**SUPREME COURT OF NOVA SCOTIA**
**Citation:** *R. v. P.K.G.*, 2025 NSSC 302

**Date:** 20250923
**Docket:** CRH 530100
**Registry:** Halifax

**Between:**

His Majesty the King

v.

P.K.G.

**SENTENCE DECISION**
**PUBLICATION BAN: s. 486.4 and s. 486.5 of the *Criminal Code***

**Judge:** The Honourable Justice Jamie Campbell

**Heard:** September 4, 2025, in Halifax, Nova Scotia

**Counsel:** Nicholas Comeau, for the Crown
Trevor McGuigan, for the Defence

**By the Court (orally):**

[1] "Amazing. That's like the time I became free."

[2] Those are the recorded and unscripted words of a ten-year-old boy. He was speaking to the police just three weeks after leaving the family home with his mother and brother. They had gone to live in Bryony House, a shelter for women and children. The boy had been repeatedly beaten by his father. He had seen his father assault both his older brother and his mother. His older brother said that it happened so often that they just got used to it. His mother said that she could not cry and could not intervene to help her sons for fear that it would make matters worse. She had been sexually assaulted, kicked, punched, dragged by her hair and had her face held close to the hot element of a stove. Freedom for all three of them was found in a shelter.

[3] Those words, "That's like the time I became free", hang over the sentencing process in this case. Courts must denounce the abuse that led to a 10-year-old, his 12-year-old bother and his mother, being placed in that situation. A sentence may not deter anyone else from committing a similar crime. But it must speak to society's revulsion at that conduct and the condemnation of domestic violence.

[4] But at the same time, sentencing is not an act of vengeance. It is restrained by principles. Those too speak to the kind of society that we are. The rhetoric of denunciation should not loosen the reins of restraint.

[5] Mr. G was convicted of 8 charges involving assaults against his wife and sons and sexual assault against his wife. The facts are as set out in *R. v. P.K.G.*, 2025 NSSC 87. The offences took place in 2018 and 2019, soon after the family arrived in Canada from India. There is one conviction of sexual assault, one conviction of assault by choking, and two convictions of assault all against his wife, two convictions of assault with a weapon against each of his sons, and two convictions of assault against each of his sons.

**Agreements**

[6] Crown and defence counsel have agreed in this case on some basic issues that relate to the sentencing of Mr. G. The gravity of the offences is high. There are aggravating factors present, in that the offences were committed against an intimate partner and victims under 18, and the offences had a significant impact on

the victims. Mr. G has no prior criminal record. Mr. G's denial that he committed the offences is not a factor to be considered.

[7] Mr. G did not give evidence about his conditions during remand. Crown counsel, Mr. Comeau, has agreed that the narrative set out in the brief filed by Mr. G's counsel, Mr. McGuigan, is not contested by the Crown.

**Purposes and Principles of Sentencing**

[8] Imposing a sentence is a nuanced exercise that is governed by the purposes and principles of sentencing set out in the *Criminal Code*. Those purposes and principles provide guidance while still requiring judges to determine sentences that reflect the unique circumstances of each case and each offender. Those purposes and principles exist in tension with each other in that they do not all guide the judge toward the same conclusion.

[9] The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society and to contribute to the respect for law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions. The objective of a criminal sentence can be to denounce unlawful conduct, to deter the offender, to separate the offender from society, to assist in the rehabilitation of the offender, to provide reparations to the victim, and to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders. Many sentences seek to accomplish more than one of those objectives. And some crimes are identified as requiring a sentence that focuses on a particular objective.

[10] When, for example a sentence is imposed for an offence that involved the abuse of a person under 18, the court must give "primary consideration" to the objectives of denunciation and deterrence. That does not mean that other considerations are not involved.

[11] The fundamental principle of sentencing is that the sentence imposed must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. The court must also take into account aggravating and mitigating factors identified in the *Criminal Code*. For example, it is an aggravating factor that an offender abused their intimate partner or abused a person under 18. If the offender abused a position of trust or authority, for example as a parent, that is an aggravating factor. Evidence that the offence had a significant impact on the victim, considering their age and other personal circumstances, is also an aggravating factor.

[12] The sentence imposed should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences in similar circumstances. That is referred to as the principle of parity. No two situations are identical. It has been said many times that judges sentence people, not offences. Each person and each crime must be assessed individually, but sentences imposed on other people provide guidance in determining a range within which a sentence should fall.

[13] Where consecutive sentences are imposed the combined sentence should not be unduly long or harsh. That principle of totality prevents simple arithmetic from creating a sentence that does not reflect the circumstances of the offender and the offences. When the appropriate sentences for each of a number of offences are added together the result may far exceed the sentence that reflects the moral culpability of the offender.

[14] An offender should not be deprived of liberty if less restrictive sanctions are appropriate and when incarceration is appropriate it should be for the shortest period of time that complies with the purposes and principles of sentencing. Judges must exercise restraint.

