancing, it was observed in *Oland*:

> [50] … where the applicant has been convicted of murder or some other very serious crime, the public interest in enforceability will be high and will often outweigh the reviewability interest, particularly where there are lingering public safety or flight concerns and/or the grounds of appeal appear to be weak: *R. v. Mapara*, 2001 BCCA 508, 158 C.C.C. (3d) 312, at para. 38; *Baltovich*, at para. 20; *Parsons*, at para. 44.
>
> [51] On the other hand, where public safety or flight concerns are negligible, and where the grounds of appeal clearly surpass the "not frivolous" criterion, the public interest in reviewability may well overshadow the enforceability interest, even in the case of murder or other very serious offences.

[32] With this guidance, I am of the view the balancing exercise in this case favours reviewability provided Mr. Munro has suitable sureties providing adequate supervision of compliance with his conditions. Adequate supervision by suitable sureties is relevant to whether a reasonable member of the public would have confidence in the administration of justice.

Assessing the Proposed Sureties

[33] The evidence of both Mr. Munro's mother and father displayed a close bond and supportive relationship between parent and adult child. I find both parents are trustworthy, honest, intelligent and responsible people who love their son and wish to assist him. In assessing their suitability, I take guidance from the reasons of Hoskins, J. in *R. v. Aylward*, 2023 NSSC 68, citing Justice Trotter in *The Law of Bail in Canada* (3rd Edition) at 7:3, at p. 7-19 and specifically Justice Hoskins' discussion of the role of the modern surety:

---

[12] *Oland* at paras. 44-45.
[13] *Oland* at para. 44.

> [48] … today sureties are required to take on a much greater role in the supervision and/or monitoring of the accused in the community. Sureties are responsible for ensuring that the accused complies with all of the conditions of release. They are seen as the eyes and ears of the Court. Consequently, it is critical in managing risk to ensure that the surety has the ability to act as an appropriate and effective surety. In order for a surety to be effective, he or she must be generally concerned of the prospect of forfeiture should the accused breach a condition of release. An effective surety possesses strong moral characteristics, including being conscious of taking the appropriate action if required while being concerned for the welfare of the accused person. On the other hand, the accused person must understand and appreciate the real risk of loss to the surety should there be a breach of a condition of release. This requires the accused person to possess a genuine concern for placing the surety's property in jeopardy coupled with a concern of breaching the trust reposed in him or her by the surety, the Court, and the public. All of this concern is meant to bind the conscience of the accused person to ensure that he or she complies with the conditions of release.

[34] I find both Mr. Munro’s parents are appropriate sureties. I am further satisfied Mr. Munro understands their jeopardy as his supervisors and is sufficiently motivated by the risk of forfeiture to meaningfully bind him to the strict conditions of his proposed release. As I understand the Crown submission, the issue is with their ability to effectively supervise Mr. Munro’s compliance. Their level of supervision is critical to the adequacy of Mr. Munro’s bail plan.

[35] Mr. Munro’s father has been a lawyer for 40 years and is now semi-retired. He has a modest income but has accumulated assets over his long career including real property and savings. He resides in the local area and has regular contact with his son. He offered a promise to pay up to $15,000. While this initially appeared to be an insufficient amount, the evidence established he was also responsible for Mr. Munro’s legal fees. With this context, I find his pledge more significant. I also recognize Mr. Munro’s father is a member of the Bar with a clear understanding of his risk and responsibility as surety. Arguably, his jeopardy is more than financial. In terms of his level of supervision, I find it sufficient as a supplement to Mr. Munro’s mother but not as substitute.

[36] Mr. Munro’s mother is a semi-retired seamstress with a modest income. She is a meditation instructor and end of life coach. She operates her own business from home. She also works outside the home for 2-3 hours every other day. Since she and Mr. Munro began living in the same apartment, they have spent a lot of time together and remain close. Neither refer to any disputes which could undermine their living arrangements. I am satisfied Mr. Munro’s mother

understood her responsibility going forward and would be consistently available as an effective supervisor.[14] She testified to having very modest savings and offered to pledge the amount of $2,000. This is in addition to the amount pledged under Mr. Munro's previous release order. I am satisfied losing the money she pledged would impact her in a significant way.

