Cite as: Royal Bank of Canada v. Stinziano, 1970 NSCA 1 S. C. &.1 4809 IN lPIE SUESEW COURT OF NOVA SCOT1[A APLEAE DIVBIW 'BSE ROmL BANK OF CANAM, a Chartered Bank, App llant [ ~ l a i n tfff and - - Judgment Creditor 1 and Rea]ecr&ent [Defendant and Judwnt Debt or 1 - and - I L m N M. SMXTH, h a his capacity a8 Clerk of the Comty Court Judge 'a Crindna l Cotirt for District Number One Oarnishee The matter h e r ~ ,i n so far a s we art able to Betermine from the record bafore us, turn8 upon the special facts of this prticular case. involves no question of' l a w of general appUcation, a pronouncement upon which could assist the Court belaw; a t least no question of l a w has been specifloally referred to this Court for determination. thder section 25 (2) of The Judicature Act, 1950, i t would seem that a Judge of the Trial Division has a duty t o decltde all queetiour coming properly before him, bat he may reserve the case, or any polat In a case, far the consideratiom of the Appeal Dividon. A primary duw there - . fore rests witb the Judw of the Trial Division to try and decide the Sorues
- - -1 coming before h i m . If for good and eufflcient masons he i s unable t o discharge that primary duty and reserves the case, or any pzrt of the case, then tbis Court ahoulil have before it the reasons of the t r ia l Judge for so reserving the matter for the cansideration of t h i s Court. me record before us does not disclose any such reasme, nor does it s ta te any question or question8 far our conaideration: see Howard v. L-anc-ashi-re In surance Co., 14 N.S .R. 374. And although the reference i n t h i s caw was considered by our Appeal C o u r t before the passing of The JuBScature Act, the principle of practice applied there, i t seems t o ~PC, remaiae uaaltcrcd. re l a the unanimous oginion of the Court, therefore, that we have no power t o entertain the reference so made. The meter will be returned t o the learned Chambera Yudge. MmD a t Halifax, Nova Scotia, this 19th day of March,
You are being directed to the most recent version of the statute which may not be the version considered at the time of the judgment.