Citation: R. v. Collins, 2006 NSCA 12
Date: 20060202
Docket: CAC 246815
Registry: Halifax
Between:
Richard Collins
Appellant
v.
Her Majesty the Queen
Respondent
Judge(s): MacDonald, C.J.N.S.; Cromwell and Hamilton, JJ.A.
Appeal Heard: February 2, 2006, in Halifax, Nova Scotia
Written Judgment: February 8, 2006
Held: Appeal dismissed per oral reasons for judgment of MacDonald, C.J.N.S.; Cromwell and Hamilton, JJ.A. concurring.
Counsel: Michael J. O’Hara, for the appellant
William D. Delaney, for the respondent
Reasons for judgment:
[1] The appellant was convicted in Provincial Court for failing to stop for a school bus exhibiting flashing red lights. The Crown’s case at trial was quite simple. The bus driver and another witness confirmed that Mr. Collins on the date and place allegedly drove past the school bus while its red flashing lights were engaged. Mr. Collins, self-represented at the time, offered no defence except to suggest that he was not feeling well and that as a result his judgement was off.
[2] Following his conviction, Mr. Collins retained counsel and appealed to Supreme Court Justice Gregory Warner, sitting as a Summary Conviction Appeal Court. There, Mr. Collins raised a technical argument concerning the relevant provisions of the Motor Vehicle Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 293 which are:
2 In this Act, ...
(bi) "school bus" means a school bus as defined in the Motor Carrier Act and includes a school bus marked or designated as such as provided by regulation;
. . .
103. (3) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the driver of a vehicle shall stop the vehicle before passing a school bus that is exhibiting flashing red lights and is stopped on or near a highway and shall remain stopped until the school bus proceeds.
. . .
(5) For the purpose of subsections (3) and (4), "exhibiting flashing red lights" and "exhibits flashing amber lights" have the meaning determined by the Governor in Council by regulation
[3] Essentially before Justice Warner, Mr. Collins argued that by virtue of s. 103(5), a conviction could not be sustained without a regulation defining the phrase “exhibiting flashing red lights”. To date, no regulation specifically referencing s. 103(5) has been enacted.
[4] Justice Warner accepted the appellant’s premise concerning the requisite regulation as contemplated by s. 103(5). However, in dismissing the appeal, the Summary Conviction Appeal Court judge found that the required provision did in fact exist by virtue of regulations under the Motor Vehicle Act and the Motor Carrier Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 292. The judge reasoned:
[15] The essence of this argument is that: (a) none of the above regulations were prescribed under s 103(5), and (b) none of them define the term “exhibiting flashing red lights”; therefore, since there is no definition of that term in a regulation, and the duty under s. 103(3) is dependent upon the existence of a regulation that defines the term, there is no duty to stop for a school bus. The appellant cited, in support of this position, the British Columbia Supreme Court decision in R. v. Jensen, 1994 CarswellBC 2599.
[16] The Appellant submits that the regulation prescribed under s. 200 of the Motor Vehicle Act (incorporating the CSA standards for school buses) is not applicable for two reasons:
(a) It is not a regulation prescribed under s. 103(5) and
(b) It does not define the term “exhibiting flashing red lights”.
[16] Section 200 is the general section of the [Motor Vehicle] Act authorizing the making of regulations, including regulations respecting the use and incorporation of equipment on vehicles that relate to the safety of persons and the safe operation of vehicles. A regulation prescribed under s. 200 is a regulation for the purposes of s. 103(5). Secondly, the term “exhibiting flashing red lights”, both by its plain meaning ( ordinary dictionary definition) and read remedially - which is the manner in which all statutes are required to be read - means “ showing flashing red lights” and the Equipment Approval Regulations clearly prescribe the standards and specifications for showing red warning lights on school buses.
[17] The appellant further argues that the regulations under the Motor Carrier Act cannot be considered as regulations referred to in s. 103(5) of the Motor Vehicle Act. The Court disagrees. The definition of a school bus in the Motor Vehicle Act explicitly incorporates the definition contained in the Motor Carrier Act and incorporates, by reference, the provisions of the Motor Carrier Act. There is nothing in s. 103(5) that limits a relevant regulation prescribed by Governor in Council only to a regulation promulgated under s. 103(5) of the Motor Vehicle Act or to the Motor Vehicle Act itself.
[5] While we would dismiss the appeal, respectfully, we would do so for different reasons.
[6] Section 103(3), standing alone, contains everyday language to explain a straightforward event. There is nothing complicated about the concept of a school bus exhibiting its red flashing lights. At the same time we acknowledge that s. 103(5) allows for two possible interpretations. On one hand, as the appellant proposes, it could be seen as inextricably linked to s. 103(3). In other words, without the contemplated regulation, there could never be a successful prosecution under s. 103(3). On the other hand, s. 103(5) could be seen as simply accommodating a regulation that, when passed, would provide a specific definition to compliment s. 103(3). Respectfully, we prefer this latter interpretation which would preserve the plain language of s. 103(3). It is not reasonable to interpret s.103(5) as vitiating an otherwise unambiguous offence (as it had been since it was introduced into the statute in 1969 without reference to any delegated power to define the term) because of a contemplated regulation as yet to be enacted. In other words, the appellant’s proposed interpretation would lead to an absurdity; something our rules of statutory interpretation are designed to avoid. See Sullivan, Sullivan and Driedger on the Construction of Statutes, Markham: Butterworths (2002) at 251-255, and Morgentaler v. The Queen, (1975) 20 C.C.C. (2d) 449, at 495 and 496.
[7] For these reasons, we would grant leave but dismiss the appeal.
MacDonald, C.J.N.S.
Concurred in:
Cromwell, J.A.
Hamilton, J.A.