Cite as: Canadian Surety Company v. Pentagon Investments Ltd., 1992 NSCA 54 
   S.C.A. 
   No. 02649 
   IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NOVA SCOTIA 
   APPEAL DIVISION 
   BETWEEN: 
   THE CANADIAN SURETY COMPANY 
   1 
   Scott C. Norton 
   1 
   for the Appellant 
   Appellant 
   1 
   1 
   - and - 
   1 
   E. J. Flinn, Q.C. 
   1 
   for the Respondent 
   PENTAGON INVESTMENTS LTD. 
   1 
   1 
   Respondent 
   1 
   Application Heard: 
   1 
   April 23, 1992 
   Judgment Delivered: 
   May 4, 1992 
   BEFORE THE HONOURABLE CHIEF JUSTICE CLARKE. IN CHAMBERS 
  
 
 
   CLARKE, C.J.NS.: 
   This is an application for a stay of execution pursuant to Civil Procedure 
   Rule 62.10(2) which provides: 
   " 
   A 
   Judge on application of a party t o an appeal may, 
   pending 
   disposition o f the appeal, order stayed the execution of any judgment 
   appealed from or o f any judgment or proceedings o f or before a magistrate 
   or tribunal which is being reviewed on an appeal under Rules 56 or 58 
   or otherwise." 
   The appellant, Canadian Surety, i s the insurer o f the respondent, Pentagon. 
   Following three fires which occurred on the property o f Pentagon in November, 
   1987, it (the insured) commenced an action against Canadian Surety (the insurer) 
   by which i t claimed the proceeds of a policy o f f i re insurance. 
   Mr. Justice Goodfellow, after the trial, found for Pentagon. 
   His decision 
   is dated November 22, 
   1991 and the order for judgment arising therefrom is dated 
   February 13, 
   1992. 
   The tr ial judge's reasons for judgment are reported in (19921, 
   108 N.S.R. 
   (2d) 148. 
   The judgment at tr ial provides for the replacement cost o f the buildings 
   to Pentagon upon their reconstruction in accordance with the terms o f the insurance 
   policy. 
   This is an amount slightly in excess of $1,500,000.00. 
   In addition, it provides 
   for the payment by Canadian Surety to Pentagon for loss o f equipment, supplies, 
   rental income and prejudgment interest which the parties have agreed is $1 50,242.52. 
   It is this latter sum that is the subject of this application. 
   Canadian Surety is appealing the decision of the tr ial judge. 
   It contends 
   that if it is successful in its appeal, it may not be able to recover $150,242.52 
   from 
   Pentagon due to i ts financial position. 
   Canadian Surety has offered to place the 
   sum in an interest bearing trust account for the benefit o f Pentagon pending the 
   outcome of the appeal or in the alternative, to review other proposals for securing 
   the payment. 
   None of these proposals are acceptable to Pentagon; hence, 
   this 
   application by Canadian Surety seeking to stay the execution of the judgment. 
  
 
 
   Counsel agree that the principles applicable to this application are those 
   set forth by Mr. Justice Hallett, of this court, in F u l t m Insurance Agencies Ltd. 
   v. Purdy (1990). 100 N.S.R. 
   (2dl 341, and in particular at pages 346 and 347: 
   " 
   A review o f the cases indicates there is a trend towards applying 
   what 
   is in effect the American Cyanamid test for an interlocutory 
   injunction in considering 
   applications 
   for stays o f execution pending 
   appeal. 
   In my opinion, it is a proper test as it puts a fairly heavy burden 
   on the appellant which 
   is warranted on a stay application considering 
   the nature o f the remedy which prevents a litigant from realizing the 
   fruits o f his litigation pending the hearing o f the appeal. 
   In my opinion, stays o f execution of judgment pending disposition 
   of the appeal should only be granted if the appellant can either: 
   (11 
   satisfy the Court on each o f the following: 
   ( i l that there 
   is an arguable issue raised on the appeal; ( i i l that if the stay is 
   not granted and the appeal is successful, the appellant w i l l have 
   suffered irreparable harm that it is dif f icult to, 
   or cannot be 
   compensated for by a damage award. 
   This involves not only the 
   theoretical consideration whether the harm is susceptible of being 
   compensated in damages but also whether if the successful party 
   at tr ial has executed on the appellant's property, whether or not 
   the appellant if successful on appeal w i l l be able to collect, and 
   ( i i i l that the appellant w i l l suffer greater harm if the stay is not 
   granted than the respondent would suffer if the stay is granted; 
   the so-called balance of convenience or: 
   (21 
   failing t o meet the primary test, satisfy the Court that there 
   are exceptional circumstances that would make it fit and just that 
   the stay be granted in the case." 
   1. 
   Arguable issue 
   The appellant is advancing three grounds o f appeal: 
   "(a) the Trial Judge erred in failing to find on the evidence before him 
   that 
   the 
   Respondent 
   breached 
   Statutory 
   Condition 
   4 
   of 
   the 
   Appellant's 
   Policy o f Insurance in that the Respondent failed to 
   promptly notify the Appellant of changes material to the risk and 
   in the manner in which the Learned Trial Judge characterized the 
   test 
   for determining 
   whether 
   there had been changes material 
   t o the risk; 
   (bl 
   the Trial Judge erred in failing to find on the evidence before him 
   that the Respondent breached Statutory Condition 7 o f the said 
   Policy in that the Respondent wilfully made false statements in 
   the sworn Proof o f Loss filed with the Appellant in respect of certain 
   materials and equipment alleged to have been lost in a f i re which 
   occurred on November 24, 1987; 
   (cl 
   the Trial Judge erred in failing t o find on the evidence before him 
   that the Respondent breached Statutory Condition 7 o f the said 
   Policy in that the Respondent intentionally damaged the premises 
   by arson." 
  
