Cite as: Chebucto Ford Sales Ltd. v. MacIsaac, 1989 NSCO 4
•
PROVINCE OF NOVA SCOTIA
COUNTY OF HALIFAX
C.H. No. 63810
S.C.C.H. No. 15740
IN
THE
COUNTY
COURT
OF DISTRICT NUMBER ONE
Between:
CHEBUCTO FORD SALES LIMITED
Appellant
- and
J. D. MACISAAC
Respondent
Cameron R. Anderson, Esq., Counsel for the Appellant.
J. D.- Maclsaac, Q.C., appearing on his own behalf as Respondent.
1989,
Japuary
9th,
Palmeter,
C.J .C.C.:-
This
is an appeal
by
way of
Stated Case from a decision of Daniel B. Morrison, Q.C., an Adjudicator of the Small
Claims Court of Nova Scotia wherein he awarded the respondent claimant the sum
of $2,908.93 together with costs of $25.00.
The appellant
lists two grounds of appeal,
namely, erroneous
in
point
of law and a denial of natural justice.
The facts as found by the learned adjudicator
are set out in the Stated Case as follows:
1.
The
claimant,
J.
D.
Maclsaac,
resides
at
Halifax,
in
the County of Halifax.
2.
The defendant company, Chebucto Ford Sales Limited,
has a place of business in the City of Dartmouth, and at all
material times was engaged in the sale of new and used motor
vehicles.
3.
In
the
month
of
May,
1985
the claimant attended at
the
defer.dant's
place
of
business,
and
voiced
the
purpose
of his visit to the defendant's Sales Manager.
4.
The
Sales
Manager,
James
(Jim)
Connolly
on learning
that the claimant was interested in purchasing a new "pickup"
- 2
truck
as
a
means of transportation in getting to and from
his home and the cottage, directed the claimant to the "truck"
manager's area, and accompanied the claimant to the Sales
Manager's station
and
advised of the claimant's interest in
purchasing a new pickup truck.
5.
The claimant asserted to the sales person that he wanted
a truck with long life, economical to operate and dependable
-
The claimant and the sales person viewed various models
on display
and
the
features of the
models discussed
-
The
claimant was
the user of gasoline operated motor vehicles,
and to this end his interest in buying a "pickup" truck waE
a vehicle operated by gasoline.
6.
The claimant and the sales person engaged in a question
and answer conversation relative to the merits of the various
models viewed -
The primary concern of the claimant relative
to dependability, a long life free of major defects and economy
was stressed by the claimant -
These assertions of the claimant
led to the mention of the word "diesel", and which brought
a
quick retort from
the sales
manager to the effect "now
we are talking".
7.
The
claimant
was
not
experienced
in
the
operation
of a diesel pickup truck, and queried the sales person as to
its
dependability
and
economy
as
compared
to
a
gasoline
operated vehicle -
The purchase price for a "diesel" operated
pickup
truck
was
considerably
higher,
but
the
benefits
in
the long run outweighed the gasoline operated vehicle.
8.
The claimant liked what he heard, and relying on the
various assertions of the sales person decided that he would
buy a 1985 Ford Ranger (diesel) pickup truck.
9.
On
July
12,
1985
the claimant
purchased
a
1985
Ford
Ranger (diesel) pickup truck with "cap" at a cost of $13,687.lD
(Provincial
Tax
included.)
With
the
purchase
the claimant
received the basic warranty coverage.
lD.
The claimant was asked if he wished to purchase the
"extended
warranty
program"
and
he
replied
that
he
was
not
interested
in
the
program
as
he
had
the
"Consumer
Protection Act" as a warranty.
11.
The
claimant
operated
his
1985
Ford
Ranger
without
any major problems during the period of July 12, 1985 to January
I, 1988 -
During said period he had the Ford Ranger serviced
in
accordance
with
the
"manual's"
recommendations,
and
on December I, 1987 the claimant took the 1985 Ford Ranger
to the defendant's place of business for routine check, change
of oil and filter.
-
3
12.
On January 1, 1988 the claimant was operating his 1985
Ford
Ranger
Pickup,
and
was
headed
in
the
direction of
Windsor, in the County of Hants.
He noted that the vehicle
was
malfunctioning,
and
he
pulled over
to the side of the
road.
The motor would spin, but would not catch.
13.
The claimant's Ford Ranger was towed to the Defendant's
place of business with a request from the claimant to determine
the cause cf the "no start" -
To do so it was necessary to
disassemble the engine.
14.
The
findings
of
the
mechanics
associated
with
the
disassem bling of the engine revealed that the "cylinder head
and camshaft" and parts and materials in connection therewith
required replacement at a
probable cost of Three Thousand
Dollars ($3,000.00).
.
15.
