Provincial Court

Version française

 

PROVINCIAL COURT OF NOVA SCOTIA

Citation: R. v. LaPointe, 2023 NSPC 41

Date: 20230512

Docket:  8541639

Registry: Dartmouth

Between:

Sa Majesté le Roi/ His Majesty the King

 

v.

David LaPointe

 

Judge:	L’Honorable/ The Honourable Judge Theodore Tax,
Heard:	Le 25 novembre, 2022 et le 13 janvier, 2023/ November 25, 2022 and January 13, 2023, in Dartmouth, Nova Scotia
Decision	Le 12 mai, 2023/ May 12, 2023
Charge:	Sections 320.14(1)(a) and 320.14(1)(b) du Code Criminel du Canada/ of the Criminal Code of Canada
Counsel:	Nicholas Comeau, Pour le Service des poursuites publiques de la Nouvelle-Écosse/ for the Nova Scotia Public Prosecution Patrick Atherton, Pour l'Avocat de la défense/ for the Counsel for Defence

 

 

La Cour:

[1]             M. David LaPointe a été accusé d'avoir conduit un moyen de transport alors que ses facultés étaient affaiblies par l'alcool, en contravention de l'article 320.14 (1) (a) du Code criminel. Il a également été accusé d'avoir, dans les deux heures suivant la fin de la conduite d'un moyen de transport, un taux d'alcoolémie égal ou supérieur à 80 mg d'alcool par 100 ml de sang, contrairement à l'alinéa 320.14 (1) (b) du Code criminel. Les infractions auraient été commises le ou vers le 20 novembre 2021 à ou près de Halifax, en Nouvelle-Écosse.

[2]             La Couronne a procédé par voie de déclaration sommaire de culpabilité et, le 30 mai 2022, M. LaPointe a enregistré un plaidoyer de non-culpabilité à l'égard des accusations portées devant la Cour. Il a demandé, comme il en avait le droit, un procès en français et celui-ci a été fixé le 25 novembre 2022.

Introduction :

[3]             Le procès s’est déroulé le 25 novembre 2022, sur la base d’un aveu au procès conjoint selon l’article 655 du Code criminel. Suite à une conférence préparatoire au procès avec les parties le 21 juillet 2022, des plaidoiries sur la Charte ont été déposées par la Couronne et la Défense avant la date prévue pour le procès. La question en litige est de savoir si les policiers ont violé les droits de M. LaPointe en vertu de l’article 10 (b) de la Charte au cours de sa détention et, dans l’affirmative, si la preuve de l’échantillon d’haleine doit être exclue en vertu de l’article 24 (2) de la Charte.

[4]             Au cours du procès tenu le 25 novembre 2022, en plus de l’exposé conjoint des présentes en vertu de l’article 655 du Code criminel et déposé comme pièce numéro 1, la Couronne a présenté la pièce numéro 2, qui est une preuve audiovisuelle d’environ 30 minutes démontrant les policiers militaires arrêtent le véhicule conduit par M. LaPointe et leurs interactions avec lui.

[5]             Après le dépôt de ses pièces, le procureur de la Couronne a clos sa preuve et a invité la Cour à déclarer, M. LaPointe non coupable de la première accusation, soit d’avoir conduit un moyen de transport alors que sa capacite était affaiblie contrairement à l’alinéa 320.14 (1) (a) du Code criminel, car le procureur de la Couronne a fait remarquer que la preuve de cette infraction était insuffisante devant la Cour. Par conséquent, à la suite de cette déclaration et d’une demande de l’avocat de la défense, M. LaPointe a été déclaré non coupable de ce chef d’accusation.

[6]             Suite à cette décision, les parties ont indiqué à la Cour que la question en litige concernant le deuxième chef d’accusation allégué dans la dénonciation, à savoir l’accusation de conduite en violation de l’alinéa 320.14 (1) (b) du Code criminel, nécessite une décision de la Cour quant à savoir s’il y avait eu violation des droits de M. LaPointe en vertu de la Charte et si les résultats de l’analyse de l’échantillon d’haleine devaient être exclus.

[7]             L’exposé conjoint des faits a confirmé que M. LaPointe avait fourni deux (2) échantillons convenables de son haleine pour qu’ils soient analysés au moyen d’un alcootest approuvé, le premier résultat étant de 140 mg d’alcool par 100 ml de sang à 1 h 57 et le second, de 130 mg d’alcool par 100 ml de sang à 2 h 18, le 20 novembre 2021.

[8]             Par la suite, les parties ont ensuite présenté leurs plaidoiries finales sur la base de l’exposé des faits convenu et des preuves audiovisuelles diffusées au cours du procès. Au cours de ces plaidoiries, l’avocat de la défense a soutenu que les policiers n’avaient pas rempli ses obligations d’information en vertu de l’article 10 (b) de la Charte, étant donné que M. LaPointe avait déclaré qu’il souhaitait parler à un avocat et que l’avocat de son choix était un avocat qui parlait français. Il soutient que les agents de la police militaire ont également manqué à leurs obligations de l’exécution en lui disant seulement qu’il faudrait « un certain temps » pour trouver un avocat parlant français à cette heure tardive. Dans ces circonstances, par conséquent, le choix de M. LaPointe n’était pas entre un avocat parlant français et un avocat parlant anglais, mais plutôt entre un avocat parlant anglais ou pas d’avocat du tout.

[9]             Pour sa part, le procureur de la Couronne a plaidé par écrit, avant la date du procès, et dans ses observations orales du procès, que la défense n’avait pas établi qu’il y avait eu violation, en vertu de l’article 10 (b) de la Charte, du droit de M. LaPointe à l’information ou à la mise en œuvre de son droit de communiquer sans délai avec un avocat. M. LaPointe a été informé de ses droits et l’aide juridique a été contactée pour déterminer si un avocat parlant français pouvait être appelée. La question n’est pas de savoir si l’agent aurait pu faire plus, mais si le droit à l’assistance d’un avocat a été communiqué et mis en œuvre. La Couronne est d’avis que l’avocate de l’aide juridique a dit qu’il faudrait « un certain temps » pour trouver cet avocat et le procureur de la Couronne soutient que M. LaPointe a été informé de ce fait et qu’il a ensuite pris la décision consciente de parler à l’avocate de service anglophone.

[10]         En plus de ces observations sur l’article 10 (b) de la Charte, les parties ont également fait allusion à une partie de l’aveu au procès conjoint selon laquelle l’un des agents avait, par inadvertance, entendu et enregistré une partie de l’appel de M. LaPointe à l’avocat de service. Le procureur de la Couronne a indiqué que cette question avait été soulevée au dernier moment de la préparation de l’aveu au procès et il a admis qu’il s’agissait d’une violation de l’article 10 (b) de la Charte, mais il n’était pas d’accord avec le point de vue de la défense selon lequel la preuve de l’alcootest devrait être exclue en vertu de l’article 24 (2) de la Charte.

[11]         Dans l’aveu conjoint des faits déposés comme pièce numéro 1, les parties décrivent brièvement, aux paragraphes 35 à 40, que le matelot de première classe Kneeland a pu entendre une partie de ce que M. LaPointe avait dit à l’avocat de service, et il s’est ensuite éloigné de la porte. Il a été informé plus tard que le microphone de son uniforme avait également capté une partie de la conversation entre M. LaPointe et l’avocat.

[12]         Étant donné la brièveté des déclarations contenues dans la pièce numéro 1, relativement au fait que le matelot de première classe Kneeland a entendu une partie de la conversation avec l’avocat ou des détails sur l’enregistrement partiel de cette conversation, la Cour s’est demandé s’il serait possible de trancher la question relative à la Charte en se fondant sur ces brefs faits. Les parties ont été invitées à considérer si elles souhaitaient entendre un témoignage viva voce sur cette question et à considérer des plaidoiries additionnelles sur la question puisqu’elle n’avait pas été abordée dans les plaidoiries initiales qui s’étaient concentrées sur la possibilité de parler avec l’avocat de son choix et d’informer M. LaPointe qu’il pouvait attendre jusqu’à ce qu’un avocat francophone soit trouvé par l’Aide Juridique.

[13]         Les parties ont informé la Cour qu’elles souhaitaient examiner leurs options et qu’elles se parleraient de la manière dont elles allaient procéder. Par conséquent, les dates de mise en état de cette affaire ont été fixées au 9 décembre et 16 décembre 2022. À cette dernière date, les parties ont informé la Cour que le matelot de première classe Kneeland serait appelé à témoigner et la Cour a indiqué que si l’avocat de la défense souhaitait appeler M. LaPointe, il pourrait témoigner par vidéoconférence étant donné qu’il réside au Québec.

[14]         Lorsque les parties ont informé la Cour qu’elles avaient l’intention d’entendre un témoignage de vive voce sur les questions soulevées en raison de la brièveté de l’aveu conjoint des faits, la Cour a fixé au 13 janvier 2023 pour ce témoignage supplémentaire. À cette date, le procureur de la Couronne a appelé le matelot de première classe Kneeland à témoigner et l’avocat de la défense a appelé M. David LaPointe.

[15]         Il a été convenu, après le témoignage supplémentaire de ces deux témoins, que les parties présenteraient d’autres plaidoiries finales concernant la demande de la défense en vertu de l’article 10 (b) de la Charte. Les parties ont convenu, lors d’une brève audience sur l’état de l’instance le 27 janvier 2023, que la défense déposerait sa plaidoirie écrite supplémentaire au plus tard le 28 février 2023, et que la réponse écrite de la Couronne serait déposée au plus tard le 24 mars 2023. La Cour a pris en délibéré sa décision sur la demande relative à la Charte jusqu’au 12 mai 2023.

Les Plaidoiries des Parties à l’Instance :

[16]         La défense souligne que les tribunaux ont reconnu qu’un accusé a le droit de consulter un avocat et que ce droit comprend la possibilité de le faire en privé. En l’espèce, la Couronne a admis que l’écoute par inadvertance d’une partie de l’appel et l’enregistrement par inadvertance d’une partie de l’appel de M. LaPointe à son avocat sur la caméra corporelle du policier, que d’autres policiers militaires ont tenté d’écouter, constituaient des violations graves des droits protégés par l’alinéa 10(b) de la Charte de M. LaPointe. L’avocat de la défense soutient que la combinaison de ces violations et le fait de ne pas avoir informé M. LaPointe de son droit d’attendre un délai raisonnable pour parler à l’avocat de son choix, un avocat francophone, constituent une violation supplémentaire des droits de M. LaPointe garantis par l’article 10 (b) de la Charte et que la réparation appropriée devrait être l’exclusion de la preuve obtenue à l’aide de l’alcootest.

[17]         La Couronne est d’avis que, bien qu’elle reconnaisse que l’enregistrement par inadvertance de l’appel de M. LaPointe à son avocat constitue une violation des droits protégés par l’article 10 (b) de la Charte, il s’agit d’une « erreur honnête et de bonne foi » de la part du policier, ce qui représente une violation moins grave de la Charte. Le policier militaire qui pouvait entendre M. LaPointe parler à l’avocat de service alors qu’il se tenait près de la porte partiellement ouverte de la pièce où se trouvait M. LaPointe, s’est immédiatement éloigné, mais le microphone de son sac de corps a également capté par inadvertance une partie de la conversation. Le policier n’a jamais essayé d’écouter l’enregistrement, et il a été informé plus tard par d’autres policiers que l’enregistrement était déformé et brisé, de sorte qu’aucun son n’a été détecté par qui que ce soit.

[18]         Dans ces circonstances, le procureur de la Couronne plaide qu’il s’agit d’une intrusion non intentionnelle et relativement mineure dans le droit de M. LaPointe garanti par l’article 10 (b) de la Charte et qu’elle n’a pas entravé sa discussion avec l’avocate de service. Étant donné que M. LaPointe n’a pas manifesté d’insatisfaction à l’égard de l’avis juridique ou qu’il n’a pas indiqué qu’il souhaitait parler de nouveau avec l’avocate de service, malgré cette violation mineure, l’analyse de l’article 24 (2) de la Charte ne devrait pas entrainer l’exclusion des éléments de preuve obtenus.

[19]         En ce qui concerne la question de l’accès de M. LaPointe à l’avocat de son choix, en l’occurrence un avocat francophone, le procureur de la Couronne souligne que ce sont les policiers militaires qui l’ont suggéré et qui ont contacté l’avocate de service de l’aide juridique pour prendre les dispositions nécessaires. Celle-ci a indiqué qu’elle le ferait, mais que cela pourrait prendre « un certain temps » ou « un peu de temps », et lorsque M. LaPointe a été informé que la recherche d’un avocat francophone pourrait prendre un certain temps, après moins de cinq minutes, il a pris la décision consciente et volontaire de parler à l’avocate de service anglophone.

[20]         De plus, M. LaPointe n’a jamais exprimé son insatisfaction à l’égard des conseils qu’il a reçus ou indiqué qu’il ne comprenait pas ce dont il avait discuté avec l’avocate de service. Il n’a pas non plus demandé à parler de nouveau à l’avocate de service ou à renouveler sa demande d’entretien avec un avocat francophone. Dans ces circonstances, le procureur de la Couronne plaide qu’il n’y a pas eu de violation des droits de mise en œuvre de l’article 10 (b) de M. LaPointe.    

[21]         Enfin, le procureur de la Couronne estime que la preuve obtenue dans cette affaire, à savoir un échantillon d’haleine et les résultats de l’instrument approuvé, sont très fiables et que l’intérêt de la société à ce que l’affaire soit jugée sur le fond ne devrait pas entraîner l’exclusion de la preuve.

Les faits convenus et des preuves supplémentaires :

[22]         L’aveu conjoint des faits survenus, qui a été produit comme pièce numéro 1, a été fourni au tribunal en anglais. L’aveu conjoint des faits comportait 48 phrases numérotées. Pour les besoins de ce résumé des faits convenus, je propose de les regrouper en paragraphes tout en me référant aux numéros utilisés par les parties dans ce document :

#1-2 - During the early morning hours of Saturday, November 20, 2021, four (4) Canadian military police officers were stationed at the main gate of the Stadacona (at the intersection of Admirals Way and Gangway Road, County of Halifax, City of Halifax, Province of Nova Scotia). These officers were conducting a sobriety checkpoint for drivers. The four (4) military police officers were: (1) Master Corporal Slyhuis, (2) Corporal Morin, (3) Corporal MacPherson and (4) Sailor First Class Kneeland (lead investigator).

#3-5 - At approximately 12:39 AM, on November 20, 2021 Sailor First Class Kneeland approached a black Chevrolet Cruze which had been stopped at the sobriety checkpoint. Sailor First Class Kneeland notes that this vehicle was equipped with a Québec license plate. At 12:41 AM, Sailor First Class Kneeland spoke with the driver of the black Chevrolet Cruze and detected an odour of alcoholic beverages emanating from the vehicle. The driver of the black Chevrolet Cruze was identified via a Québec drivers license as Mr. David LaPointe.

#6-8 - Following some questioning by Sailor First Class Kneeland about his alcohol consumption, Mr. LaPointe responded “yes two or three drinks about an hour ago.” The approved screening device demand (hereinafter referred to as the “ASD”) was read to Mr. LaPointe by Sailor First Class Kneeland. It is noted that Mr. LaPointe understood this ASD Demand. At 12:43 AM Mr. LaPointe registered a “FAIL” reading on the ASD.

#9-13 - Sailor First Class Kneeland informed Mr. LaPointe that he was under arrest for impaired operation of a motor vehicle. At 12:44 AM, Mr. LaPointe was placed in mechanical restraints. At 12:45 AM, a search incidental to arrest of Mr. LaPointe occurred in front of the marked police vehicle. Conversation occurred between Mr. LaPointe and the military police officers during the search incidental to arrest. Mr. LaPointe was subsequently placed in the rear seat of a marked police vehicle.

#14-20 - At 12:50 AM, Sailor First Class Kneeland read and explained the Approved Instrument Demand to Mr. LaPointe. Mr. LaPointe stated that he understood. Corporal Morin was standing nearby when this occurred and captured the exchange on his audio recorder. At 12:52 AM, Sailor First Class Kneeland read the Rights to Counsel (RTC) to Mr. LaPointe. Mr. LaPointe is heard on the MVRS audio/video footage declining his section 10 (b) Rights to Counsel. At 12:53 AM, Sailor First Class Kneeland read the Waiver of Rights to Mr. LaPointe. The Police Caution was read to Mr. LaPointe shortly thereafter. Mr. LaPointe indicated that he understood the Police Caution.