**Mr. G's Circumstances**

[15] Mr. G's personal circumstances are set out in a pre-sentence report. He is 47 years old and came to Canada from India in 2018 "for a better life and future of kids and family". He had a stable upbringing and moved out of the family home when he was 16 years old. He completed Grade 12 and then did a three year program in mechanical engineering. He then completed a B.A. in 2002. In India he worked for an automotive manufacturing company. When he came to Canada, he could not find work in his field and got work with a food delivery company a few months before the circumstances giving rise to the charges.

[16] Mr. G maintains that he is innocent. He is absolutely entitled to do that, and it is not an aggravating factor in determining his sentence.

[17] Three letters were submitted on Mr. G's behalf. They are from his relatives in India and express shock at the outcome of the trial. He is described as a principled, soft-spoken and disciplined person, who has consistently gone above and beyond to support his family and community. He supported his wife's education financially and emotionally and his commitment to his family has been unwavering. The judgement of the court was described as having left the family in

disbelief and pain. While respecting the court process they feel that “something essential was missed”.

## ***Duncan*** **Credit**

[18] Mr. McGuigan on behalf of Mr. G has argued that Mr. G should be given credit for harsh conditions on remand. Judge Shane Russell (as he then was) in *R. v. Z.Z.*, 2024 NSPC 42, provided an analysis of the “*Duncan* credit’ which acts a mitigating factor in sentencing, considering particularly difficult and punitive pre-sentence custody conditions. A credit of 1.5:1 is often applied under s. 719(3.1) of the *Criminal Code*. *Duncan* credit is an enhanced credit.

[19] Unlike remand credit it is not a deduction from an otherwise fit sentence but is instead a mitigating factor to be considered before a sentence is arrived at. As Judge Russell noted, it need not be expressed as a precise numerical value.

[20] The court must consider not just the nature of the harsh conditions but the impact on the person claiming the credit. There must be a sufficient evidentiary record to demonstrate the presence of the particularly harsh conditions and that those conditions have had an adverse effect on the offender.

[21] Caution is required to make sure that the *Duncan* credit does not reduce an appropriate sentence to the point that it is no longer fit and appropriate.

[22] In Mr. G’s case he has been in custody since June 25, 2024. For the first 2.5 months Mr. G was on full lockdown and permitted out of his cell between one and four hours each day at the Central Nova Scotia Correctional Facility. He was transferred to Northeast Nova Scotia Correctional Facility in June 2025 and spent 5 or 6 days locked in his cell for 23 hours. From June 25 to July 31, 2025, he was placed in what he was told was “Transitional Holding”, a two cell area. Mr. G said that his cellmate appeared to have mental health issues. He would leave feces unflushed in the toilet, would throw garbage on the floor and threatened Mr. G.

[23] Mr. G said that he filed a complaint against a correctional officer after multiple incidents, which included the guard ignoring for a week Mr. G’s request for a razor, swearing, yelling and intimidating Mr. G and giving his canteen to another inmate. Mr. G said that he had been spit on by another inmate in the presence of guards who did not intervene.

[24] Mr. G said that he has regularly been the subject of racist remarks and threats from inmates, including comments about his skin colour, his religion and his nationality. He said that on many occasions he would return from court to find things stolen.

[25] Mr. G does not eat pork or beef. He has made requests for meals that conform to his dietary restrictions but has learned later that he had been served food containing pork products.

[26] Mr. G's experience while on remand has not been good. It might be said that the experience of remand is rarely if ever good. It could not possibly be. A person is incarcerated, in close quarters with sometimes violent, sometimes mentally ill, sometimes rude and sometimes racist people. Staffing limitations have resulted in lockdowns that have meant drastic reductions in time spent out of cells. The conditions in provincial institutions have been the subject of several decisions expressing grave concerns.

[27] The credit of 1.5:1 referred to in s. 719(3.1) addresses the fact that remand time is more difficult than time spent serving a sentence. Programming is sparse and the opportunity to somehow make the best of the time is not there. *Duncan* credit is intended to go beyond that to address "exceptionally punitive conditions which go well beyond the normal restrictions associated with pretrial custody", *R. v. Marshall*, 2021 ONCA 344, at para. 50. Denial of medications to a mentally ill inmate amounted to what Judge Scovil, in an oral decision, later upheld on appeal, called "the egregious conduct of the state" which justified giving two days credit for each day in custody. *R. v. Casey*, 2015 NSSC 187, para. 22. In *R. v. Chaisson*, 2023 NSSC 144, affirmed 2024 NSCA 11, Justice Norton gave credit for the time that the accused had been denied dental care. In *R. v. Z.Z.* Judge Russell was satisfied that conditions including lockdowns, water quality issues, unaddressed dental care needs, assaults by other inmates and lack of programming, were present though he noted that important surrounding details were lacking. Those were considered as mitigating circumstances in calculating a sentence.