 
 
   A review of the decision of the Trial Judge reveals that he made strong 
   findings of fact against the appellant and upon his application of the law 
   concluded, without hesitation, 
   that Pentagon's claim succeeds. 
   However, it 
   is not for me t o decide the case on appeal. 
   After considering the documentation 
   before the Court which is naturally limited in an application of this type, I 
   am satisfied that the appellant is advancing serious and substantial grounds 
   o f appeal sufficient t o find that the appellant has met the burden on it of 
   satisfying the first test of the primary ground, namely that there are arguable 
   issues raised on the appeal. 
   For this reason, the appeal will go forward. 
   2. 
   Irreparable Harm 
   The position of the appellant 
   i s principally based upon the unaudited 
   financial statements of Pentagon dated December 
   31, 
   1987 which indicate 
   assets of $1 1,737,333.00 
   and liabilities o f $1 1,816,104.00 
   and a deficit of 
   $78,771.00 
   in shareholders' equity. 
   There is a net loss in the income statement 
   o f $374,000.00 (rounded] resulting in retained earnings decreasing from a positive 
   position in year 1986 to a negative position in year 1987. 
   Counsel says the 
   appellant has been unable to obtain any additional financial information, more 
   current than year end 1987. 
   The appellant further says that it knows o f no 
   reason why the respondent will be harmed if it does not recover i ts judgment 
   money now and that it has not been provided with any reasons by Pentagon 
   t o confirm that it requires the proceeds for any particular purpose. 
   Counsel o f the respondent submits that Pentagon is under no obligation 
   t o provide current financial statements to the appellant and that an application 
   for a stay is not the time or place t o make a minute examination of the financial 
   records o f the judgment creditor. 
   He informs the Court that there is no evidence 
   Pentagon i s in bankruptcy, that it is still in business, that it is not insolvent 
   and that there are no judgments registered against it. 
  
 
 
   The beginning point 
   i s that Pentagon i s entitled to the "fruit" of its 
   litigation and the onus 
   i s on Canadian Surety 
   to show 
   on a balance o f 
   probabilities that it w i l l suffer irreparable harm if it pays out the $150,000 
   awarded by the Court to Pentagon. 
   This is not a shifting burden. 
   As Mr. 
   Justice Freeman wrote in his decision dealing with a stay application in Anwar 
   Construction Limited et a1 v. 
   J. 
   R. 
   Phillips Electrics Limited et al, S.C.A. 
   02528, October 3, 
   1991, p. 4. 
   "... A judgment 
   creditor does not as a rule have to prove 
   i t s financial stability as 
   a condition of collecting on 
   i t s 
   judgment." 
   While the appellant is obviously concerned or otherwise it would not 
   have made this application, it has not shown that Pentagon i s insolvent nor 
   that it has ceased to continue i t s corporate existence and carry on the cond-uct 
   of its business and commercial purposes. 
   Pentagon suffered i t s f i re loss in 
   November, 1987 and a court of competent jurisdiction has decided it is entitled 
   to the award which i s the subject o f this application. 
   Four and one-half years 
   i s a long time to wait for recovery in the world of commerce. 
   In this instance 
   only partial recovery i s a t stake, pending the outcome of the appeal on the 
   broader issues. 
   On this ground, I find the appellant has not satisfied the primary test. 
   3. 
   Balance of Convenience 
   Based on Fulton, irreparable harm and balance of convenience are two 
   parts of the same primary principle upon which the appellant must satisfy 
   the Court if the stay is to be granted. 
   In spite of the assurances offered by 
   the appellant to set aside the money in an interest bearing account, and thereby 
   secure it, the respondent would continue t o be deprived o f the fund, to which 
   it is presently entitled, for a considerable time. 
  
 
 
   - 5 - 
   than those already considered under the primary test "that would make it f i t 
   and just that the stay be granted in this case." 
   Conclusion 
   The application is dismissed. 
   The appeal has been set down for hearing. 
   The 
   respondent is awarded costs on the application of $600.00 plus its disbursements. 
  
 
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