#21-22 - Between 12:53 AM and 12:56 AM, the Rights to Counsel and the Waiver of Rights were explained/paraphrased to Mr. LaPointe in plain language by Corporal Morin. In this time period, Mr. LaPointe also alludes to the presence of a language barrier (English to French). At 12:56 AM, Corporal Morin once again (in plain language) asked Mr. LaPointe whether he wanted to speak with a lawyer.

#23-24 - Just before 12:57 AM, Mr. LaPointe changed his mind and indicated that he wished to exercise his right to speak to a lawyer. This was done following a conversation with Corporal Morin. Between 12:57 AM and 1:03 AM, several of the military police officer speak among themselves. They discuss the situation and agreed that Mr. LaPointe should have access to a French language/French speaking lawyer.

#25-28 - At 1:06 AM, Corporal McPherson departed from the scene with Mr. LaPointe en route to the Detachment (MPU Halifax). At 1:10 AM, Corporal MacPherson arrived at the detachment with Mr. LaPointe. The noted mileage of the marked police vehicle indicates that this was approximately a short one (1) kilometre voyage. Sailor First Class Kneeland then escorted Mr. LaPointe to the “client/solicitor room” of the detachment. The mechanical restraints were removed.

#29-31 - At 1:15 AM, Sailor First Class Kneeland telephoned the after-hours Nova Scotia Legal Aid number. The lawyer who answered the call was duty counsel, Ms. Sarah Greenwood. At the request of Mr. LaPointe, Sailor First Class Kneeland asked Ms. Sarah Greenwood if Nova Scotia Legal Aid could provide a French speaking lawyer. Ms. Sarah Greenwood said that this would be possible, but that it could take a while.

#32 - Mr. LaPointe was apprised of that fact and under the circumstances, Mr. LaPointe felt that he had no choice but to accept an English-speaking lawyer as it was intimated that no French-speaking counsel would be available for a considerable length of time. He felt that speaking with “a” lawyer was better than speaking with “no” lawyer. Mr. LaPointe indicated that he did not wish to wait to speak to a French-speaking legal aid lawyer. As such, Mr. LaPointe spoke to Ms. Sarah Greenwood.

#33-34 - At 1:25 AM, Mr. LaPointe completed his call with duty counsel/Legal Aid (Ms. Sarah Greenwood). At the conclusion of his call with Nova Scotia Legal Aid, Mr. LaPointe stated to Sailor First Class Kneeland that he was satisfied with the legal advice that he was provided.

#35-40 - During Mr. LaPointe’s telephone call with counsel in the client/solicitor room, Sailor First Class Kneeland could hear some of what Mr. LaPointe was saying. However, Sailor First Class Kneeland could not understand what was being discussed. Sailor First Class Kneeland could not hear counsel speak. Sailor First Class Kneeland then moved further down the hallway so that he could no longer hear any of the conversation between Mr. LaPointe and his counsel. Sailor First Class Kneeland was advised that his microphone was able to pick up some of the conversation between Mr. LaPointe and his lawyer. However, Sailor First Class Kneeland was advised the audio was distorted and broken on this audio recording. The audio recording was not recovered.

#41-44 - Mr. LaPointe was brought to the Breath room where two (2) samples of his breath were eventually and successfully provided into the Approved Instrument (EC/IR II). Corporal Morin was the Qualified Technician. Corporal Morin explained to Mr. LaPointe how to provide samples of his breath into the Approved Instrument. Mr. LaPointe acknowledged that he understood. At 1:57 AM, a first (1st) reading of 140 mg of alcohol in 100 mL of blood was registered on the Approved Instrument. At 2:18 AM, a second (2nd) reading of 130 mg of alcohol in the hundred millilitres of blood was registered on the Approved Instrument.

#45 -The rest of the investigation and the rest of Mr. LaPointe’s time in custody was uneventful. Everything unfolded in accordance with standard procedure. Mr. LaPointe was released from custody at 3:44 AM on November 20, 2021, and was served with the usual documentation.

#46 - To note, as depicted on the MVRS audio/video footage, Mr. LaPointe was exceedingly cooperative and polite with officers during his detention, arrest and time in custody. The Officer’s indicated the same throughout the reports and notes.

#47 - Moreover, the entirety of the conversation between Mr. LaPointe and the military police officers (as captured on the MVRS audio/video) occurred exclusively in the English language.

#48 - It is the parties’ intention to play the MVR S audio/video during the course of the trial and will ask that same become part of the evidence at the trial proper.

[23]         Tel que mentionné dans l’exposé conjoint des faits, les parties avaient l’intention de faire jouer l’enregistrement audiovisuel de l’interaction entre les policiers militaires et M. LaPointe le 20 novembre 2021, au bord de la route. L’enregistrement vidéo audiovisuel d’une durée d’environ 27 minutes, de 12 h 39 à 1 h 6, a été déposé comme pièce numéro 2 au procès.

[24]          La vidéo a été prise à partir de l’un des véhicules de la police militaire et l’audio a été enregistré à partir des radios des officiers de la police militaire portés  sur leurs uniformes. La Chevrolet Cruze noire est arrêtée par les policiers et M. LaPointe est invité à immobiliser sa voiture.

[25]         L’interaction avec M. LaPointe au bord de la route se fait en anglais et après le résultat « Fail » à la suite de la demande d’ASD, le matelot de première classe Steven Kneeland est chargé par un autre officier de lire la demande d’alcootest de l’alcootest approuvé à partir d’une carte, ce qui se fait en anglais. On demande à M. LaPointe s’il a compris la demande et le matelot de première classe Kneeland paraphrase en disant qu’il devait se présenter au détachement et fournir des échantillons d’haleine pour que l’on puisse analyser la quantité d’alcool dans son sang. Lorsqu’on lui demande s’il a compris cette demande, M. LaPointe dit qu’il l’a comprise et répondu, en anglais, qu’il est d’accord pour le faire.

[26]         Au même moment, M. LaPointe est arrêté pour conduite avec facultés affaiblies et le matelot de première classe Kneeland lui a alors lu, en anglais, son droit d’obtenir des conseils juridiques auprès d’un avocat de son choix ou de l’avocat de service de l’aide juridique. M. LaPointe a confirmé qu’il comprenait ce droit et, lorsqu’on lui a demandé s’il souhaitait contacter un avocat, il a d’abord répondu, en anglais : « Non, vous avez fait votre travail ». Ensuite, le matelot de première classe Kneeland a lu, en anglais, une renonciation à ces droits et la mise en garde de la police, que M. LaPointe a indiqué comprendre.

[27]         Ensuite, le caporal Morin a expliqué, en anglais, qu’ils allaient se rendre au détachement pour fournir des échantillons d’haleine dans l’Intox EC/IR II. À ce moment-là, le caporal Morin dit également au matelot de première classe Kneeland que M. LaPointe devrait avoir la possibilité de parler à un avocat français et qu’ils devraient pouvoir le faire. Le matelot de première classe Kneeland confirme qu’il appellera un avocat français et convient que M. LaPointe aurait avantage à parler à un avocat en français.

[28]         M. LaPointe a également été informé que s’il changeait d’avis et souhaitait parler à un avocat, il n’avait qu’à en informer les policiers militaires et cela serait arrangé. M. LaPointe a mentionné qu’il ne savait pas trop quoi faire et a demandé conseil au caporal Morin, qui lui a répondu qu’il ne donnait pas de conseils aux gens, car c’est à eux de prendre la décision. M. LaPointe a expliqué qu’il était originaire du Québec et qu’il voulait savoir si cet incident aurait un impact sur sa capacité à conduire sa voiture jusqu’au Québec.

[29]         Une fois de plus, le caporal Morin a informé M. LaPointe qu’il ne pouvait pas lui donner d’avis juridique, mais étant donné les commentaires selon lesquels il pourrait ne pas comprendre les prochaines étapes, même s’il avait d’abord dit qu’il ne souhaitait pas parler à un avocat, le caporal Morin a dit qu’ils prendraient des dispositions pour que M. LaPointe parle à un avocat au détachement afin de comprendre les répercussions et les prochaines étapes. M. LaPointe a indiqué qu’il ne comprenait pas vraiment les prochaines étapes en raison de la « barrière linguistique » et a de nouveau demandé des conseils sur les conséquences à l’agent de la police militaire, qui lui a de nouveau répondu qu’il ne pouvait pas lui donner de conseils. En réponse à ce qui a été posé comme « une question oui ou non » concernant la possibilité de parler à un avocat, M. LaPointe a déclaré qu’il aimerait parler à un avocat.

[30]         À ce moment-là, le caporal Morin, en parlant avec l’un des autres policiers présents sur les lieux, a indiqué que M. LaPointe comprenait qu’il avait le droit de parler à un avocat, mais qu’il voulait connaître certains aspects juridiques pour savoir quelles étaient les implications et les enjeux pour l’avenir. Il demande alors au matelot de première classe Kneeland, qui a indiqué que c’était la première ou l’une des premières fois qu’il était impliqué dans une arrestation pour conduite avec facultés affaiblis et qu’on lui demandait de fournir un échantillon d’haleine, d’emmener M. LaPointe au détachement, de lui enlever les menottes et de le placer dans la salle d’entrevue pour qu’il puisse parler à l’avocat.

[31]         Comme indiqué auparavant, les parties ont décidé de présenter des preuves supplémentaires le 13 janvier 2023. La Couronne a appelé le matelot de première classe Steven Kneeland, qui est membre de l’unité de police militaire. Il est devenu membre de l’unité de police militaire à Halifax en janvier 2019. Le 20 novembre 2021, il a interagi avec M. LaPointe au bord de la route et l’a amené au bureau du détachement de la police militaire où il pouvait parler à un avocat. Le trajet a été court et ils sont arrivés au détachement vers 1 h 15.

[32]         À son arrivée au détachement, le matelot de première classe Kneeland a placé M. LaPointe dans la salle d’entrevue avocat-client et lui a demandé s’il voulait des conseils juridiques en français ou en anglais, avant de téléphoner à l’avocate  de service de l’aide juridique. M. LaPointe a indiqué qu’il voulait parler à un avocat qui parle français et le matelot de première classe Kneeland a demandé à l’avocate de service si elle pouvait s’en charger. Elle lui a répondu qu’elle pouvait le faire, mais que cela prendrait un certain temps. Par la suite, le matelot de première classe Kneeland a déclaré qu’il avait fourni cette information à M. LaPointe, qui lui a alors répondu que cela prendrait trop de temps et qu’il s’adresserait à un avocat anglophone.

[33]         Le matelot de première classe Kneeland a dit que M. LaPointe disait qu’il était d’accord pour parler à l’avocate de service de l’aide juridique en relativement peu de temps, après avoir être informe du délai. Le matelot de première classe Kneeland a estimé que c’était peut-être entre 2 et 5 minutes, avant que M. Lapointe dise qu’il parlerait à l’avocate de service en anglais.

[34]         Une fois que le matelot de première classe Kneeland a reçu cette information, il a contacté l’avocat de garde de l’aide juridique et a passé le téléphone à M. LaPointe dans la salle d’entrevue avocat/client, puis il a quitté la pièce. Il a attendu à l’extérieur jusqu’à ce que M. LaPointe l’informe que l’appel était terminé.

[35]         En réponse à des questions concernant la taille de la salle d’entrevue avocat-client, le matelot de première classe Kneeland a déclaré qu’elle mesurait environ 5 pieds de large sur 10 pieds de long, avec une table au milieu et une chaise. Il n’y a pas de fenêtre dans la pièce, mais il y a une fenêtre dans la porte pour la pièce. Il n’y a pas de téléphone dans la pièce, mais il est possible d’utiliser un téléphone cellulaire pour contacter l’avocat. Une fois que M. LaPointe a reçu le téléphone, le matelot de première classe Kneeland a fermé la porte et s’est éloigné de quelques pas dans le couloir pour donner un peu d’intimité à M. LaPointe pendant qu’il parlait à l’avocat. La porte n’était pas verrouillée, mais elle était fermée et il se trouvait à environ trois ou quatre pieds de la porte dans le couloir.

[36]         Le matelot de première classe Kneeland a déclaré qu’il y avait une fenêtre d’où il pouvait regarder dans la pièce s’il faisait quelques pas dans le couloir. Lorsqu’il était à deux ou trois pas de la porte, il pouvait entendre M. LaPointe parler, mais il ne pouvait pas entendre ce que l’avocat disait. Comme il pouvait entendre ce que disait M. LaPointe, il a fait quelques pas de plus pour s’éloigner de la porte. La voix de M. LaPointe était relativement faible et peu audible. Après avoir fait trois ou quatre pas supplémentaires pour s’éloigner de la porte, il est entré dans la salle d’entretien avec le client et l’avocat, où il n’a rien entendu de la conversation. L’appel à l’avocat a duré environ 10 minutes, de 1 h 15 à 1 h 25. Il s’est trouvé au premier endroit, plus près de la porte, pendant les deux ou trois premières minutes de cette conversation, avant de se déplacer plus loin dans le couloir.

[37]         En ce qui concerne le fonctionnement du microphone de la radio attachée à son uniforme, le matelot de première classe Kneeland a déclaré qu’il est activé automatiquement dès que les lumières d’urgence du véhicule de police sont allumées. En l’espèce, l’enregistrement des conversations a commencé lorsque M. LaPointe s’est arrêté et que le matelot de première classe Kneeland a commencé à lui parler. Le matelot de première classe Kneeland ne s’est pas rendu compte que son microphone continuait d’enregistrer alors qu’il se tenait à l’extérieur de la salle d’entrevue avec le client, jusqu’à ce que le caporal MacPherson l’en avise.

[38]         Le matelot de première classe Kneeland a déclaré qu’il n’avait pas entendu l’enregistrement, mais que quelqu’un d’autre l’avait informé, à un moment ultérieur, qu’il y avait une distorsion et qu’il n’était pas possible de distinguer ce qui avait été dit. Plus tard, il a essayé d’écouter ce qui avait été enregistré, mais il a répété que l’enregistrement était déformé et qu’il n’était pas en mesure de distinguer ce qui avait été dit. Lorsqu’on lui a demandé pourquoi il avait fait cela, il a déclaré qu’il pensait que le microphone n’enregistrait pas et qu’il n’avait écouté que dans le but de divulguer des informations. Il a déclaré qu’il n’avait utilisé ce microphone qu’une dizaine de fois avant cette soirée et que chaque fois, c’était différent, ajoutant qu’il avait à peine utilisé le microphone avant le 20 novembre 2021, lorsque le véhicule de M. LaPointe a été intercepté par la police militaire.

[39]         En contre-interrogatoire, le matelot de première classe Kneeland a déclaré qu’au bord de la route, il avait informé M. LaPointe du motif de son arrestation et lui avait remis la mise en garde de la police au poste de contrôle. Il a confirmé avoir lu les droits de M. LaPointe de parler à un avocat en anglais à l’endroit où il a été arrêté. Les droits ont été lus devant la voiture de police et il craignait que M. LaPointe n’ait pas compris, c’est pourquoi il l’a mentionné au caporal un peu plus tard.

[40]         Le matelot de première classe Kneeland a déclaré qu’il n’était pas trop préoccupé par le fait que M. LaPointe n’ait pas pu comprendre la raison de son arrestation et l’explication de ses droits au bord de la route. Cependant, il a reconnu qu’il y avait eu une discussion au bord de la route sur le fait que M. LaPointe avait un accent français, qu’il conduisait une voiture avec une plaque d’immatriculation du Québec et qu’ils pensaient que sa langue maternelle était le français ; c’est pourquoi les agents de la police militaire ont convenu qu’il devrait avoir la possibilité de consulter un avocat francophone lorsqu’ils arriveraient au détachement.

