Court of Appeal

Decision Information

Decision Content

                                                                                                                  Docket No.: CA 162073

           Date:  20000517

 

                                        NOVA SCOTIA COURT OF APPEAL

                      [Cite as: Nova Scotia (Education and Culture) v. Nova Scotia

                        Teachers' Union, 2000 NSCA 66]

                                                                             

                                             Flinn, Chipman and Cromwell, JJ.A.

                                                             

 

BETWEEN:

 

 

THE MINISTER OF EDUCATION AND CULTURE

 

Appellant    

 

- and -

                                                                                   

 

NOVA SCOTIA TEACHERS' UNION

 

Respondent

 

 

_____________________________________________________________________

 

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

_____________________________________________________________________

 

 

 

Counsel:                                 Eric Durnford, Q.C. for the appellant

Lorraine Lafferty for the respondent

 

Appeal Heard:                       May 17, 2000 

 

Judgment Delivered:            May 17, 2000   

 

THE COURT:                         Appeal dismissed, per oral reasons for judgment of Flinn, J.A., Chipman and Cromwell, JJ.A. concurring.


Flinn, J.A.: (Orally)

 

[1]              We are in agreement with Justice Davison's conclusion that arbitrator Christie was correct in allowing the respondent's grievance, and in deciding that the main issue in this arbitration was settled by the majority judgment of this court in QE 11 Health Sciences Centre v. Nova Scotia Government Employees Union (1998), 166 N.S.R. (2d) 194.

 

[2]              Both arbitrator Christie and Justice Davison gave detailed reasons and it is therefore not necessary to set out the facts and relevant statutory provisions here.

 

[3]              The Public Sector Compensation (1994-1997) Act ("the legislation") clearly cancelled salary increments that would otherwise have accrued as a result of the length of time of employment between May 1, 1994 and April 30, 1995. However, the legislation did not alter nor have any effect on the number of years of experience which employed teachers acquire. Unlike the situations in Parliament v. Canada (1988), 20 F.T.R. 126 and Tremblay v. Canada, [1999] F.C.J. No. 719, decided under federal public sector agreements and legislation, the collective agreement here provides for increments to be paid on the basis of actual years of service. The legislation extended collective agreements to November 1, 1997, that is, one day after the freeze imposed by the legislation had come to an end. As Justice Freeman said in QE 11 at para. 69:

 


It would not be unreasonable to conclude that the legislators in 1994, intended that the original pay rates had been restored to the collective agreements before they expired.  This interpretation is sufficiently obvious that, if it was not intended, it should have been averted by appropriate language.

 

 

[4]              The majority of this court decided in QE 11 that the legislation "was not intended to have any lingering effect" beyond October 31, 1997 (the last date of the period covered by the legislation). Therefore, salary increments due to the teachers under the collective agreement, after October 31, 1997, and based on years of experience, are not affected by the legislation.

 

[5]              To accept the position advanced by the appellant is tantamount to saying that for the purpose of determining experienced based salary increments for teachers, after the wage restraint period covered by the legislation has expired, an employed teacher is deemed to have one year less of teaching experience than he or she actually has. That interpretation gives a lingering effect to the legislation which it was never intended to have.

 

[6]              In our view, section 23 of the Interpretation Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 235 does not assist the appellant. As mentioned, the Parliament and Tremblay cases are readily distinguishable. As regards the other aspects of the case, we are in substantial agreement with the reasons of arbitrator Christie.

 

 

 


[7]              The appeal is, therefore, dismissed. The appellant will pay to the respondent its costs of this appeal which are fixed at $1,000.00 inclusive of disbursements.

 

 

Flinn, J.A.

 

Concurred in:

Chipman, J.A.

Cromwell, J.A.

 

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