The
claimant,
upon
learning
of
the
findings
of
the
Defendant's mechanics, voiced his concern to the Sales Manager
and
demanded
that
the
named
defendant
repair
the
Ford
Ranger at no cost to him.
16.
The
Sales
Manager
undertook to contact
management
of the defendant company as well as Ford Company of Canada
representatives
in
the
Atlantic area
-
A
couple of weeks
later the claimant was told that his "warranty" had expired,
and any repairs effected on the 1985 Ford Ranger would be
done at the expense of the claimant.
17.
The claimant elected to have the repairs
done at the
named defendant's place of business for the following reasons:
(a)
The claimant had an inoperative truck;
(b)
The
engine
of
the
1985
Ford
Ranger
was
disassembled;
(c)
The claimant had hopes that the defendant company
would
relent
in
its
stance
of hiding
behind
the
expired warranty, and show goodwill.
18.
The
defendant
company
repaired
the
claimant's
1985
Ford Ranger, and made it roadworthy at a cost of $2,908.93
to the claimant -
He paid the said amount under protest under
date of February 2, 1988.
19.
An
examination of the defective parts .removed
from
the
disassembled
engine
was
conducted
by
two technicians
of Ford Motor Company.
Their findings were to the effect
that
the
inspection
revealed
a
metal transfer
between
the
bearing surface cf the cylinder head and the camshaft.
The
technicians found that this would have caused the camshaft
- 4
to cease turning with the resultant engine stoppage, and it
appeared to them that the camshaft gear drive pin sheared
off -
The
probable
cause
as
far
as
the
technicians
could
determine was a lack of lubrication to the camshaft bearing
surface.
The technicians also noted that the camshaft showed
wear on the lobes which is consistent with a lack of adequate
lubrication.
20.
A
couple
of
months
later
the
claimant
was
heading
homeward, and noticed signs of engine heating -
The claimant
arranged to have the Ford Ranger towed to the Defendant's
place of business -
Repairs were effected to correct a "lube"
problem at a cost of $154.00.
21.
The
claimant,
unhappy
with
the
stance
taken
by
the
named defendant company, commenced proceedings in Small
Claims
Court
to
recover
the
sum
of
$2,908.93
from
the
Defendant Company.
22.
The defendant company did not file a Defence to the
claim of the claimant, and the matter came on for hearing
at Halifax on August 30, 1988.
23.
The claimant appeared in person, and on his own behalf.
He was supported by Gerald Mills, a former owner of transport
vehicles
and
heavy
machinery
covering
a
period
in excess
of Thirty-Five (35) years.
24.
At the request of the claimant Mr. Mills examined the
camshaft and noted the burned out bearing -
He attributed
the burned out bearing to oil starvation.
25.
Mr. Mills also pointed out that in his experience with
motor
vehicles
covering
a
period of Thirty-Five
(35)
years
it is unusual for a vehicle with mileage of 40,000 to break
down from
damage noted by him in his examination of the
parts removed by the defendant company from the 1985 Ford
Ranger Pickup Truck.
26.
The
defendant
company
appeared
through
Mr.
Arthur
MacDonald, Service Manager -
He has been in the automotive
repair business for a period of Twenty-Five (25) years -
He
inspected the parts taken from the disassem bled engine, and
in
his
opinion
the
parts
were
damaged
through
a
lack of ·
lubrication.
27.
The claimant contended at the hearing that he did not
get what he bargained for, namely, a motor vehicle envisaged
in the Consumer Protection Act.
28.
The claimant also contended that the 1985 Ford Ranger
was not of merchantable quality and durable for a reasonable
period of time.
- 5
29.
The claimant further contended that he relied on the
assertions and representations of the defendant's sales staff
to
the
effect
that
the
Ford
Ranger
(Diesel)
would
prove
dependable, and economical to operate.
30.
The defendant company contended that all motor vehicles
have
problems,
and that if the claimant wished to protect
himself from malfunctions occurring in his 1985 Ford Ranger
he should have purchased the "extended warranty" protection
plan.
31.
found
and
determined
on
a
review of the
evidence
as
a
whole
that
the
defendant
company
through
its
representatives
and
assertions
led
the
claimant
to
believe
that he was purchasing a "pickup" truck durable for its purposes,
and for a reasonable period of time.
32.
I further found and determined on the facts as adduced
that the 1985
Ford Ranger
was not abused or
misused -
It
was used as
a
means of travelling from
his cottage in the
Windsor area and his home in the City of Halifax.
33.
I
also
found
that
the
1985
Ford
Ranger
was
not of
"merchantable"
quality,
and
in
arriving at
such
finding
I
accepted the explanation of Mr. Gerald Mills that the damaged
parts did not result from normal wear.
34.
I determined and I so find, on the facts, that the claimant
relied on
the reliance given him that the Ford Ranger was
suitable to be driven without major defects, and I
inferred
such reliance from the circumstances of the sale.