[41]         En ce qui concerne la demande de M. LaPointe de parler à un avocat francophone, le matelot de première classe Kneeland n’est pas certain du nombre de fois où il a fait cette demande. Le témoin a ajouté qu’il était clair pour lui que M. LaPointe voulait parler à un avocat francophone si c’était possible. Environ cinq minutes après leur conversation sur le fait que cela prendrait un certain temps, M. LaPointe a informé le matelot de première classe Kneeland qu’il serait possible de parler à l’avocate anglophone. Il a répété ce que l’avocate de service lui avait dit et qu’il avait transmis l’information à M. LaPointe qu’il faudrait « un certain temps » pour trouver un avocat francophone à ce moment-là.

[42]         Une fois que M. LaPointe a dit qu’il parlerait à l’avocate de service anglophone, le matelot de première classe Kneeland a composé le numéro et a passé le téléphone à M. LaPointe. Une fois qu’il a remis le téléphone à M. LaPointe, il a quitté la pièce et il croit avoir fermé la porte derrière lui, mais il admet qu’elle était peut-être un peu ouverte. Il est resté relativement près de la porte pendant 2 ou 3 minutes, puis il a entendu M. LaPointe parler à l’avocate et, bien qu’il n’ait pas pu distinguer les mots, il est allé plus loin dans le couloir pour ne rien entendre du tout.

[43]         Le dernier témoin du procès était M. David LaPointe. Il a déclaré que lorsqu’il est arrivé au bureau du détachement avec le matelot de première classe Kneeland, il a été placé dans une pièce après avoir demandé à parler à un avocat francophone. M. LaPointe se souvient que le matelot de première classe Kneeland lui a dit qu’il faudrait « beaucoup de temps » pour trouver un avocat qui pourrait lui parler en français.

[44]         Par conséquent, après avoir reçu cette information, M. LaPointe a changé d’avis et a dit qu’il pouvait parler à un avocat en anglais. Il a pris cette décision parce qu’il pensait que c’était un choix entre parler à l’avocat en anglais ou ne pas parler à un avocat du tout. Il a déclaré que ce n’est qu’environ 3 à 5 minutes après avoir été informé qu’il serait « assez long » de parler à un avocat en français qu’il a dit qu’il serait acceptable de rencontrer l’avocate de service anglophone.

[45]         M. LaPointe a déclaré qu’une fois au téléphone avec l’avocate de service, le matelot de première classe Kneeland avait laissé la porte de la pièce ouverte de 4 à 6 pouces. Pendant qu’il parlait avec l’avocat, il entendait des bruits en arrière-plan et il croit qu’il s’agit de la radio sur l’épaule du matelot de première classe Kneeland. Compte tenu de l’emplacement des bruits, M. LaPointe estime que le policier militaire se trouvait juste derrière la porte.

[46]         M. LaPointe a ajouté que pendant qu’il parlait au téléphone cellulaire avec l’avocate, il s’est promené dans la pièce et, en regardant par la fenêtre de la porte, il a vu que le matelot de première classe Kneeland n’était qu’à trois ou quatre pieds de la porte au début de la conversation. Cependant, M. LaPointe a confirmé que le matelot de première classe Kneeland s’était éloigné de la porte vers la fin de la conversation.

[47]         En contre-interrogatoire, M. LaPointe a confirmé qu’il avait vu la vidéo et entendu la conversation entre les officiers de police ainsi que leur interaction avec lui. Il a reconnu que les policiers l’avaient traité équitablement tout au long de leur intervention.

[48]         Le procureur de la Couronne a noté que, lors de son interrogatoire direct, M. LaPointe avait utilisé trois descriptions du temps qu’il faudrait à l’avocate de l’aide juridique pour prendre des dispositions afin qu’un avocat francophone le rencontre. Il avait déjà répondu que cela pouvait être assez long, beaucoup de temps ou très long. M. LaPointe a répété qu’il avait compris, d’après les renseignements fournis par le matelot de première classe Kneeland, que ce serait « long. »

[49]         M. LaPointe a convenu avec le procureur de la Couronne que lorsque son véhicule a été intercepté et qu’il a été arrêté par la police militaire, il a d’abord dit qu’il n’avait pas besoin de parler à un avocat. Il a convenu que c’est le caporal MacPherson qui a suggéré de parler à un avocat lorsqu’il n’a pas été en mesure de répondre à certaines des questions posées par M. LaPointe. Il est d’accord avec le procureur de la Couronne que, sur le bord de la route, il n’a pas exprimé la demande de parler à un avocat en français. Il a également convenu avec le procureur de la Couronne que personne n’avait dit qu’un appel à l’avocat de service anglophone était sa seule chance de parler à un avocat à ce moment-là.

[50]         M. LaPointe a convenu avec le procureur de la Couronne qu’il avait parlé à l’avocate de service, Mme Greenwood, et que la conversation avec elle avait duré environ cinq minutes, en anglais. Il a également confirmé qu’après la conversation en anglais avec l’avocate de service, il avait informé la police qu’il était « satisfait » des informations obtenues au cours de la conversation. M. LaPointe a ajouté que ce qu’il voulait vraiment dire par cette remarque était qu’il était « plus ou moins satisfait » des informations obtenues au cours de la conversation, mais il a convenu qu’il n’avait jamais dit qu’il n’était « pas satisfait ».

[51]         Au cours de la conversation avec l’avocate de service, M. LaPointe a confirmé qu’il avait un téléphone cellulaire et qu’il se promenait dans la pièce lorsqu’il avait sa conversation privée avec l’avocate. Le matelot de première classe Kneeland avait quitté la pièce, mais M. LaPointe a déclaré que la porte était ouverte de 4 à 6 pouces et a convenu avec le procureur de la Couronne qu’il n’avait pas fait d’effort pour fermer la porte. Il a également convenu que rien ne l’empêchait de fermer la porte pendant la conversation avec l’avocat.

ANALYSE :

[52]         Les questions soumises à la Cour dans le cadre de ce recours fondé sur la Charte sont les suivantes :

1.                 La police a-t-elle enfreint le droit de M. LaPointe, garanti par l’alinéa 10b) de la Charte, à l’information et à la mise en œuvre, de retenir les services d’un avocat de son choix, en l’occurrence un avocat francophone, et de lui donner des instructions sans délai, au cours de sa détention ?

2.                 En ce qui concerne le droit à la mise en œuvre de retenir les services d’un avocat sans délai en vertu de l’alinéa 10b) de la Charte, le procureur de la Couronne a admis que l’enregistrement par inadvertance de l’appel de M. LaPointe à son avocat constituait une violation des droits que lui confère l’alinéa 10b) de la Charte. Cette concession soulève la question du droit d’une personne détenue de consulter un avocat en privé.

3.                 La preuve provenant de l’échantillon d’haleine devrait-elle donc être exclue en vertu de l’article 24 (2) de la Charte ?

Article 10 (b) de la Charte Droit à l’Assistance d’un Avocat(e) :

[53]         En ce qui concerne les demandes de cette nature fondées sur la Charte, une partie, comme M. LaPointe en l’espèce, qui allègue une violation de son droit à l’assistance d’un avocat doit établir cette violation selon la prépondérance des probabilités. Si la violation est établie, le tribunal doit alors déterminer s’il y a lieu d’exclure des éléments de preuve en vertu de l’article 24 (2) de la Charte. L’analyse de l’article 24 (2) de la Charte implique la mise en balance d’un certain nombre de facteurs concurrents pour déterminer s’il y a lieu d’exclure des éléments de preuve.

[54]         L’article 10 (b) de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés (la « Charte ») prévoit ce qui suit :

« 10. Arrestation ou détention — Chacun a le droit, en cas d’arrestation ou de détention.... (b) d’avoir recours sans délai à l’assistance d’un avocat et d’être informé de ce droit ».

[55]         Dans R. c. M.A.D., 2016 NBQB 180, au para. 41, une affaire qui soulevait des questions relatives aux droits d’un accusé en vertu de l’article 10 (b) de la Charte, et qui portait également sur la question du droit de consulter un avocat en privé, le juge Morrison a expressément décrit le but de l’article 10 (b) de la Charte comme suit :

« 41.    Dans R. c. Bartle, 1994 CanLII 64 (CSC), [1994] 3 R.C.S. 173, 92 C.C.C. (3d) 289 (C.S.C.), la Cour suprême a déclaré que l’objet du droit à l’assistance d’un avocat était de donner à la personne accusée/détenue la possibilité d’être informée des droits et des obligations que la loi lui reconnaît, et d’obtenir des conseils juridiques.  L’arrêt fait l’énoncé, souvent cité, des obligations en matière d’information et de mise en application :

(1)  informer la personne détenue de son droit d’avoir recours sans délai à l’assistance d’un avocat et de l’existence de l’aide juridique et d’avocats de garde;

(2) Si la personne détenue a indiqué qu’elle voulait exercer ce droit, lui donner la possibilité raisonnable de le faire (sauf en cas d’urgence ou de danger);

(3) S’abstenir de tenter de soutirer des éléments de preuve à la personne détenue jusqu’à ce qu’elle ait eu cette possibilité raisonnable (encore une fois, sauf en cas d’urgence ou de danger).  (Voir, par exemple, Manninen, aux pp. 1241 et 1242; R. c. Evans, 1991 CanLII 98 (CSC), [1991] 1 R.C.S. 869, à la p. 890; et Brydges, aux pp. 203 et 204.)

La première obligation a trait à l’information et les deuxième et troisième ont trait à la mise en application.  Il y a généralement violation des droits garantis au détenu par l’alinéa 10(b) si la police ne s’acquitte pas de l’une ou l’autre de ces obligations.  Ces obligations ne prennent pas toujours naissance, toutefois.  La personne détenue doit invoquer le droit de recourir à l’assistance d’un avocat, et faire preuve de diligence raisonnable dans l’exercice de ce droit, sinon les obligations de mise en application soit ne prendront pas naissance, soit seront suspendues (R. c. Black, 1989 CanLII 75 (CSC), [1989] 2 R.C.S. 138). »

[56] Un excellent résumé des principes juridiques applicables à l’article 10 (b) de la Charte dans le contexte d’une enquête sur la conduite avec facultés affaiblies a été fourni par le juge Schwartzl dans R, c. Valleau, 2018 ONCJ 280 aux paras. 12 à 22 :

            Applicable Legal Principles :

[12.]    The police must give a detainee his rights to counsel before breath samples are provided and must give the person both (a) sufficient information and (b) a reasonable opportunity to exercise those rights: R. v. Brydges (1990), 1990 CanLII 123 (SCC), 53 C.C.C. (3d) 330 (S.C.C.).

 

[13.]    Where the police assist the detainee in exercising his rights to counsel, the police must be reasonably diligent in that assistance: R. v. Wilding, 2007 ONCA 853 (CanLII), [2007] O.J. No. 4776 (C.A.); R. v. Model, 2016 ONCJ 563 (CanLII), [2016] O.J. No. 4789 (O.C.J.) at para 43; R. v. Vernon, 2015 ONSC 3943 (CanLII), [2015] O.J. No. 4157 (S.C.J.). However, the police are not required to exhaust all reasonable means for a detainee to speak with a lawyer: R. v. Winterfield, 2010 ONSC 1288 (CanLII), [2010] O.J. No. 952 (S.C.J.) para 46 - 67; R. v. Sharma, [2004] O.J. No. 2991 (S.C.J.).

 

[14.]   The test is not whether the police could have done more, but rather whether the police provided the accused with the necessary information and assistance to allow the accused to exercise his rights in light of the circumstances of the case: R. v. Gentile, [2008] O.J. No. 3664(S.C.J.) at para 24; R. v. Blackett, [2006] O.J. No. 2999 (S.C.J.) at para 23 -- 24 and 29; R. v. Antoninas, 2014 ONSC 4220 (CanLII), [2014] O.J. No. 5226 (S.C.J.) at para 93.

 

[15.]   Where a detainee indicates that he has understood his rights and has been given a reasonable opportunity to exercise them, an equivocal response by him would not, on its own, trigger an obligation on the police to obtain a clear waiver where it is found that nothing about the situation indicated to police (a) that the detainee did not understand his rights or (b) that he was deprived of opportunity to exercise his rights: R .v. J.W.C., [2011] O.J. No. 3608 (C.A.) at para 19 to 30.

 

[16.]    The detainee is required to be reasonably diligent in the pursuit of his rights: R. v. Leclair and Ross (1989), 1989 CanLII 134 (SCC), 46 C.C.C. (3d) 129 (S.C.C.) at p. 135; R. v. Richfield (2003), 2003 CanLII 52164 (ON CA), 178 C.C.C. (3d) 23 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Clarke (2005), 2005 CanLII 15452 (ON CA), 196 C.C.C. (3d) 426 (Ont. C.A.) at para 31-33; R. v. Van Binnendyk, [2007] O.J. No. 2899 (C.A.).

 

[17.]    Where a detainee wants to call a specific lawyer or a third party to access counsel, he has a duty to tell the police who he wants to call and why: R. v. Williams, [2014] O.J. No. 2559 (C.A.) at para 39; R. v. Johnston (2004), 2004 BCCA 148 (CanLII), 183 C.C.C. (3d) 157 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Antoninas, supra.

 

[18.]   The police are only able to respond to information provided by the detainee and cannot be held to a standard of clairvoyance: R. v. Eakin, 2000 CanLII 2052 (ON CA), [2000] O.J. No. 1670 (C.A); R. v. Littleford, 2001 CanLII 8559 (ON CA), [2001] O.J. No. 2437 (C.A.).

 

[19.]   The police must generally permit the detainee to contact a third party, such as a spouse, parent, neighbour, or paralegal, etc. to facilitate contact with counsel. It may be reasonable for the police to make those contacts on behalf of the detainee: R. v. Tremblay (1987), 1987 CanLII 28 (SCC), 37 C.C.C. (3d) 565 (S.C.C.); R. v. Crossman, [1991] B.C.J. No. 729 (C.A.); R. v. Kumarasamy, [2002] O.J. No. 303 (S.C.J.); R. v. Barran, [2004] O.J. No. 1686 (O.C.J.).

 

[20.]   Where the police do not allow a detainee to make their own calls or other inquiries that are part of the exercise of their right to counsel, and there is a real likelihood that the detainee does not fully understand his right to counsel the police have a duty to clarify to the detainee all his options including the right to speak to any lawyer, not just one he already has or duty counsel:  R. v. Pangias, [2014] O.J. No. 2058 (O.C.J.); R. v. Sakhavevych, [2017] O.J. No. 5209; R. v. Della-Vedova, [2018] O.J. No. 1596 (O.C.J.).

 

[21.]   Unless the detainee expresses to the police dissatisfaction with advice received, he is not entitled to Charter relief: R. v. Neziol, [2001] O.J. No. 4372 (S.C.J.); R. v. Kumarasamy, supra, R. v. Cairns, 2004 CanLII 17588 (ON CA), [2004] O.J. No. 210 (C.A.); R. v. Burley (2004), 2004 CanLII 9437 (ON CA), 181 C.C.C. (3d) 463 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Traicheff, [2008] O.J. No. 4361 (S.C.J.), aff'd [2010] O.J. No. 5355 (C.A.); R. v. Willier, 2010 SCC 37 (CanLII), [2010] S.C.J. No. 37 (S.C.C.) at para 42.

 

[22.]   The police have no obligation under s. 10(b) to monitor the quality of the legal advice received by a detainee from duty counsel: R. v. Willier, supra, at para 41; R. v. Beierl, [2010] O.J. No. 4477 (C.A.). To require the police to do so would undermine the right to confidentiality and privacy a detainee enjoys with his lawyer.

[57]   En appliquant ces principes juridiques aux faits de la présente affaire, j’estime que la preuve a établi que les policiers militaires ont informé M. LaPointe de son droit à l’assistance d’un avocat sur le bord de la route, peu après le résultat « Échec » de l’ASD. Les droits ont été répétés dans un langage simple. Bien que l’anglais soit la deuxième langue de M. LaPointe, il a déclaré qu’il comprenait ce droit et a d’abord déclaré qu’il ne souhaitait pas parler à un avocat en disant « non, vous avez fait votre travail ».

[58] Par la suite, en ce qui concerne la renonciation au droit de consulter un avocat, j’estime que les faits convenus et les éléments de preuve supplémentaires ont établi que le caporal Morin a réitéré, en langage clair, les droits à l’avocat et la renonciation, et c’est alors que M. LaPointe a parlé d’une « barrière linguistique » et que le caporal Morin a ajouté que si M. LaPointe souhaitait changer d’avis et exercer son droit de parler à un avocat, ce droit lui serait certainement accordé.