[37] The concern arising from the evidence of Mr. Munro's mother was the prospect of her being called away to care for her ailing family member. In my view, Mr. Munro's bail plan hinged on his mother's availability as the residential supervisor. In her absence, the present bail plan is not adequate.

Conclusion

[38] As I indicated at the conclusion of the bail hearing, Mr. Munro's motion for bail pending appeal was granted on conditions which were incorporated into his release order and are attached as an appendix to this decision. The release conditions require his mother to be available as his residential surety and for him to be bound to strict house arrest at their residence. His release is also conditional upon Mr. Munro's promise to pay the amount of $10,000 along with his mother's pledge in the amount of $2,000 and his father's of $15,000 for a total of $17,000.

[39] I find Mr. Munro's release on these conditions satisfies a reasonable and well-informed, dispassionate and thoughtful member of the public, fully apprised of all the circumstances, that his detention pending appeal is not necessary in the public interest.

Gogan, J.A.

APPENDIX

AND IT IS ORDERED that he abide by the following conditions of release:

(a) Keep the peace and be of good behaviour;

(b) Remain within the Province of Nova Scotia;

(c) Attend court as and when directed;

(d) Reside with surety Deborah Luscomb at 5841 Point Pleasant Drive, Apartment 1, Halifax, Nova Scotia, unless permission to reside elsewhere is obtained from the court;

---

[14] The Crown asserted she may be overly invested in the outcome of the proceedings as a potential witness and therefore an ineffective monitor relying on *R. v. Aylward*, 2023 NSSC 68 at para. 54. I found the circumstances in *Aylward* distinguishable and the evidence persuasive that she understood her responsibility to supervise Mr. Munro's compliance.

(e) Have no direct or indirect contact or communication with xxxxxxxxxx, except through counsel;

(f) Do not attend a public park or public swimming area where persons under the age of 16 years are present or can reasonably be expected to be present, or a daycare centre, schoolground, playground or community centre;

(g) Do not be within two kilometers of any place of residence, education or employment of xxxxxxxxxx;

(h) Do not seek, obtain or continue any employment, whether or not the employment is remunerated, or become or be a volunteer in a capacity, that involves being in a position of trust or authority towards persons under the age of 16 years;

(i) Do not possess any firearm, cross-bow, prohibited weapon, restricted weapon, prohibited device, ammunition, or explosive substance;

(j) Deposit all his passports with the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal unless his passports are being held by another court. If his passports are returned to him from another court, deposit all his passports with the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal within 2 business days of receiving them;

(k) Do not make any applications for passport renewal;

(l) Do not have any contact or communication, directly or indirectly, with, nor be in the presence of, any person known to be, or who reasonably appears to be, under the age of 18 years of age, except while in the immediate physical presence of either of the sureties and, in the case of a young person under 16 years of age, only with the consent of the young person's parent or legal guardian;

(m) Remain in his residence, except:

(i) when dealing with a medical emergency or attending a medical appointment involving you and while in the physical presence of either surety;

(ii) when attending a scheduled appointment with counsel, supervisor, or probation officer, and when travelling to and from the appointment by direct route and while in the physical presence of either surety; and

(iii) (when attending court at a scheduled appearance or when under subpoena, and when travelling to and from court by a direct route, and while in the physical presence of either surety,

so long as the surety accompanying you has a cellular telephone with them that has the telephone number 902-403-7590 or 902-789-6842;

(n) Prove compliance with house arrest by presenting at the entrance of the residence should a peace officer attend to check on compliance; and

(o) Turn himself into custody of the keeper of the Springhill Institution, in Springhill, Nova Scotia, by one o'clock (1:00 p.m.) in the afternoon on the day preceding the day on which the appeal decision will be released, and that he will be advised at least twenty-four (24) hours before the time by which he must surrender into custody at the

Springhill Institution. In the event that the appeal is sooner dismissed, quashed, or abandoned, he shall surrender into the custody of the keeper at Springhill Institution, in Springhill, Nova Scotia, within twenty-four (24) hours of the filing with the Registrar of this Court of the Order dismissing or quashing the appeal or the Notice of Abandonment of the appeal, as the case may be.