35.
I
allowed
the claimant the sum of $2,908.93 together
with
costs
in
the
sum of Twenty-Five
($25.00),
and
which
said sum of $2,908.93 comprised the sum paid to the named
defendant covering repairs effected to the 1985 Ford Ranger.
At the request of counsel for the appellant the learned adjudicator stated
the following case for consideration by this court, namely:
1.
Did I err in finding that the Consumer Protection Act
R.S.N.S. 1967 applies to the claim of the claimant;
2.
Did I err in finding that the 1985 Ford Ranger (Diesel)
purchased
by
the claimant from
the
defendant
was not of
"merchantable" quality;
- 6
3.
Did
I
err
in
finding that the' claimant
relied on
the
assertions of the Sales Manager to the effect that the 1985
Ford Ranger (Diesel) would last him for a reasonable period
of time;
4.
Did I err in finding that the sale of the 1985 Ford Ranger
(Diesel) to the claimant was Expected to operate like a motor
vehicle, and that the defendant is liable to the claimant in
contract for the loss incurred by the claimant.
Dealing first with the submission by the appellant as to denial of justice
counsel states that the lec:rned adjudicator failed to consider the defence filed by
the appellant.
A
Defence was filed however the learned adjudicator in paragraph
22 of the Stated Case made the finding that the appellant had not filed a Defence.
However, on questioning by this court counsel for the appellant indicated that all
of the matters in the filed Defence had been placed before the learned adjudicator
and had been argued at the time of the hearing.
Under the circumstances I do not
find the appellant was denied natural justice merely because the adjudicator stated
no Defence was filed.
All matters in the Defence were placed before the adjudicator
at the hearing.
Dealing with
the
issues
as
outlined
by
the learned adjudicator.
First
of all did the adjud ;cator err in finding that the Comsumer Protection Act (the" Act")
applies to the claim of the respondent.
Section 20C(l) of the Act states as follows:
20CO)
"In this Section and Section 20D 'consumer sale' means
a contract of sale of goods or services including an agreement
of sale as well as a sale and a ccnditional sale of goods made
in
the
ordinary
course
of
business
to
a
purchaser
for
his
consumption or use but does not include a sale,
(a) to a purchaser for resale;
(b)
to
a
purchaser
whose
purchase
is
in the
cc·urse
of carrying on business;
(c)
to
an
association
of
individuals,
a
partnership
or a ccrporation; or
(d)
by
a trustee in bankruptcy, a
receiver, liquidator
or a person acting under the order of a court."
- 7
There is
no question that the appellant was engaged
motor vehicles.
The respondent purchased a
course of business" which is envisaged by the Act.
dealers.
The Act would definitely apply if the circumstances warrant and I would
answer the first question in the negative.
Secondly,
did
the
adjudicator
I=urchased by the respondent from the appellant was not of "merchantable" quality.
Section 20C(3)(h) of the of the Consumer Protection Act states:
"Notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, the following
conditions or warranties on the part of the seller are implied
in every consumf:r sale:
(h)
a
condition that the goods are of merchantable quality,
except for such defects as are described:"
The question to be determined is what is "merchantable". In my opinion this definition
is determined by the circumstances in each particular case.
I accept the definition of merchantable quality as accepted in the case
of Hardwick Game Farm v. Suffolk Agricultural and Poultry Producers Association,
[1969] 2 A.C., 31, [1968] 2 ALL E.R. 444 (H.L.);
" .•• the
goods
should
be
in
such
acquainted with the facts, and therefore knowing what hidden
defects exist and not being limited to their apparent condition
would
buy
them
obtainable
for
sound order and condition and without spEcial terms."
[Australian
Knitting
Mills
Ltd.
387, at p. 413.]
Ref:
Bristol Tramways Co., Ltd. v. Fiat Motors Ltd., [1910]
2 K.B. at p. 841.
Counsel for each party referred to The Sale of Goods (London: Pitman
Publishing Limited, 1975, 5th Ed.) by P.S. Atiyah.
in
the sale of new and used
motor vehicle.
This is the "ordinary
There is no exemption for car
err
in
finding
that
the
motor
vehicle
a
state that a
buyer,
fully
such goods
if
in
reasonable
v.
Grant
(1933),
50
C.L.R.
At p. 91, Professor Atiyah is quoted:
- 8
"It will
be apparent that the concept of merchantability
is
an extremely flexible ene, and
this flexibility
is
in
no way
restricted by the new statutory definition.
It does not seem
to be going too far to say that, in effect, the concept merely
requires
the goods
to
be
of
the sort of quality
reasonably
to
be
expected
having
regard
to all the circumstances
of
the case.