[59] En fait, après cette conversation avec le caporal Morin et avant de quitter les lieux de l’interpellation, M. LaPointe a changé d’avis en réponse à une question de type « oui ou non » et a indiqué qu’il souhaitait parler à un avocat. J’estime qu’en fait, ce sont les policiers militaires, en parlant entre eux et en discutant de la situation, qui ont suggéré que M. LaPointe ait accès à un avocat qui pourrait lui donner des conseils en français.

[60] De plus, j’estime que la preuve a établi que le matelot de première classe Kneeland, après son arrivée au détachement, a communiqué avec l’avocate de service de l’aide juridique, Sarah Greenwood, et a demandé, au nom de M. LaPointe, de trouver un avocat qui pourrait fournir des conseils juridiques à M. LaPointe en français. Compte tenu du fait qu’il était un peu plus d’une heure du matin le 20 novembre 2021, il n’est pas surprenant que l’avocate de service de l’aide juridique ait indiqué qu’il serait probablement possible de trouver un avocat qui pourrait fournir des conseils juridiques en français, mais que « cela pourrait prendre un certain temps », selon l’exposé conjoint des faits au paragraphe 31.

[61] Le matelot de première classe Kneeland a informé M. LaPointe de cette discussion avec l’avocat de service de l’aide juridique et, selon M. LaPointe, son interprétation de « un certain temps » était que cela prendrait « beaucoup de temps ». Il n’y a pas eu de discussion entre le policier militaire et M. LaPointe au sujet du délai, et M. LaPointe n’a pas non plus soulevé la question avec le policier militaire en disant que son impression de cette information était qu’il n’avait le choix qu’entre l’avocat de service qui ne parlait que l’anglais ou pas d’avocat du tout.

[62] J’estime qu’à cet égard, il aurait été assez simple, si M. LaPointe avait agi avec une diligence raisonnable pour faire valoir ses droits, de poser la question si c’était le cas. Certes, le matelot de première classe Kneeland, en communiquant l’information de l’avocate de service, avait simplement indiqué qu’il faudrait peut-être un certain temps pour trouver un avocat capable de donner des conseils en français. J’estime que son témoignage a été présenté de façon directe et que les policiers n’essayaient pas de contraindre M. LaPointe, de quelque façon que ce soit, à prendre immédiatement la décision de consulter Mme Greenwood, plutôt que d’attendre un délai raisonnable pour voir s’il était possible de trouver un avocat parlant français.

[63] De plus, je constate que quelques minutes après que le matelot de première classe Kneeland a fourni cette information à M. LaPointe, celui-ci a volontairement changé d’avis, sans aucune contrainte de la part du policier militaire, et a indiqué qu’il serait prêt à parler à Mme Greenwood, l’avocate de service de l’aide juridique anglophone. Si M. LaPointe avait des réserves, comme l’a déclaré le juge Schwartzl dans Valleau, supra, au para. 18, « la police ne peut que répondre aux renseignements fournis par le détenu et ne peut être tenue à une norme de clairvoyance ».

[64] En outre, après l’appel téléphonique de M. LaPointe avec l’avocate de service, Mme Sarah Greenwood, M. LaPointe, selon le para. #34 de l’exposé conjoint des faits, a informé le matelot de première classe Kneeland qu’il était « satisfait de l’avis juridique qui lui avait été donné ». Au cours du procès, M. LaPointe s’est dit d’accord avec cette déclaration, mais il a ensuite déclaré que ce qu’il entendait par cette remarque, à ce moment-là, c’était qu’il était « plus ou moins satisfait » de l’avis. Lorsque le procureur de la Couronne a insisté sur ce point, M. LaPointe a confirmé qu’il n’avait dit à aucun des policiers militaires qu’il n’était pas satisfait de l’avis donné par l’avocat de service.

[65] Sur la base de ces conclusions factuelles, j’estime que les commentaires de la Cour suprême du Canada dans l’affaire R. c. Willier, 2010 CSC 37 au para. 43 ressemblent à la situation en l’espèce et, dans cette affaire, la Cour suprême du Canada a conclu qu’il n’y avait pas eu violation du droit à l’assistance d’un avocat de M. Willier. Dans l’affaire Willier, supra, la Cour unanime a conclu au para. 43

« [43] Compte tenu de l’ensemble des circonstances de l’espèce, les juges majoritaires de la Cour d’appel ont conclu à bon droit que M. Willier n’a pas été privé de son droit à l’assistance d’un avocat que lui garantit l’al. 10b).  La police n’a nullement porté atteinte au droit de M. Willier d’avoir une possibilité raisonnable de consulter l’avocat de son choix en lui rappelant simplement que l’aide juridique était disponible immédiatement et gratuitement après qu’il a tenté sans succès d’appeler Me Royal.  Lorsque M. Willier a dit préférer attendre, l’agent Lahaie l’a informé avec raison qu’il était peu probable que Me Royal le rappelle rapidement étant donné que c’était un dimanche, et lui a rappelé qu’un avocat de garde était disponible immédiatement.  On n’a pas dit à M. Willier qu’il ne pouvait attendre la réponse de Me Royal, ni que l’aide juridique était son seul recours.  Rien n’indique que son choix d’appeler l’avocat de garde était le produit de la coercition.  La police avait une obligation d’information visant à s’assurer que M. Willier était au courant de l’existence de l’aide juridique, et le fait de se conformer à cette obligation n’a pas porté atteinte à son droit d’avoir une possibilité raisonnable de communiquer avec l’avocat de son choix.  C’est à bon droit qu’on a présenté à M. Willier une autre voie lui permettant d’obtenir des conseils juridiques, une option dont il a choisi de se prévaloir de plein gré. »

[66] Lorsque j’examine les principes juridiques applicables aux aspects de l’article 10(b) de la Charte liés à l’information et à la mise en œuvre, y compris l’aspect du choix de l’avocat, j’estime que les policiers ont respecté le droit à l’assistance d’un avocat, qu’ils ont fait preuve d’une diligence raisonnable en fournissant à M. LaPointe l’avocat de son choix et que ce dernier a décidé en toute connaissance de cause d’obtenir un avis juridique de l’avocate de garde de l’aide juridique anglophone, sans être contraint de le faire.

[67] De plus, à la suite de cette consultation avec l’avocate de service, rien n’indique que M. LaPointe n’a pas compris les conseils qui lui ont été donnés ou les réponses de l’avocat aux questions qu’il a pu poser au cours de la brève rencontre et, dans ces circonstances, il est logique et conforme à l’exposé conjoint des faits qu’il ait été « satisfait des conseils juridiques qu’on lui a donnés ».

[68] Ayant tiré ces conclusions, j’estime que la police n’a pas violé le droit de M. LaPointe, garanti par l’alinéa 10b) de la Charte, de retenir les services d’un avocat de son choix, en l’occurrence un avocat francophone, et de lui donner des instructions sans délai, au cours de sa détention.

L’article 10(b) de la Charte et le Droit de Consulter un Avocat en Privé :

[69] Dans l’affaire R. c. MacKinnon, 2013 NSSC 356, le juge Wood [comme il était alors] a succinctement exposé les principes juridiques applicables en ce qui concerne la reconnaissance par le tribunal que le droit de consulter un avocat prévu à l’article 10 (b) de la Charte comprend le droit de le faire en privé. Dans l’affaire MacKinnon, supra, il a déclaré au para. 12:

“[12] The courts have recognized that the right to consult with counsel includes the right to do so in private.  The Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Playford, 1987 CanLII 125 (ONCA), [1987] O.J. No. 1107 stated as follows:

31.  In my opinion, the right to retain and instruct counsel without delay carries with it the right to do so in privacy.  It would defy common sense to expect an accused person to instruct counsel properly when his instructions can be overheard by other persons and in particular by police officers.  Such lack of privacy might even seriously prejudice his ability to retain counsel.  Retention of counsel usually requires some explanation by the accused of the circumstances which have led to his arrest. ...”

[70] Le droit d’avoir recours à un avocat et de lui donner des instructions est bien connu. Ses composantes essentielles et sa raison d’être ont été simplement résumées par le juge Robertson, dans l’affaire R. c. O’Donnell, 2004 NBCA 26, au paragraphe 4 :

« [4]   Il est de jurisprudence constante que le droit d’avoir recours à l’assistance d’un avocat garanti par l’alinéa 10 (b) de la Charte confère un droit corollaire de consultation en privé. Sans le degré requis de respect de la vie privée, le droit constitutionnel à l’assistance d’un avocat devient illusoire. Quoiqu’une renonciation à ce droit soit possible, la question ne se pose pas ici. Il n’est pas nécessaire que la consultation soit très privée, mais l’accusé doit pouvoir à tout le moins s’entretenir avec son avocat sans que leur conversation soit entendue. De plus, ceux et celles qui exercent leur droit à l’assistance d’un avocat n’ont pas à demander de le consulter en privé, ni à exiger un entretien plus privé que ce que la police est disposée à accorder. Le droit de consulter un avocat en privé vaut également pour les conseils juridiques demandés au téléphone et il est sans importance que l’éventail de ces conseils soit restreint (qu’ils ne portent que sur la décision de fournir ou non des échantillons d’haleine). De fait, dans presque toutes les causes de respect de la vie privée, il est question de consultations téléphoniques par suite de demandes d’échantillons d’haleine (voir, en général, R. c. Young (1987), 1987 CanLII 108 (NB CA), 81 R.N. B. (2e) 233 (C.A.); Regina c. LePage (1986), 1986 CanLII 119 (NS CA), 32 C.C.C. (3d) 171 (C.A.N. É.); Regina c. McKane (1987), 1987 CanLII 6794 (ON CA), 35 C.C.C. (3d) 481 (C.A. Ont.); R. c. Playford (1987), 1987 CanLII 125 (ON CA), 40 C.C.C. (3d) 142 (C.A. Ont.) et R. c. Carroll (2002), 24 M.V.R. (4th) 248 (C.J. Ont.)»

[71] Dans l’affaire R. v. Finbow, 2017 NSSC 291, le juge Duncan a examiné les circonstances dans lesquelles une conversation entre un accusé et son avocat s’est déroulée dans une pièce mal insonorisée. De nombreux éléments de preuve montraient que les conversations à l’extérieur de la pièce pouvaient être entendues à l’intérieur, et vice versa, ce qui a amené l’accusé à avoir une croyance subjective raisonnable que sa vie privée était compromise, ce qui constituait une violation de ses droits en vertu de l’article 10 (b).

[72] En dernière analyse, la Cour dans l’affaire Finbow a conclu, supra, aux paras. 108-109, qu’il était plus que probable que les agents qui se tenaient immédiatement à l’extérieur de la pièce où M. Finbow s’entretenait avec son avocat pouvaient entendre l’accusé lorsqu’il s’entretenait avec son avocat. Le fait qu’ils n’aient pas cherché à le faire ou qu’ils ne l’aient pas fait n’a pas d’incidence sur sa conviction raisonnable qu’ils pouvaient le faire. M. Finbow s’est acquitté de la charge de prouver, selon la prépondérance des probabilités, que le droit à la vie privée garanti par l’article 10 (b) de la Charte a été violé. Sur la base de l’analyse de l’article 24 (2) de la Charte, le fait que l’accès à l’avocat ait été retardé a constitué une violation supplémentaire de l’article 10 (b), ce qui a entraîné l’exclusion de la déclaration faite par l’accusé à la suite de sa conversation avec l’avocat.

[73] En l’espèce, la preuve a établi que le matelot de première classe Kneeland avait laissé la porte de la salle d’entrevue avocat-client partiellement ouverte et qu’il pouvait entendre M. LaPointe parler à l’avocate de service au cours des premières minutes de leur conversation. Bien qu’il se soit éloigné, aucun effort n’a été fait pour fermer la porte afin de s’assurer que M. LaPointe s’entretenait en privé avec l’avocat de service. En outre, contrairement à d’autres affaires citées par l’avocat, dans lesquelles rien ne prouve que le policier a entendu une partie de la conversation, celle-ci a été enregistrée par inadvertance, ce dont le matelot de première classe Kneeland n’a eu connaissance qu’après coup. Cependant, des collègues avaient entendu l’enregistrement et tenté de l’écouter en entier, bien qu’ils aient constaté qu’il était déformé.

[74] Dans ces circonstances, sur la base des principes juridiques établis concernant le droit de consulter un avocat en privé, le procureur de la Couronne a très justement informé la Cour qu’il reconnaissait qu’il y avait eu violation de l’article 10 (b) de la Charte en ce qui concerne la mise en œuvre de son droit de consulter un avocat.

Analyse de l’article 24 (2) de la Charte

[75] L’article 24 (2) de la Charte prévoit ce qui suit :

Irrecevabilité d’éléments de preuve qui risqueraient de déconsidérer l’administration de la justice

(2) Lorsque, dans une instance visée au paragraphe (1), le tribunal a conclu que des éléments de preuve ont été obtenus dans des conditions qui portent atteinte aux droits ou libertés garantis par la présente charte, ces éléments de preuve sont écartés s’il est établi, eu égard aux circonstances, que leur utilisation est susceptible de déconsidérer l’administration de la justice.

[76] Dans l’affaire R. c. Grant, 2009 CSC 32, la Cour suprême du Canada a établi un test en trois parties pour l’analyse en vertu de l’article 24 (2) :

          (a) La gravité de la conduite attentatoire de l’État.

(b) L’incidence de la violation sur les intérêts de l’accusé protégés par la Charte.

(c) L’intérêt de la société à ce que l’affaire soit jugée au fond.

[77] Dans l’affaire Grant, supra, au para. 68, la Cour suprême du Canada a déclaré que l’expression « jeter le discrédit sur l’administration de la justice » doit être comprise dans le sens à long terme du maintien de l’intégrité du système judiciaire et de la confiance du public à son égard. L’exclusion d’une preuve entraînant un acquittement peut susciter des critiques immédiates. Mais l’article 24 (2) ne se concentre pas sur la réaction immédiate au cas individuel. Il s’agit plutôt de déterminer si la réputation générale du système judiciaire, considérée à long terme, sera affectée négativement par les éléments de preuve. L’enquête est objective. Il s’agit de savoir si une personne raisonnable, informée de toutes les circonstances pertinentes et des valeurs qui sous-tendent la charte, conclurait que l’admission de la preuve est de nature à déconsidérer l’administration de la justice.

[78] La Cour suprême du Canada a également noté dans l’arrêt Grant, supra, au para. 70 que l’article 24 (2) est axé sur la société. L’article 24 (2) ne vise pas à punir la police ou à indemniser l’accusé, mais plutôt à répondre à des préoccupations systémiques. L’article 24 (2) se concentre sur l’impact général de l’admission de la preuve sur la réputation à long terme du système judiciaire

La gravité de la conduite attentatoire de l’État.

[79] En ce qui concerne cet aspect de l’analyse, le procureur de la Couronne convient que le droit de parler à un avocat en privé est un pilier fondamental de l’article 10 (b) de la Charte. Le respect de la vie privée est essentiel pour permettre à l’accusé de parler franchement à son avocat et de recevoir en retour des avis et des conseils en toute connaissance de cause.

[80] Dans l’affaire Grant, supra, au para. 73, la Cour suprême du Canada a déclaré que le tribunal doit tenir compte, dans le cadre de cette demande, de la gravité de la violation, compte tenu de la gravité du comportement offensant des autorités de l’État que la primauté du droit oblige à faire respecter les droits garantis par la Charte.

[81] En l’espèce, le matelot de première classe Kneeland a pu entendre M. LaPointe parler à l’avocat alors qu’il se tenait trop près de la porte de la salle d’entretien client/avocat, par la porte qui était restée légèrement ouverte. Lorsqu’il s’est rendu compte qu’il pouvait entendre M. LaPointe parler à l’avocat par la porte laissée ouverte de la salle d’entretien avec l’avocat, il s’est déplacé plus loin dans le couloir. Il y avait aussi l’enregistrement audio de la conversation de M. LaPointe avec l’avocat, qui avait été capté par inadvertance par le microphone du matelot de première classe Kneeland. Bien qu’il ne l’ait su que plus tard, d’autres officiers de la police militaire ont tenté d’écouter l’enregistrement, mais ont indiqué que le son était déformé et qu’ils ne pouvaient pas comprendre ce que M. LaPointe avait dit à l’avocat.

[82] Bien que je ne doute pas que le policier militaire ait agi de bonne foi en facilitant la consultation entre M. LaPointe et l’avocat de service, et bien que l’incident soit le résultat de quelques actes involontaires, il ne peut être considéré comme une violation mineure du droit fondamental de consulter un avocat en privé. On s’attend à ce que la police connaisse ses obligations en vertu de la Charte et qu’elle les remplisse, et dans ce cas-ci, la police n’a pas respecté son obligation envers M. LaPointe de consulter l’avocat en privé, violant ainsi les droits que lui confère l’alinéa 10 (b) de la Charte.

[83] Dans l’ensemble, dans les circonstances, j’estime que la violation de la Charte était grave et que ce facteur favorise l’exclusion de la preuve.

L’incidence de la violation sur les intérêts de l’accusé protégés par la Charte.

[84] Le fait de ne pas avoir donné accès à un avocat en privé, même si M. LaPointe savait que le policier militaire entendait ce qu’il disait et enregistrait par inadvertance ce qu’il disait, n’a pas nécessairement eu d’incidence sur les conseils juridiques qu’il a reçus. Dans la présente affaire, contrairement à certaines des autres affaires qui ont été renvoyées à la Cour au sujet de cette question, il y a des preuves que M. LaPointe savait que des parties de sa conversation avaient été entendues puisqu’il a entendu du bruit à l’extérieur de la salle des clients/avocats par la porte ouverte et qu’en se promenant pendant qu’il était au téléphone cellulaire avec l’avocat de service, il a vu que le matelot de première classe Kneeland se trouvait très près de la porte de cette salle, qui était légèrement entrouverte.

[85] Comme l’a dit le juge Bliss dans l’affaire R. c. Granda, 2018 ONCJ 260 au para. 58 :

« [58]    The issue of the impact of the breach on the Charter protected interests of the accused raises issues that attenuate the seriousness of the breach.  First, there is no evidence that the accused was aware that parts of his conversation with counsel could be heard and was recorded, and so his ability to consult with counsel was not impaired by the police conduct.  As well, almost immediately after leaving the interview room he told the officer almost the same thing that was audible from his discussion with duty counsel. There is also no evidence that the police used the impugned information in any way.  While those might militate against the serious(ness) of the violation, it cannot be that just because an accused does not know that he is being recorded or speaks to police, that he somehow neutralizes the significant violation of his rights.  Those facts might lessen the seriousness, but the fact that Mr. Granda’s communications were recorded still offends, in my view, the administration of justice and supports, on balance, the exclusion of the evidence.”

[86] Je note ici que dans l’affaire Granda, supra, au para. 58, la Cour aégalement constaté que l’accusé savait que certaines parties de sa conversation avec son avocat pouvaient être entendues et enregistrées. Par conséquent, à bien des égards, la situation dans l’affaire Granda était très similaire à la présente affaire et cet aspect du test Grant milite en faveur de l’exclusion.

L’intérêt de la société à ce que l’affaire soit jugée au fond :

[87] Le juge Cromwell a déclaré dans l’affaire R. c. Côté, 2011 CSC 46, en ce qui concerne ce troisième facteur, qu’il s’agit de l’intérêt de la société à ce que l’affaire soit jugée sur le fond. Il a demandé si la fonction de recherche de la vérité du processus pénal serait mieux servie par l’admission ou l’exclusion de la preuve. La fiabilité de la preuve et son importance pour l’accusation sont des facteurs clés. L’admission d’une preuve non fiable ne servira pas les intérêts de l’accusé dans le cadre d’un procès équitable ni le désir du public de découvrir la vérité. D’autre part, l’exclusion de preuves fiables peut nuire à la fonction de recherche de la vérité du système judiciaire et rendre le procès inéquitable du point de vue du public.

[88] Il ne fait aucun doute que la preuve que l’on cherche à exclure en l’espèce est l’échantillon d’haleine et les résultats de l’alcootest approuvé. Je suis d’accord avec le procureur de la Couronne pour dire que ces preuves ont été jugées très fiables et que de nombreuses décisions à travers le pays ont fait référence à la gravité de l’infraction de conduite avec facultés affaiblies. En ce qui concerne ce critère, la société a tout intérêt à ce qu’une affaire grave soit jugée sur le fond, en particulier lorsque les preuves en question sont très fiables. Dans l’ensemble, ces facteurs plaident en faveur de l’inclusion de l’échantillon d’haleine.

La dernière étape consiste à mettre en balance les trois enquêtes :

[89] Sur ce point, le juge Cromwell a déclaré dans l’affaire R. v. Côté, supra, au para. 48 :

« [48] Après avoir examiné ces questions, le tribunal doit mettre en balance l’appréciation de chacune d’elles pour statuer sur la demande fondée sur le par. 24(2), et aucune « règle prépondérante » ne régit cette opération (Grant, par. 86).  Au contraire, « [l]a preuve à l’égard de chacune de ces questions doit être soupesée afin de déterminer si, eu égard aux circonstances, l’utilisation des éléments de preuve serait susceptible de déconsidérer l’administration de la justice » (Harrison, par. 36).  Nulle considération ne doit l’emporter systématiquement sur une autre.  Par exemple, comme l’explique la Cour dans Harrison, la gravité de l’infraction et la fiabilité de la preuve ne doivent pas pouvoir « supplanter » l’analyse fondée sur le par. 24(2), car une telle supplantation « priverait les personnes accusées de crimes graves de la protection des libertés individuelles garanties par la Charte à tous les Canadiens et, en fait, attesterait que dans l’administration du droit pénal, “la fin justifie les moyens” » (par. 40, citant 2008 ONCA 85, 89 O.R. (3d) 161, par. 150, la juge Cronk, dissidente).  Dans tous les cas, le tribunal doit se soucier de la considération dont jouira à long terme l’administration de la justice. »

[90] Lorsque je considère les commentaires du juge Cromwell selon lesquels la gravité de l’infraction et la fiabilité de la preuve ne devraient pas systématiquement l’emporter sur d’autres considérations et lorsque je considère l’importance fondamentale et le pilier du système de justice pénale qu’est le droit d’un accusé de consulter son avocat en privé, j’estime que la fiabilité de la preuve peut priver une personne accusée d’un crime grave de la protection des libertés individuelles garanties par la Charte.

[91] J’estime également que les commentaires formulés à cette dernière étape de l’analyse de l’arrêt Grant par le juge Bliss dans l’arrêt Granda, précité, supra, au para. 59, s’appliquent également à la présente affaire, car il s’agissait dans les deux cas de policiers qui avaient entendu et enregistré la conversation entre un client et l’avocat de service alors qu’ils étaient sous la garde de la police. Si la société a certainement intérêt à ce que les affaires de conduite en état d’ébriété soient jugées sur le fond, on peut se demander à quel prix l’administration de la justice est mise à contribution. Comme dans l’affaire Granda, j’estime qu’en l’espèce, le droit fondamental de M. LaPointe de consulter son avocat en privé a été violé et qu’à ce titre, l’admission des résultats de l’alcootest jetterait le discrédit sur l’administration de la justice.

[92] Je suis d’accord avec le juge Bliss lorsqu’il conclut qu’il n’y a pas d’autre remède que l’exclusion de la preuve pour sanctionner de façon appropriée la conduite des policiers et envoyer un message pour régler le problème dont ils sont responsables et, dans l’affaire Granda, il a conclu que les résultats de l’analyse de l’haleine devaient être exclus.

[93] Après avoir pris en considération les commentaires des juges Cromwell et Bliss, qui ont statué sur une situation similaire, et après avoir examiné les trois étapes de l’analyse Grant en l’espèce, je conclus que la violation du droit à la vie privée en l’espèce était grave et qu’en dernière analyse, compte tenu de tous les facteurs, la mesure corrective appropriée consiste à exclure la preuve fournie par l’alcootest.

Conclusion

[94] Étant donné que j’en suis arrivé à cette conclusion et que j’ai accueilli la demande d’exclusion de la preuve fondée sur la Charte, je déclare M. LaPointe non coupable de l’infraction résiduelle dont la Cour est saisie, à savoir l’infraction à l’alinéa 320.14 [1] b) du Code criminel.

 

Theodore Tax,  JPC

English Version

 

PROVINCIAL COURT OF NOVA SCOTIA

Citation: R. v. David LaPointe, 2023 NSPC 41

Date: 20230512

Docket:  8541639

Registry: Dartmouth

Between:

Sa Majesté le Roi/ His Majesty the King

 

v.

David LaPointe

 

 

Judge:	L’Honorable/ The Honourable Judge Theodore Tax,
Heard:	Le 25 novembre, 2022 et le 13 janvier, 2023/ November 25, 2022 and January 13, 2023, in Dartmouth, Nova Scotia
Decision	Le 12 mai, 2023/ May 12, 2023
Charge:	Sections 320.14(1)(a) and 320.14(1)(b) du Code Criminel du Canada/ of the Criminal Code of Canada
Counsel:	Nicholas Comeau, Pour le Service des poursuites publiques de la Nouvelle-Écosse/ for the Nova Scotia Public Prosecution Patrick Atherton, Pour l'Avocat de la défense/ for the Counsel for Defence

By the Court:

[1]             Mr. David Lapointe was charged with the offence of operating a conveyance while his ability to do so was impaired by alcohol contrary to section 320.14 (1) (a) of the Criminal Code. He was also charged with the offence of within two hours of ceasing to operate a conveyance having a blood alcohol concentration that was equal to or exceeded 80 mg of alcohol in 100 mL of blood contrary to section 320.14(1)(b) of the Criminal Code. The offences are alleged to have occurred on or about November 20, 2021 at or near Halifax, Nova Scotia.

[2]             The Crown proceeded by way of summary conviction and on May 30, 2022 Mr. Lapointe entered a plea of not guilty to the charges before the court. He requested, as it was his right to do so, a trial in the French language and the trial date was set for November 25, 2022.

Introduction:

[3]             The trial proceeded on November 25, 2022, based upon an agreed statement of facts. During a Pre-Trial Conference with the parties on July 21, 2022, it had been agreed thar Charter briefs would be filed by the Crown and the Defence prior to the scheduled trial date. The key issue is whether the police infringed Mr. Lapointe’s section 10(b) Charter rights in the course of his detention and if so, should the breath sample evidence be excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter.

[4]             At the outset of the trial on November 25, 2022, in addition to the agreed statement of facts, made pursuant to section 655 of Criminal Code, which was filed as Exhibit 1, the Crown introduced Exhibit 2, which was about 30 minutes of audiovisual evidence of the military police officers stopping the vehicle operated by Mr. Lapointe and their interactions with him.

[5]             After those exhibits were filed, the Crown Attorney closed his case and invited the court to find Mr. Lapointe not guilty of the first charge of impaired operation of a conveyance contrary to section 320.14(1)(a) of the Criminal Code. The Crown Attorney noted that there was insufficient proof of that offence before the Court. As a result, following that statement and a motion by Defence Counsel, Mr. Lapointe was found not guilty of that offence.

[6]             Based upon that decision, the parties indicated that the key issue in relation to the second offence alleged in the Information, that is, the over 80 charge contrary to section 320.14(1)(b) of the Criminal Code was the Court’s decision with respect to whether there was a breach of Mr. Lapointe’s Charter rights and whether the breath sample results would be excluded.

[7]              The Agreed Statement of Facts confirmed that Mr. Lapointe had provided two (2) suitable samples of his breath for analysis by an Approved Instrument, with the first result being 140 mg of alcohol in 100 mL of blood at 1:57 AM and the second reading being 130 mg of alcohol in 100 mL of blood at 2:18 AM on November 20, 2021.

[8]             Thereafter, pursuant to their agreement, the parties made their closing submissions on the basis of the agreed statement of facts and the audiovisual evidence played during the trial. During those submissions, Defence Counsel maintained that the police had failed to discharge their informational duties under section 10(b) of the Charter as Mr. Lapointe had stated that he did wish to speak with a lawyer and that his counsel of choice was a lawyer who spoke French. He maintained that they also breached the implementational duties by only telling him that would take “some time” to locate a lawyer at that late hour who spoke French. As a result, the choice made by Mr. Lapointe was not between an English or French speaking counsel but rather, between an English-speaking counsel or no counsel at all.

[9]             For his part, the Crown Attorney submitted in his written brief, in advance of the trial date and his oral submissions on the trial date that the Defence had not established a section 10(b) Charter breach of either Mr. Lapointe’s informational or implementation all rights to contact counsel without delay. Mr. Lapointe was informed of his rights and legal aid was contacted to determine if a lawyer who spoke French could be contacted and the issue is not whether the officer could have done more but whether the right to counsel was communicated and implemented. It is the position of the Crown that the Legal Aid lawyer said it would take “awhile” to locate that lawyer and the Crown Attorney submits that Mr. Lapointe was advised of that fact and then he made a conscious decision to proceed to speak to the Anglophone Duty Counsel.

[10]         In addition to those submissions on section 10(b) Charter, the parties also alluded to a portion of the agreed statement of facts that one of the officers had inadvertently overheard and recorded some of Mr. Lapointe’s call to the Duty Counsel. The Crown Attorney indicated that this had come up at the last moment of preparing the agreed facts and he conceded that it was a breach of section 10(b) of the Charter but did not agree with the Defence view that the breath test evidence should be excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter.

[11]         In the agreed statement of facts which was filed as Exhibit 1, the parties briefly described, at paragraphs 35- 40, that Sailor First Class Kneeland could hear some of what Mr. Lapointe had said to the Duty Counsel, so he then moved a few feet away from the door. He was later advised that his microphone on his uniform had also picked up some of the conversation between Mr. Lapointe and the lawyer.

[12]         Given the brevity of the statements in Exhibit 1, in relation to Sailor First Class Kneeland overhearing some of the conversation with the lawyer or any details about the partial recording of that conversation, the Court questioned whether it would be possible to determine the Charter issue based on those brief facts. The parties were asked to consider whether they wished call viva voce testimony with respect to that issue and to consider additional submissions on the issue as it had not been canvassed in the initial briefs which had been focused on having the opportunity to speak with counsel of choice and informing Mr. Lapointe that he could wait until a Francophone lawyer was located by Legal Aid.

[13]         The parties advised the Court that they wished to consider their options and would speak to each other about the manner in which they would proceed. As a result, status dates for this matter were scheduled on December 9, 2022 and December 16, 2022. On the latter date, the parties advised the Court that Sailor First Class Kneeland would be called as a witness and the Court indicated that if Defence Counsel wished to call Mr. Lapointe, he could testify by videoconference given the fact that he resided in Québec.

[14]         When the parties advised the court that they intended to call viva voce evidence with respect to the issues that were raised based upon the brevity of the agreed statement of facts, the Court scheduled January 13, 2023 for that additional testimony. On that trial continuation date, the Crown Attorney called Sailor First Class Kneeland as a witness and Defence Counsel called Mr. David Lapointe.

[15]         It was agreed following the additional testimony of those two witnesses that the parties would provide additional closing submissions with respect to the Defence section 10(b) Charter application. The parties agreed, during a brief status hearing on January 27, 2023, that the Defence would file their additional written brief by February 28, 2023, with the Crown’s written reply to be filed by March 24, 2023. The Court reserved its decision on the Charter application until May 12, 2023.

Positions of the Parties:

[16]         It is the position of the Defence that courts have recognized that an accused person has a right to consult with counsel and that right includes the ability to do so in private. Here, the Crown has conceded that the inadvertent overhearing of a portion of the call and the inadvertent recording of a portion of Mr. Lapointe’s call to counsel on the officer’s body camera, which other military police officers attempted to listen to, were serious breaches of his section 10 (b) Charter protected rights. Defence Counsel submits that the combination of those breaches and the failure to inform Mr. Lapointe of his right to wait a reasonable period of time to speak with counsel of choice, a French speaking lawyer, constituted an additional breach of Mr. Lapointe’s section 10(b) Charter rights and the appropriate remedy ought to be exclusion of the obtained breathalyzer evidence.