The new definition, far from
being, as definitions
frequently
are,
a
straight-jacket, turns out to
be
largely
a
non-definition;
it delegates to the Court the task of deciding
what is
reasonable and the circumstances of each particular
case,
guided
no
doubt
by
general
acceptance
of
what
reasonableness requires in various classes of cases."
This concept of merchantability is I suggest quite flexible and must be
defined by relationship to the circumstances of each particular case.
In the matter before me it is clear that the learned adjudicator accepted
the evidence of the witness Mills for the respondent that the damaged parts did
not result from normal wear and therefore concluded that the motor vehicle was
not of "merchantable quality".
There was evidence before the learned adjudicator
upon which he could make this finding.
I can find no error in his finding in this regard
and I would therefore answer the second question in the Stated Case in the negative.
The third question is
whether the respondent relied upon the assertions
of the Sales
Manager of the appellant that the motor
vehicle
would
last
for
a
reasonable
period of time.
Both parties agree that certain representations were
made by the Sales Manager and that the appellant relied upon them.
It is clear that
the sales manager knew the purposes for which the respondent required the motor
vehicle.
The appellant argues that the vehicle performed
properly for over two
and one half years for some 72,000
kilometers and that this
would constitute a
"reasonable period of time";
Section 20C(J)(j) of the Act states:
"Notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, the following
conditions or warranties on the part of the seller are implied
in every consumer sale:
(j) a condition that the goods shall be durable for a reasonable
period of time having regard to the use to which they would
-
9
normally
be
put
and
to all the
surrounding
circumstances
of the sale."
The evidence is clear and the learned adjudicator so found that the respondent used
the motor vehicle precisely in the manner described to the appellant and that the
motor vehicle was serviced by the respondent in accordance with the manufacturers
manual.
The appellant
makes a great deal of the fact that the problem arose
after the manufacturer's warrant period had elapsed and also that the respondent
did not purchase the "extended warranty plan" which was offered.
In my opinion
there is no magic in either the basic warranty or the extended warranty plan. If
the goods were in themselves not merchantable and durable for a reasonable period
of time the seller does not get off the hook by reason of ending of warranty or failure
to purchase an extended warranty plan.
Ba~ed on the facts as found by the learned adjudicator, 72,000 kilometers
or two and one half years or both is not in my opinion a reasonable period of time
having regard to the use to which the respondent waf putting the motor vehicle.
The respondent cites the case of Murrant v. Cross Investments Limited, 74 N.S.R.
(2d), 419, where the plaintiff purchased a new yacht and after one year of operation
the main mast broke.
Tidman, J. on finding that the defendant supplied a defective
mast and thereby committed a breach of s.
20C(3)(j) of the Consumer Protection
Act said at p. 429
"I
find
that
the
demasting
was
caused
by
an
improperly
constructed mast. It was not durable for a reasonable period
of time having regard to the use to which the boat would
normally be put.
I can find nothing in the evidence to indicate
that the boat's crew was responsible for the demasting.
They
were
in
my opinion using the
boat in a
way
a
boat would
normally be used."
In the case before me the learned adjudicator found that the appellant had supplied
a defective motor vehicle and thereby committed a breach of s.
20C(3)(j) of the
Act. I find no error in this finding and I would answer question three in the negative.
-
10
_ The
last
question
is
whether
the
learned adjudicator
erred
in
finding
that the motor vehicle sold to the respondent was expected to operate like a motor
vehicle and that the appellant was liable to the respondent in contract for the loss
incurred.
In
my opinion the learned adjudicator did not err and correctly awarded
the sum of $2,908.93 together with costs to the respondent.
In it's memorandum to this court the appellant states as follows:
"As
a
policy consideration,
the appellant asks
this court to
consider
the
ramifications
of
allowing
the
purchaser
of
a
motor vehicle to return to the dealer two and one half years
or 72,000 kilometers later to allege that a component defect
in the vehicle requires repair in view of the warranty systems
established
in
the
motor
vehicle
retail
industry
and
the
accepted practice of offering extended warranties to consumers
such as the claimant in this case."
1 do not consider this submission to have any credibility whatsoever.
The doctrines
of "merchantability" and "reasonably durable for the purpose" are flexible and must
be applied to the circumstances of each particular case.
In this case they were
applied
and
the appellant was
found
wanting.
On other circumstances the same
decision might not have been reached.
The practice cf offering extended warranties
in my opinion is not as "accepted" as the appellant would wish this court to believe,
A purchaser is still protected under the Consumer Protection Act, notwithstanding
any of these extended warranty plans offered by car dealers.
I have answered all questions
posed
by
the learned adjudicator in the
negative and I would accordingly dismiss the appeal.
As the respondent acted as
his own counsel I decline to award any costs.
A Judge of the County Court
of District Number One
You are being directed to the most recent version of the statute which may not be the version considered at the time of the judgment.