[17]         It is the position of the Crown that while they acknowledge the inadvertent recording of Mr. Lapointe’s call to counsel was a breach of his section 10(b) Charter protected rights, this amounted to a “good faith honest error” by the police that represents a less serious Charter infringement. The military police officer who could hear Mr. Lapointe speaking to the Duty counsel while standing close to the partially open door of the room where Mr. Lapointe was located, immediately moved away, but his body pack microphone also inadvertently picked up some of the conversation. The officer never attempted to listen to the recording, and he was later advised by other officers that the recording was distorted and broken so no sound was detected by anyone.

[18]         In those circumstances, the Crown Attorney submits that this is a case of an unintentional and relatively minor intrusion into Mr. Lapointe’s section 10(b) Charter right, and it did not inhibit his discussion with the Duty Counsel. Given that fact, this should be regarded as a less serious, inadvertent Charter breach which had no impact on Mr. Lapointe’s discussion with the Duty counsel. In addition, the fact that he did not indicate any dissatisfaction with the legal advice or that he wanted to speak with the duty counsel again, despite the minor breach, the evidence obtained should not be excluded on the section 24(2) Charter analysis.

[19]         With respect to the issue of the providing access to the Mr. Lapointe with access to counsel of choice, in this case, a French-speaking lawyer, the Crown Attorney points out that it was the military police officers who had suggested that and contacted the Legal Aid Duty counsel to make those arrangements. The Legal Aid Duty counsel advised that she would do so, but it might take “some time” or “a while” and when Mr. Lapointe was advised that locating a French-speaking counsel might take some time, after a few minutes, he made a conscious and voluntary decision to speak with the English speaking Duty counsel.

[20]         Moreover, Mr. Lapointe never expressed any dissatisfaction with the advice he received or that he did not understand what he had discussed with the Duty Counsel, nor did he ask to speak with the duty counsel again or to renew his request for a conversation with a French-speaking lawyer. In those circumstances, the Crown Attorney submits that there was no breach of Mr. Lapointe’s section 10(b) implementational rights.         

[21]         Finally, the Crown Attorney submits that the evidence obtained in this case being a breath sample and results from the Approved instrument are highly reliable and society’s interest in having the matter adjudicated on its merits should not result in the exclusion of the evidence.

The Agreed facts and Additional Evidence:

[22]         The agreed statement of facts which was filed as Exhibit 1 was provided to the court in English. The statement of facts were provided in 48 numbered sentences. For the purpose of this summary of these agreed facts, I propose to regroup them into paragraphs but at the same time referring to the numbers utilized by the parties in the Agreed Statement of Facts:

#1-2 - During the early morning hours of Saturday, November 20, 2021, four (4) Canadian military police officers were stationed at the main gate of the Static Kona (at the intersection of Admirals Way and Gangway Road, County of Halifax, city of Halifax, province of Nova Scotia). These officers were conducting a sobriety checkpoint for drivers. The four (4) military police officers were: (1) Master Corporal Slyhuis, (2) Corporal Morin, (3) Corporal MacPherson and (4) Sailor First Class Kneeland (lead investigator).

#3-5 - At approximately 12:39 AM, on November 20, 2021 Sailor First Class Kneeland approached a black Chevrolet Cruze which had been stopped at the sobriety checkpoint. Sailor First Class Kneeland notes that this vehicle was equipped with a Québec license plate. At 12:41 AM, Sailor First Class Kneeland spoke with the driver of the black Chevrolet Cruze and detected an odour of alcoholic beverages emanating from the vehicle. The driver of the black Chevrolet Cruze was identified via a Québec drivers license as Mr. David Lapointe.

#6-8 - Following some questioning by Sailor First Class Kneeland about his alcohol consumption, Mr. Lapointe responded “yes two or three drinks about an hour ago.” The approved screening device demand (hereinafter referred to as the “ASD”) was read to Mr. Lapointe by Sailor First Class Kneeland. It is noted that Mr. Lapointe understood this ASD Demand. At 12:43 AM Mr. Lapointe registered a “FAIL” reading on the ASD.

#9-13 - Sailor First Class Kneeland informed Mr. Lapointe that he was under arrest for impaired operation of a motor vehicle. At 12:44 AM, Mr. Lapointe was placed in mechanical restraints. At 12:45 AM, a search incidental to arrest of Mr. Lapointe occurred in front of the marked police vehicle. Conversation occurred between Mr. Lapointe and the military police officers during the search incidental to arrest. Mr. Lapointe was subsequently placed in the rear seat of a marked police vehicle.

#14-20 - At 12:50 AM, Sailor First Class Kneeland read and explained the Approved Instrument Demand to Mr. Lapointe. Mr. Lapointe stated that he understood. Corporal Morin was standing nearby when this occurred and captured the exchange on his audio recorder. At 12:52 AM, Sailor First Class Kneeland read the Rights to Counsel (RTC) to Mr. Lapointe. Mr. Lapointe is heard on the MVRS audio/video footage declining his section 10 (b) Rights to Counsel. At 12:53 AM, Sailor First Class Kneeland read the Waiver of Rights to Mr. Lapointe. The Police Caution was read to Mr. Lapointe shortly thereafter. Mr. Lapointe indicated that he understood the Police Caution.

#21-22 - Between 12:53 AM and 12:56 AM, the Rights to Counsel and the Waiver of Rights were explained/paraphrased to Mr. Lapointe in plain language by Corporal Morin. In this time period, Mr. Lapointe also alludes to the presence of a language barrier (English to French). At 12:56 AM, Corporal Morin once again (in plain language) asked Mr. Lapointe whether he wanted to speak with a lawyer.

#23-24 - Just before 12:57 AM, Mr. Lapointe changed his mind and indicated that he wished to exercise his right to speak to a lawyer. This was done following a conversation with Corporal Morin. Between 12:57 AM and 1:03 AM, several of the military police officer speak among themselves. They discussed the situation and agreed that Mr. Lapointe should have access to a French language/French speaking lawyer.

#25-28 - At 1:06 AM, Corporal McPherson departed from the scene with Mr. Lapointe en route to the Detachment (MPU Halifax). At 1:10 AM, Corporal MacPherson arrived at the detachment with Mr. Lapointe. The noted mileage of the marked police vehicle indicates that this was approximately a short one (1) kilometre voyage. Sailor First Class Kneeland then escorted Mr. Lapointe to the “client/solicitor room” of the detachment. The mechanical restraints were removed.

#29-31 - At 1:15 AM, Sailor First Class Kneeland telephoned the after-hours Nova Scotia Legal Aid number. The lawyer who answered the call was duty counsel, Ms. Sarah Greenwood. At the request of Mr. Lapointe, Sailor First Class Kneeland asked Ms. Sarah Greenwood if Nova Scotia Legal Aid could provide a French speaking lawyer. Ms. Sarah Greenwood said that this would be possible, but that it could take a while.

#32 - Mr. Lapointe was apprised of that fact and under the circumstances, Mr. Lapointe felt that he had no choice but to accept an English-speaking lawyer as it was intimated that no French-speaking counsel would be available for a considerable length of time. He felt that speaking with “a” lawyer was better than speaking with “no” lawyer. Mr. Lapointe indicated that he did not wish to wait to speak to a French-speaking legal aid lawyer. As such, Mr. Lapointe spoke to Ms. Sarah Greenwood.

#33-34 - At 1:25 AM, Mr. Lapointe completed his call with duty counsel/Legal Aid (Ms. Sarah Greenwood). At the conclusion of his call with Nova Scotia Legal Aid, Mr. Lapointe stated to Sailor First Class Kneeland that he was satisfied with the legal advice that he was provided.

#35-40 - During Mr. Lapointe’s telephone call with counsel in the client/solicitor room, Sailor First Class Kneeland could hear some of what Mr. Lapointe was saying. However, Sailor First Class Kneeland could not understand what was being discussed. Sailor First Class Kneeland could not hear counsel speak. Sailor First Class Kneeland then moved further down the hallway so that he could no longer hear any of the conversation between Mr. Lapointe and his counsel. Sailor First Class Kneeland was advised that his microphone was able to pick up some of the conversation between Mr. Lapointe and his lawyer. However, Sailor First Class Kneeland was advised the audio was distorted and broken on this audio recording. The audio recording was not recovered.

#41-44 - Mr. Lapointe was brought to the Breath room where two (2) samples of his breath were eventually and successfully provided into the Approved Instrument (EC/IR II). Corporal Morin was the Qualified Technician. Corporal Morin explained to Mr. Lapointe how to provide samples of his breath into the Approved Instrument. Mr. Lapointe acknowledged that he understood. At 1:57 AM, a first (1^st) reading of 140 mg of alcohol in 100 mL of blood was registered on the Approved Instrument. At 2:18 AM, a second (2nd) reading of 130 mg of alcohol in the hundred millilitres of blood was registered on the Approved Instrument.

#45 -The rest of the investigation and the rest of Mr. Lapointe’s time in custody was uneventful. Everything unfolded in accordance with standard procedures. Mr. Lapointe was released from custody at 3:44 AM on November 20, 2021, and was served with the usual documentation.

#46 - To note, as depicted on the MVRS audio/video footage, Mr. Lapointe was exceedingly cooperative and polite with officers during his detention, arrest and time in custody. The Officer’s indicated the same throughout the reports and notes.

#47 - Moreover, the entirety of the conversation between Mr. Lapointe and the military police officers (as captured on the MVRS audio/video) occurred exclusively in the English language.

#48 - It is the parties’ intention to play the MVRS audio/video during the course of the trial and will ask that same become part of the evidence at the trial proper.

[23]         As mentioned, in the Agreed Statement of Facts, the parties intended to play the audiovisual recording of the military police officers’ interaction with Mr. Lapointe on November 20, 2021, at the roadside. The audiovisual video recording of about 27 minutes from 12:39 AM to 1:06 AM was filed as Exhibit 2 in the trial.

[24]          The video was taken from one of the military police vehicles and the audio was recorded from the military police officers’ radios on their uniforms. The black Chevrolet Cruze is stopped by the police officers and Mr. Lapointe is directed to turn his car off.

[25]         The interaction with Mr. Lapointe at the roadside is in English and after the “Fail” result following the ASD Demand, Sailor First Class Steven Kneeland is instructed by another officer, to read the Approved Instrument breath demand from a card, which is done in English. Mr. Lapointe is asked if he understood the demand and Sailor First Class Kneeland paraphrased that he was required to come to the detachment and provide breath samples to analyse that the quantity of alcohol in his blood. When asked if he understood that demand, Mr. Lapointe said that he did and answered, in English, that “I am agreeable to do that.”

[26]         At the same time, Mr. Lapointe was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol and then Sailor First Class Kneeland read his right to obtain legal advice from a lawyer of choice or the Legal Aid Duty counsel. Mr. Lapointe confirmed that he understood that right and when asked whether he wished to contact a lawyer he initially said, in English: “no, you did your job.”  Following that, Sailor First Class Kneeland read a waiver of those rights and the Police Caution which Mr. Lapointe indicated that he understood.

[27]         Following that, Corporal Morin also explained the rights to counsel and the waiver of that right in plain language. Then, he advises Mr. Lapointe that they would go to the detachment for the provision of breath samples into the Intox EC/IR II. At that point, the military police officers discuss and agree that Mr. Lapointe should have a chance to speak with a French lawyer and that they should be able to do that. Sailor First Class Kneeland confirms that he will call for a French lawyer and agrees that Mr. Lapointe would benefit from speaking with a lawyer in French.

[28]         Mr. Lapointe was also informed that if he did change his mind and wished to speak with a lawyer, he simply had to let the military police officers know that and it would be arranged. Mr. Lapointe mentioned that he wasn’t sure what to do and asked Corporal Morin for some advice, but the Corporal responded that he does not give advice to people as it is their decision. Mr. Lapointe explained that he was from Québec, and he wanted to know whether this incident would impact his ability to drive the car back to Québec.

[29]         Once again, Corporal Morin advised Mr. Lapointe that he could not give him legal advice but given the comments that he might not understand the next steps, even though he had initially said he did not wish to speak to a lawyer, Corporal Morin said that they would arrange for Mr. Lapointe to speak to a lawyer at the detachment to understand the impacts and next steps. Mr. Lapointe indicated that he did not really understand the next steps as it was a “language barrier” and again asked for some advice on the impacts from the military police officer, who again said that he could not provide advice to him. In response to what was posed as a “Yes or No question” with respect to speaking with a lawyer, Mr. Lapointe stated that he would like to speak with a lawyer.

[30]         At that point, one of the other police officers at the scene, indicated that Mr. Lapointe understood that he had the right to speak to a lawyer but wanted to know some “legal stuff” as to what the implications and issues were going forward. He then instructs Sailor First Class Kneeland who indicated that this was either the first or one of the first times that he had been involved in a drinking and driving arrest and demand to provide a breath sample, to take Mr. Lapointe to the detachment, take off the handcuffs and then place him in the interview room to speak with the lawyer.

[31]         As mentioned earlier, the parties decided to call additional evidence on January 13, 2023. The Crown called Sailor First Class Steven Kneeland, who is a member of the military police unit. He became a member of the military police unit in Halifax in January 2019. On November 20, 2021, he interacted with Mr. Lapointe at the roadside and brought him to the military police detachment office where he could speak with a lawyer. It was a short drive and they arrived from the scene of the stop at the detachment around 1:15 AM.

[32]         On arrival at the detachment, Sailor First Class Kneeland placed Mr. Lapointe in the solicitor/client interview room and then asked if he wanted legal advice in English or in French, before phoning the Legal Aid Duty counsel. Mr. Lapointe indicated that he wanted to speak with a lawyer who can speak French and he asked the Duty counsel if she could arrange that. She told him that she could do that, but it would take some time. After that, Sailor First Class Kneeland stated that he provided that information to Mr. Lapointe who then said it would take too long and he would speak to an English lawyer.

[33]         Sailor First Class Kneeland stated that it was a relatively brief time between Mr. Lapointe being informed that it would take some time to contact a French-speaking lawyer before he said it was okay to speak with the Legal Aid Duty Counsel. Sailor First Class Kneeland said that it was between 2 to 5 minutes when Mr. Lapointe said that he would speak with the Duty Counsel in English.

[34]         Once Sailor First Class Kneeland received that information, he contacted the Legal Aid Duty Counsel and passed the phone to Mr. Lapointe in lawyer/client interview room and then left the room. He waited outside until Mr. Lapointe advised him that the call had been completed.

[35]         In response to questions with respect to the size of the lawyer/client interview room, Sailor First Class Kneeland stated that it is about 5 feet wide by 10 feet long with a table in the middle and a chair. There are no windows in the room and there is one on the entry door to that room. There is no telephone in the room but there is the use of a cell phone to contact the lawyer. Once Mr. Lapointe was provided with the phone, Sailor First Class Kneeland closed to the door and took a few steps away from it in the hallway to provide privacy to Mr. Lapointe while he was speaking with the lawyer. The door was not locked, but it was closed, and he was about 3 to 4 feet from the door in the hallway.

[36]         Sailor First Class Kneeland stated that there was a window where he could look into the room if he took a couple of steps down the hall. When he was two or three steps from the door, he could hear Mr. Lapointe speaking, but he could not hear what the lawyer was saying. Since he could hear what Mr. Lapointe was saying, he took a couple of more steps away from the door. Mr. Lapointe’s voice was relatively quiet and not very audible. After he took the extra three or four steps away from the door to the client/lawyer interview room, he could not hear any of the conversation. The call to the lawyer was about 10 minutes long from 1:15 AM to 1:25 AM. He was in the first location closer to the door for the first two or three minutes of that conversation before moving further down the hall.

[37]         With respect to the operation of the microphone on the radio attached to his uniform, Sailor First Class Kneeland stated that it is activated automatically once they turn on the emergency lights of the police vehicle. In this case, the recording of any conversations began when Mr. Lapointe pulled up to the stop and Sailor First Class Kneeland began speaking with him. Sailor First Class Kneeland did not realize that his microphone was still recording while he was standing outside the client/solicitor interview room, until Corporal MacPherson advised him.

[38]         Sailor First Class Kneeland said that he had not heard the recording but that that he was informed by someone else, at a later point in time, that there was distortion and that it was not possible to make out what had been said. Later, he tried to listen to what was actually captured on the recording but reiterated that recording was distorted and he was not able to make out what was said. When asked why he did that, he stated that he thought the microphone was not recording and that he only listened for the purpose of providing disclosure. He stated that he had only use that microphone pack about 10 times before that evening and each one is different, adding that he had hardly used the microphone prior to November 20, 2021, when Mr. Lapointe’s vehicle was stopped by the military police.

[39]         On cross-examination, Sailor First Class Kneeland stated that at the roadside he had informed Mr. Lapointe of the reason for his arrest and had provided the police caution at the checkpoint. He confirmed that he read Mr. Lapointe’s rights to speak with a lawyer in English at the location where he was arrested. The rights were read in front of the police car and he had a concern that Mr. Lapointe may not have understood, and that is why he mentioned that to the Corporal a little later.

[40]         Sailor First Class Kneeland stated that he was not overly concerned that Mr. Lapointe was unable to understand the reason for his arrest and the explanation of his rights at the roadside. However, he did agree that there was a discussion at the roadside that Mr. Lapointe had a French accent, was driving a car with Québec license plates and they thought that his first language was French and that is why the military police officers agreed that he should have the opportunity to consult with a French-speaking lawyer when they got to the detachment.

[41]         With respect to Mr. Lapointe asking to speak with a French lawyer, Sailor First Class Kneeland was not sure how many times he had made that request. The witness added that it was clear to him that Mr. Lapointe wanted to speak with the French lawyer if that was possible. About five minutes after they had the conversation that it would take some time, Mr. Lapointe advised Sailor First Class Kneeland that it would be okay to speak with the English lawyer. He reiterated that she had told him and he had passed on the information to Mr. Lapointe that it would take “awhile” to locate a French-speaking lawyer at that time.

[42]         Once Mr. Lapointe said that he would speak with the English-speaking Duty Counsel, Sailor First Class Kneeland dialed the number and passed the phone over to Mr. Lapointe. Once he handed the phone to Mr. Lapointe, he left the room and he believed that he closed the door behind him but conceded that it may have been open a little bit. He stayed relatively close to the door for 2 to 3 minutes, but then he could hear Mr. Lapointe speaking to the lawyer and although he could not make out the words, he went further down the hallway so that he would not hear anything at all.

[43]         The final witness in the trial was Mr. David Lapointe. He stated that when he got to the detachment office with Sailor First Class Kneeland, he was placed in a room after he asked to speak with a French-speaking lawyer. Mr. Lapointe recalled that he was told by Sailor First Class Kneeland that it would take “quite long” to locate a lawyer who could speak to him in French.

[44]         As a result, after receiving that information, Mr. Lapointe changed his mind and said it was okay to speak to a lawyer in English. He made that decision as he thought it was a choice between speaking to the lawyer in English or not speaking to any lawyer at all. He said that it was only about 3 to 5 minutes after being advised that it would be “quite long” to speak to a lawyer in French that he said it would be okay to meet with the English-speaking Duty Counsel.

[45]         Mr. Lapointe said that once he was on the phone with the Duty Counsel, Sailor First Class Kneeland had left the door to the room open about 4 to 6 inches. While he was speaking with the lawyer, he could hear some noises in the background, and he believes that it was the radio on Sailor First Class Kneeland’s shoulder. Given the location of the sounds, Mr. Lapointe felt that the military police officer was right outside the door.

[46]         Mr. Lapointe added that while he was speaking on the cell phone with the lawyer, he walked around the room and looking through the window in the door, he saw that Sailor First Class Kneeland was only 3 or 4 feet from the door at the beginning of the conversation. However, Mr. Lapointe confirmed that Sailor First Class Kneeland moved further away from the door towards the end of the conversation.

[47]         On cross-examination, Mr. Lapointe confirmed that he had seen the video evidence and heard the conversation between the police officers as well as their interaction with him. He agreed that the police officers had treated him fairly throughout their interaction.

[48]         The Crown Attorney noted that, during his direct examination, Mr. Lapointe he had used three descriptions of the length of time that it would take for the Legal Aid lawyer to arrange for a French-speaking lawyer to meet with him. He had earlier replied that it might be quite long or a lot of time or a long time. Mr. Lapointe reiterated that he understood from Sailor First Class Kneeland’s information that it was going to be a “long time.”

[49]         Mr. Lapointe agreed with the Crown Attorney that where his vehicle was stopped and he was arrested by the military police, he initially said that there was no need to talk to a lawyer at all. He agreed that it was Corporal Morin who had suggested talking to a lawyer when he was not able to provide answers to some of the questions posed by Mr. Lapointe. He agreed with the Crown Attorney that, at the roadside, he had not expressed a request to speak to a lawyer in French. He also agreed with the Crown Attorney that no one had said that a call to the English-speaking Duty Counsel was his only chance to speak with a lawyer at that time.

[50]         Mr. Lapointe agreed with the Crown Attorney that he had spoken with the Duty Counsel, Ms. Greenwood and that the conversation with her was about five minutes, in English. He also confirmed that after the conversation with the Duty Counsel in English he advised the police that he was “satisfied” with the information during the conversation. Mr. Lapointe added that what he really meant by that remark was that he was “more or less satisfied” with the information during the conversation but agreed that he never said that he was “not satisfied.”

[51]         During the conversation with the Duty Counsel, Mr. Lapointe confirmed that he had a cell phone and that he was walking around the room when he was having his private conversation with the lawyer. Sailor First Class Kneeland had left the room, but Mr. Lapointe stated that the door was open about 4 to 6 inches and agreed with the Crown Attorney that he did not make any effort to close the door. He also agreed that nothing prevented him from closing the door during the conversation with the lawyer.

ANALYSIS:

[52]         The issues before the Court on this Charter application are as follows:

1.                 Did the police infringe Mr. Lapointe’s section 10(b) Charter informational and implementational rights to retain and instruct counsel of choice, in this case, a French speaking lawyer, without delay, in the course of his detention?

2.                 With respect to the implementational right to retain and instruct counsel without delay pursuant to section 10(b) of the Charter, the Crown Attorney has conceded that the inadvertent recording of Mr. Lapointe’s call to counsel was a breach of his section 10(b) Charter rights. This concession raises the issue of the right of a detained person to consult legal counsel in private.

3.                 Should the breath sample evidence therefore be excluded under section 24(2) Charter?

Section 10(b) Charter Right to Counsel

[53]         With respect to Charter applications of this nature, a party, such as Mr. Lapointe in this case, who alleges a violation of his right to counsel must establish that breach on a balance of probabilities. If a breach is established, the court must then consider whether there ought to be an exclusion of evidence pursuant to section 24(2) of the Charter. The section 24(2) Charter analysis involves the weighing of a number of competing factors to determine whether evidence should be excluded.

[54]         Section 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the “Charter”) provides as follows:

“10. Arrest or detention – Everyone has the right on arrest or detention…. (b) to retain and instruct counsel without delay and to be informed of that right.”

[55]         In R. v. M.A.D., 2016 NBQB 180, at para. 41, in a case which raised issues with respect to an accused person’s Charter section 10(b) rights, which also involved the issue of the right to consult legal counsel in private, Justice Morrison specifically described the purpose of section 10(b) Charter as follows:

“41. In R. v. Bartle (1994) 92 CCC (3^rd) 289 (SCC) the Court stated that the purpose of the right to counsel is to provide to the accused/detainee the opportunity to be informed of his or her legal rights and obligations and to obtain legal advice. The decision sets out the oft-quoted informational and implementation obligations:

(1)  To inform the detainee of his or her right to retain and instruct counsel without delay and of the existence and availability of Legal Aid and duty counsel.

(2)  If a detainee has indicated a desire to exercise this right, to provide the detainee with a reasonable opportunity to exercise the right (except in urgent and dangerous circumstances), and

(3)  To refrain from eliciting evidence from the detainee until he or she has had that reasonable opportunity (again, except in cases of urgency or danger).

The first duty is informational while the second and third are implementation duties. A detainee section 10 (b) rights will generally be infringed should the police fail to perform any of these duties. These duties do not always arise, however. The detainee must invoke the right to retain and instruct counsel, and exercise this right with reasonable diligence; otherwise, the implementation duties will either not arise or be suspended (R. v. Black, [1989] 2 SCR 138).”

[56]         An excellent summary of the applicable section 10(b) Charter legal principles in the context of an impaired driving investigation was provided by Justice Schwartzl in R, v. Valleau, 2018 ONCJ 280, at paras. 12 to 22:

Applicable Legal Principles:

[12.]   The police must give a detainee his rights to counsel before breath samples are provided and must give the person both (a) sufficient information and (b) a reasonable opportunity to exercise those rights: R. v. Brydges (1990), 1990 CanLII 123 (SCC), 53 C.C.C. (3d) 330 (S.C.C.). 

 

[13.]    Where the police assist the detainee in exercising his rights to counsel, the police must be reasonably diligent in that assistance: R. v. Wilding, 2007 ONCA 853 (CanLII), [2007] O.J. No. 4776 (C.A.); R. v. Model, 2016 ONCJ 563 (CanLII), [2016] O.J. No. 4789 (O.C.J.) at para 43; R. v. Vernon, 2015 ONSC 3943 (CanLII), [2015] O.J. No. 4157 (S.C.J.). However, the police are not required to exhaust all reasonable means for a detainee to speak with a lawyer: R. v. Winterfield, 2010 ONSC 1288 (CanLII), [2010] O.J. No. 952 (S.C.J.) para 46 - 67; R. v. Sharma, [2004] O.J. No. 2991 (S.C.J.).

 

[14.]   The test is not whether the police could have done more, but rather whether the police provided the accused with the necessary information and assistance to allow the accused to exercise his rights in light of the circumstances of the case: R. v. Gentile, [2008] O.J. No. 3664(S.C.J.) at para 24; R. v. Blackett, [2006] O.J. No. 2999 (S.C.J.) at para 23 -- 24 and 29; R. v. Antoninas, 2014 ONSC 4220 (CanLII), [2014] O.J. No. 5226 (S.C.J.) at para 93.

 

[15.]   Where a detainee indicates that he has understood his rights and has been given a reasonable opportunity to exercise them, an equivocal response by him would not, on its own, trigger an obligation on the police to obtain a clear waiver where it is found that nothing about the situation indicated to police (a) that the detainee did not understand his rights or (b) that he was deprived of opportunity to exercise his rights: R .v. J.W.C., [2011] O.J. No. 3608 (C.A.) at para 19 to 30.

 

[16.]    The detainee is required to be reasonably diligent in the pursuit of his rights: R. v. Leclair and Ross (1989), 1989 CanLII 134 (SCC), 46 C.C.C. (3d) 129 (S.C.C.) at p. 135; R. v. Richfield (2003), 2003 CanLII 52164 (ON CA), 178 C.C.C. (3d) 23 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Clarke (2005), 2005 CanLII 15452 (ON CA), 196 C.C.C. (3d) 426 (Ont. C.A.) at para 31-33; R. v. Van Binnendyk, [2007] O.J. No. 2899 (C.A.).

 

[17.]    Where a detainee wants to call a specific lawyer or a third party to access counsel, he has a duty to tell the police who he wants to call and why: R. v. Williams, [2014] O.J. No. 2559 (C.A.) at para 39; R. v. Johnston (2004), 2004 BCCA 148 (CanLII), 183 C.C.C. (3d) 157 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Antoninas, supra.

 

[18.]   The police are only able to respond to information provided by the detainee and cannot be held to a standard of clairvoyance: R. v. Eakin, 2000 CanLII 2052 (ON CA), [2000] O.J. No. 1670 (C.A); R. v. Littleford, 2001 CanLII 8559 (ON CA), [2001] O.J. No. 2437 (C.A.).

 

[19.]   The police must generally permit the detainee to contact a third party, such as a spouse, parent, neighbour, or paralegal, etc. to facilitate contact with counsel. It may be reasonable for the police to make those contacts on behalf of the detainee: R. v. Tremblay (1987), 1987 CanLII 28 (SCC), 37 C.C.C. (3d) 565 (S.C.C.); R. v. Crossman, [1991] B.C.J. No. 729 (C.A.); R. v. Kumarasamy, [2002] O.J. No. 303 (S.C.J.); R. v. Barran, [2004] O.J. No. 1686 (O.C.J.).

 

[20.]   Where the police do not allow a detainee to make their own calls or other inquiries that are part of the exercise of their right to counsel, and there is a real likelihood that the detainee does not fully understand his right to counsel the police have a duty to clarify to the detainee all his options including the right to speak to any lawyer, not just one he already has or duty counsel:  R. v. Pangias, [2014] O.J. No. 2058 (O.C.J.); R. v. Sakhavevych, [2017] O.J. No. 5209; R. v. Della-Vedova, [2018] O.J. No. 1596 (O.C.J.).

 

[21.]   Unless the detainee expresses to the police dissatisfaction with advice received, he is not entitled to Charter relief: R. v. Neziol, [2001] O.J. No. 4372 (S.C.J.); R. v. Kumarasamy, supra, R. v. Cairns, 2004 CanLII 17588 (ON CA), [2004] O.J. No. 210 (C.A.); R. v. Burley (2004), 2004 CanLII 9437 (ON CA), 181 C.C.C. (3d) 463 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Traicheff, [2008] O.J. No. 4361 (S.C.J.), aff'd [2010] O.J. No. 5355 (C.A.); R. v. Willier, 2010 SCC 37 (CanLII), [2010] S.C.J. No. 37 (S.C.C.) at para 42.

 

[22.]   The police have no obligation under s. 10(b) to monitor the quality of the legal advice received by a detainee from duty counsel: R. v. Willier, supra, at para 41; R. v. Beierl, [2010] O.J. No. 4477 (C.A.). To require the police to do so would undermine the right to confidentiality and privacy a detainee enjoys with his lawyer.

[57]         Applying those legal principles to the facts of this case, I find that the evidence established that the military police officers provided Mr. Lapointe with his rights to counsel at the roadside, shortly after the “Fail” result on the ASD. The rights were repeated in a plain language format. While English was Mr. Lapointe’s second language, he stated that he understood that right and initially stated that he did not wish to speak to a lawyer in saying, in English: “no, you did your job.”

[58]         Following that, with respect to the waiver of the right to consult with counsel, I find that the agreed facts and additional evidence established Corporal Morin reiterated, in plain language, the rights to counsel and waiver and it was then that Mr. Lapointe spoke of a “language barrier” and Corporal Morin added that if Mr. Lapointe wish to change his mind and exercises right to speak to a lawyer, that right would certainly be accorded to him.

[59]         In fact, following that conversation with Corporal Morin and before leaving the scene of the roadside stop, Mr. Lapointe changed his mind in response to a “yes or no question” and indicated that he wished to speak to a lawyer. I find that, in fact, it was the military police officers, in speaking among themselves, and discussing the situation, that suggested that Mr. Lapointe have access to a lawyer who could provide advice to him in French.

[60]         In addition, I find that the evidence established that Sailor First Class Kneeland, after arriving at the detachment, contacted the Legal Aid Duty counsel, Sarah Greenwood and made a request, on behalf of Mr. Lapointe, to locate a lawyer who could provide legal advice to Mr. Lapointe in French. Bearing in mind that it was now shortly after 1 AM on November 20, 2021, it was not surprising that the Legal Aid Duty Counsel indicated that it would likely be possible to locate a lawyer who could provide legal advice in French, but “it could take a while” according to the agreed statement of facts at paragraph #31.

[61]         Sailor First Class Kneeland advised Mr. Lapointe of that discussion with the Legal Aid Duty Counsel and according to Mr. Lapointe, his interpretation of “a while” was that it would take “a long time.” There was no discussion between the military police officer and Mr. Lapointe about the timing, nor did Mr. Lapointe raise the issue with the military police officer that his impression of that information was that he only had a choice between the Duty Counsel lawyer who only spoke English or no lawyer at all.

[62]         I find that, in this regard, it would have been quite simple if Mr. Lapointe was acting in a reasonably diligent manner in pursuit of his rights, that he would have posed the question if that was the case. Certainly, Sailor First Class Kneeland in communicating the information from the Duty Counsel had simply indicated that it may take some time to locate a lawyer who could provide advice in French. I find that his evidence was presented in a straightforward manner and that the police officers were not trying to coerce Mr. Lapointe, in any way, to immediately make a decision to consult with Ms. Greenwood, rather than waiting a reasonable period of time to see whether a French speaking lawyer could be located.

[63]         Furthermore, I find that a few minutes after Sailor First Class Kneeland provided that information to Mr. Lapointe, he voluntarily changed his mind, without any coercion by the military police officer, and indicated that he would be prepared to speak to Ms. Greenwood, the Anglophone Legal Aid Duty Counsel. If Mr. Lapointe had reservations, as Justice Schwartzl stated, in Valleau, supra, at para. 18, “the police are only able to respond to information provided by the detainee and cannot be held to a standard of clairvoyance.”

[64]         In addition, after Mr. Lapointe’s telephone call with the Duty Counsel, Ms. Sarah Greenwood, Mr. Lapointe, according to para. #34 of the agreed statement of facts advised Sailor First Class Kneeland he was “satisfied with the legal advice that he was provided.” During the trial, Mr. Lapointe agreed with that statement, but then stated that what he meant by that remark, at that time, was that he was “more or less satisfied” with the advice. When pressed on the point by the Crown Attorney, Mr. Lapointe confirmed that he had not told any of the military police officers that he was not satisfied with the advice provided by the Duty Counsel.

[65]         Based upon those factual findings, I find that the comments of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Willier, 2010 SCC 37 at para. 43 resembles the situation in this case and in that case, the Supreme Court of Canada concluded that there was no violation of Mr. Willier’s right to counsel. The unanimous Court in Willier concluded at para. 43:

“43 Considering the circumstances of this case as a whole, the majority of the Court of Appeal correctly found that Mr. Willier did not suffer a violation of his section 10(b) right to counsel. In no way did the police interfere with Mr. Willier’s right to a reasonable opportunity to consult with counsel of choice by simply reminding him of the immediate availability of free Legal Aid after his unsuccessful attempt to call Mr. Royal. When Mr. Willier stated his preference to wait, Const. LaHaye reasonably informed him that it was unlikely that Mr. Royal would be quick to return his call given that it was Sunday, and reminded him of the immediate availability of duty counsel. Mr. Willier was not told that he could not wait to hear back from Mr. Royal, or that Legal Aid was his only recourse. There is no indication that his choice to call duty counsel was the product of coercion. The police had an informational duty to ensure that Mr. Willier was aware of the availability of Legal Aid, and compliance with that duty did not interfere with his right to a reasonable opportunity to contact counsel of choice. Mr. Willier was properly presented with another route by which to obtain legal advice, and option he voluntarily chose to exercise.”

[66]         When I consider the applicable legal principles with respect to both the informational and implementational aspects of section 10(b) of the Charter, including the aspect of counsel of choice, I find that the police officers provided his rights to counsel, were reasonably diligent in providing Mr. Lapointe with his counsel of choice and without coercion, he made a conscious decision to obtain legal advice from the English-speaking Legal Aid Duty Counsel.

[67]         Moreover, following that consultation with the Duty Counsel, there was no indication from Mr. Lapointe that he did not understand the advice he had been given or any of the lawyer’s responses to any of the questions he may have posed during the brief meeting and, in those circumstances, it is logical and consistent with the agreed statement of facts that he was “satisfied with the legal advice that he was provided.”

[68]         Having come to those conclusions, I find that the police did not infringe Mr. Lapointe’s section 10(b) Charter informational and implementational rights to retain and instruct counsel of choice, in this case, a French speaking lawyer, without delay, in the course of his detention.

Section 10(b) Charter and Right to Consult Legal Counsel in Private:

[69]         In the case of R. v. MacKinnon, 2013 NSSC 356, Wood J. [as he then was], succinctly laid out the applicable legal principles with respect to the court’s recognition that the section 10(b) Charter right to consult with counsel includes the right to do so in private. In MacKinnon, supra, he stated at para. 12:

“12      The courts have recognized that the right to consult with counsel includes the right to do so in private. The Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Playford, [1987] O.J. no.1107 (Ont. CA) stated as follows:

31. In my opinion, the right to retain and instruct counsel without delay carries with it the right to do so in privacy. It would defy common sense to expect an accused person to instruct counsel properly when his instructions can be overheard by other persons and in particular police officers. Such lack of privacy might even seriously prejudice his ability to retain counsel. Retention of counsel usually requires some explanation by the accused of the circumstances which have led to his arrest.”

[70]         The right to retain and instruct legal counsel is well-recognized. Its essential components and rationale were simply summarized by Robertson JA, in R. v. O’Donnell, 2004 NBCA 26 at para. 4:

“4. It is settled law that the right to retain and instruct counsel, under section 10(b) of the Charter, includes a corollary right to consult in private. Without the requisite degree of privacy, the constitutional right to counsel becomes illusory. Although waiver of the right is a possibility, the issue does not arise in the present case. While the amount of privacy need not be great, at a minimum, an accused must be able to converse with his or her lawyer without the conversation being overheard. Moreover, those who exercise the right to counsel are not required to request privacy or greater privacy than what the police are willing to provide. Furthermore, the right to consult in private extends to legal advice that is sought over the telephone and it matters not whether the advice sought is of minimal scope (whether to provide breath samples). Indeed, nearly all the privacy cases involve telephone consultations following a demand for breath samples: see generally, R. v. Young (1987), 81 NBR (2nd) 233 (NBCA); R. v. Lepage (1986), 32 CCC (3^rd) 171 (NS CA); R. V.McKane (1987), 35 CCC (3rd) 481 (Ont. CA); R. v Playford (1987) 40 CCC (3^rd) 142 (Ont.CA) and R. v. Carroll (2002) 24 MVR (4^th).

[71]         In R. v. Finbow, 2017 NSSC 291, Justice Duncan considered circumstances where an accused conversation with counsel was held in a room with poor soundproofing. There was extensive evidence that conversations outside the room could be heard within, and vice versa this because the accused to hold a reasonable subjective belief that his privacy was compromised, constituting a breach of his section 10(b) rights.

[72]         In the final analysis, the Court in Finbow concluded, supra, at para. 108-109 that it was more than probable than not, that the officers standing immediately outside the room in which Mr. Finbow was speaking with his counsel, could hear the accused when he was speaking with his counsel. That they did not seek to do so or that they did not do so, does not impact on his reasonably held belief that they could do so. The Court held that Mr. Finbow had met the burden of proving on a balance of probabilities that his section 10(b) Charter right to privacy was violated.

[73]         Based upon the section 24(2) Charter analysis, the Court held, supra, at paras, 191-192 that, after weighing all of the relevant considerations, the seriousness of the Charter breach and the impact of the police conduct on Mr. Finbow’s interests are such that the admission of the evidence would so impair public confidence in the administration of justice as to warrant the exclusion of the evidence. The application brought under sections 10(b) and 24(2) of the Charter was granted and the statement made to the police was excluded from the evidence.

[74]         In this case, the evidence established that Sailor First Class Kneeland had left the door to the lawyer/client interview room partially open and that he could hear Mr. Lapointe speaking to the Duty Counsel in the initial minutes of their conversation. Although he moved further away, no effort was made to close the door to ensure that Mr. Lapointe spoke privately with the Duty Counsel. In addition to that, unlike some of the other cases cited by the counsel where there was no evidence that the police officer heard part of the conversation, there was the inadvertent recording of the conversation, which Sailor First Class Kneeland only learned about after the fact. However, colleagues had heard the recording and attempted to listen to it all, although they found that it was distorted.

[75]         In those circumstances, based upon the established legal principles around the right to consult legal counsel in private, the Crown Attorney quite fairly advised the Court that he conceded there was a breach of section 10(b) Charter write with respect to the implementation of his right to consult with counsel.

Section 24(2) Charter Analysis

[76]         Section 24(2) of the Charter provides as follows:

(2) Exclusion of evidence bringing administration of justice into disrepute - Where, in proceedings under subsection (1) , a Court concludes that evidence was obtained in a manner that infringed or denied any rights or freedoms guaranteed by this Charter, the evidence shall be excluded if it is established that, having regard to all of the circumstances, the admission of it in the proceedings would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

[77]         In R. V. Grant, 2009 SCC 32, the Supreme Court of Canada set out a three-part test for the analysis pursuant to section 24(2):

(a)              The seriousness of the Charter infringing state conduct.

(b)             The impact of the breach on the Charter protected interests of the accused.

(c)              Society’s interest in the adjudication of the case on its merits.

[78]         In Grant, supra, at para. 68 the Supreme Court of Canada stated that the phrase “bring the administration of justice into disrepute” must be understood in the long-term sense of maintaining the integrity of, and public confidence in, the justice system. Exclusion of evidence resulting in acquittal may provoke immediate criticism. But section 24(2) does not focus on immediate reaction to the individual case. Rather, it looks to whether the overall repute of the justice system, viewed in the long-term, will be adversely affected by the evidence. The inquiry is objective. It asks whether a reasonable person, informed of all the relevant circumstances and values underlying the charter, would conclude that the admission of the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

[79]         The Supreme Court of Canada also noted in Grant, supra, at para. 70 that section 24(2)’s focus is societal. Section 24(2) is not aimed at punishing the police or providing compensation to the accused, but rather at systemic concerns. The section 24(2) focus is on the broad impact of admission of the evidence on the long-term repute of the justice system.

Seriousness of the Charter Infringing State Conduct

[80]         With respect to this aspect of the analysis, the Crown Attorney agrees that the right to speak to counsel in private is a fundamental pillar of section 10(b) of the Charter. Privacy is crucial to allow an accused to speak candidly to counsel and to receive fully informed opinions/advice in return.

[81]         In Grant, supra, at para. 73 with respect to this criterion, the Supreme Court of Canada stated that the court must consider on this application the seriousness of the violation, viewed in terms of the gravity of the offending conduct by state authorities whom the rule of law requires to uphold the rights guaranteed by the Charter.

[82]         In this case, Sailor First Class Kneeland could hear Mr. Lapointe speaking to the lawyer when he was standing too close to the door client/lawyer interview room through the door which was left slightly open. When he realized that he could hear Mr. Lapointe speaking to the lawyer, through the door which had been left open to that lawyer/client room, he moved further down the hallway. There was also the audio recording of Mr. Lapointe’s conversation with the lawyer which was inadvertently captured on Sailor First Class Kneeland’s microphone pack. Although he was not aware of it until being advised later, other military police officers had attempted to listen to the recording but indicated the sound was distorted and they could not make out what Mr. Lapointe had been saying to the lawyer.

[83]         Although I have no doubt that the military police officer was acting in good faith, in making the facilitating a consultation between Mr. Lapointe and the Duty counsel, although the incident was the result of a couple of inadvertent acts, this cannot be regarded as a minor violation of the of the fundamental right to consult with legal counsel in private. The police are expected to know their obligations under the Charter and fulfil them, and in this case, the police failed to fulfil the duty to Mr. Lapointe to have that consultation with the legal counsel in private, thereby violating his section 10(b) Charter rights.

[84]         Overall, in the circumstances, I find that the Charter violation was serious and that factor favours exclusion of the evidence.

Impact of the Breach of the Charter Protected Rights of the Accused:

[85]         The failure to provide access to counsel in private, regardless of whether Mr. Lapointe himself knew that the military police officer was overhearing what he had said and was also inadvertently recording what he had said may not have impacted necessarily the legal advice that he had received. In this case, unlike a couple of the others which were referred to the court with respect to this issue, there is evidence that Mr. Lapointe was aware that parts of his conversation had been heard as he heard noise outside the client/lawyer room through the open door and in walking around while he was on the cell phone with the Duty Counsel, saw that Sailor First Class Kneeland was very close to the door to that room which was slightly ajar.

[86]         As Justice Bliss said in R. v. Granda, 2018 ONCJ 260 at para. 58:

 “[58] The issue of the impact of the breach on the Charter protected interests of the accused raises issues that attenuate the seriousness of the breach. First, there is no evidence that the accused was aware that parts of his conversation with counsel could be heard and was recorded, and so his ability to consult with counsel was not impaired by the police conduct. As well, almost immediately after leaving the interview room he told the officer almost the same thing that was audible from his discussion with duty counsel. There is also no evidence that the police used the impugned information in any way. While those might militate against the seriousness of the violation, it cannot be that just because an accused did not know that he is being recorded or speaks to the police, that he somehow neutralizes the violation of his rights. Those facts might lessen the seriousness, but the fact that Mr. Granda’s communications were recorded still offends, in my view, the administration of justice and supports on balance, the exclusion of the evidence.”

[87]         I note here, that in Granda, supra, earlier in para. 58, the Court had also found that the accused was aware that parts of his conversation with counsel could be heard as well as being recorded. Therefore, in many respects the situation in Granda was very similar to the instant case and with this aspect of the Grant test, I find that it militates in favour of exclusion.

Society’s interests in having the matter adjudicated on its Merits:

[88]         Justice Cromwell stated in R v. Côté, 2011 SCC 46 in relation to this third factor that it is concerned with society’s interest in adjudication on its merits. It asked whether the truth-seeking function of the criminal process would be better served by the admission or exclusion of the evidence. The reliability of the evidence and it’s important to the prosecution’s case are key factors. Admitting unreliable evidence will not serve the accused fair trial interest nor the public’s desire to uncover the truth. On the other hand, excluding reliable evidence may undermine the truth-seeking function of the justice system and render the trial unfair from the public’s perspective.

[89]         There is no doubt that the evidence sought to be excluded in this case is the breath sample and its results from the Approved Instrument. I agree with the Crown Attorney that such evidence has been determined to be highly reliable and that many decisions across the country have referred to the seriousness of the offence of impaired driving. With respect to this criterion, there is a strong societal interest in seeing that a serious matter is adjudicated on its merits, especially where the evidence in question is highly reliable. Overall, those factors favour inclusion of the breath sample evidence.

The final step is to balance all three inquiries:

[90]         On this point, Justice Cromwell stated in R. v. Côté, supra, at para. 48:

[48] After considering these factors, a court must then balance the assessments under each of these avenues of inquiry in making its section 24(2) determination. There is no “overarching rule” that governs how a court must strike this balance (Grant, at para. 86). Rather, the evidence on each line of inquiry must be weighed in the balance, to determine whether, having regard to all of the circumstances, admission of the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute” (Harrison at para. 36). No one consideration should be permitted to consistently trump other considerations. For instance, as this court explained in Harrison, the seriousness of the offence and the reliability of the evidence should not be permitted to “overwhelm” the section 24(2) analysis because this “would deprive those charged with serious crimes of the protection of the individual freedoms afforded to all Canadians under the Charter and, in effect, declare that in the administration of the criminal law “the ends justify the means” (para. 40, citing 2008 ONCA 85 (Canlii per Cronk JA, dissenting” in all cases, courts must assess the long-term repute of the administration of justice.

[91]         When I consider Justice Cromwell’s comments that the seriousness of the offence and the reliability of the evidence should not consistently trump other considerations and when I consider the fundamental importance and pillar of the criminal justice system that an accused person has the right to consult with their counsel in private, I find that the reliability of the evidence may deprive a person charged with a serious crime the protection of the individual freedoms guaranteed by the Charter.

[92]          I also find that the comments in this final stage of the Grant analysis made by Justice Bliss in Granda supra, at para. 59, are equally appropriate in this case as they both involved police officers overhearing and recording of the conversation between a client and the duty counsel while in police custody. While society certainly has an interest in the adjudication of drinking and driving cases on their merits, this brings into question at what cost to the administration of justice. Like the Granda case, I find that here Mr. Lapointe’s fundamental right to consultation with counsel in private was violated and as such, the admission of the breath readings would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

[93]         I agree with Justice Bliss in his conclusion that there is no remedy short of exclusion of the evidence that appropriately sanctions the police conduct and sends a message to fix the problem that is of their making, and in the Granda case, he concluded that the breath readings must be excluded.

[94]         Having considered the comments of Justice Cromwell and Justice Bliss who adjudicated a similar situation and looking at the three steps of the Grant analysis in this case, I conclude that the privacy rights breach in this case was serious and in the final analysis, weighing all the factors, the appropriate remedy is to exclude the breathalyzer evidence.

Conclusion:

[95]         Having come to that conclusion and granting the Charter application to exclude the evidence, I find Mr. Lapointe not guilty of the remaining offence, which is before the court, namely, the offence contrary to section 320.14(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

Theodore Tax, JPC