[28] Judges appear to be more inclined to apply a numerical approach and reduce a sentence by giving a specific enhanced credit when the conditions are clearly egregious and related directly to the offender. When conditions can be described as exceptionally punitive and well beyond the normal restrictions but are less discrete and specific to the individual they can be considered a mitigating factor with no precise calculation.

[29] *Duncan* credit is not intended to be applied routinely. It should not be used to reduce sentences, either by specific amounts or by being considered one of the mitigating factors, when the conditions on remand are not "exceptionally punitive". Judge Scovil's comment about the treatment of an offender as being egregious made clear that when a message needs to be sent to effectively denounce punitive treatment on remand, the *Duncan* credit is a way to do that. Mr. G's treatment did not descend to that level. What he experienced was thoroughly unpleasant. Being in a cell with a person who does not flush the toilet and leaves garbage on the floor would be unpleasant. Being the subject of racist comments and receiving inappropriate food would be offensive and entirely objectionable. Lockdown makes a bad experience substantially worse. But the combination of things does not amount to conditions that are exceptionally punitive and that go well beyond the normal restrictions in pretrial custody.

**Factors to be Considered**

[30] The victims of these crimes were Mr. G's wife and children. He was in a position of trust. He was a person in whom they should have been able to place their trust. Those are aggravating factors by statute.

[31] These offences were committed in the family home. Mr. G's young sons were assaulted in a place where they should have felt safe and been safe. All too often that is not the case. The offences were repeated over several months. The Crown used the term "reign of terror" and that was certainly how life was perceived by Ms. G and the two sons. The impact on her and the boys of repeated assaults was chilling. They lived in fear. Until they escaped from the home they were trapped.

[32] The family was particularly vulnerable. Ms. G had no family in Canada and had just recently arrived. There was no one on whom she could call to support her. She and the boys lived in fear that Mr. G would take them back to India.

[33] The assaults on Ms. G were sometimes in the presence of one or both the boys. She was demeaned and belittled by the treatment. The boys had to witness their father beat their mother, without being able to intervene to help her. Ms. G could not intervene to help them either. She was afraid that it would make things worse for them.

[34] Mr. G has no criminal record. Neither his conviction after a trial nor his assertion of his innocence after the trial are aggravating factors. He has nevertheless completed an anger management course while in custody.

[35] Mr. G is a permanent resident of Canada. He is not a Canadian citizen. When his sentence has been served, he will no longer be eligible to remain in Canada. Under the *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act*, s. 36(1) a permanent resident is inadmissible for having been convicted in Canada of an offence punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of at least ten years or an offence for which a term of imprisonment of over six months has been imposed. This is not a situation in which the court is asked to reduce the sentence to avoid drastic immigration consequences. Those consequences will be imposed. Mr. G will be removed to India.

[36] That is a consequence that should be considered in imposing a sentence. There will be punitive measures taken against him in addition to the sentence imposed in this matter. Mr. G has invested time, money and effort in bringing the family to Canada and now he will be forced to return to India. Those impacts are moderated by the fact that he had not been able to find work in Canada in his professional field prior to his arrest, and on his return to India he will have the support of his family. He is not someone who is being sent back to a country that is now strange to him.

[37] Based on the letters from Mr. G's family, the crimes of which he has been convicted are entirely and completely out of character. His family members do not believe that he assaulted his wife and children. His behaviour toward others and toward his community has been exemplary.

[38] Sentencing is not done by algorithm. Each of the factors is considered, along with the principles and purposes of sentencing to arrive at a fair and just sentence. Factors are not given specific weights and then applied against a predetermined or base sentence.

**Count 14: Sexual Assault Against Ms. G**

[39] Mr. G was convicted of sexual assault for incidents of non-consensual sexual contact against his wife. He forced his wife to perform oral sex on him several times. She did not consent and found it to be "dirty" and "disgusting".

[40] The fact that the victim was Mr. G's wife is an aggravating factor. While he was an immigrant, so was she. She was entirely vulnerable in the circumstances.

[41] Sexual assaults within families happen in a broad range of circumstances. It is not reasonable to search for guidance by finding a case that is exactly like this one. The pattern in intimate partner violence cases appear to involve both sexual assault and other assaults, with elements of controlling behaviour. Judge Shane Russell, (as he then was) provided an eloquent description in *R. v. S.R.M.*, 2023 NSPC 33, at para. 2.

> The complexity and sad reality that is Intimate Partner Violence ("IPV") can hardly be captured in words. The injuries, shame, trauma, and oppression, occur in real time far removed from lawyers and judges at sentencing hearings. The deep-rooted impact of this violence can set in and take hold well before and long after a sentencing hearing. Intimate Partner Violence is someone's sister, someone's child, someone's granddaughter, someone's brother. Intimate Partner Violence chills, infects, and decays the mental health and wellness of our communities.

[42] An intimate partner has as much right to their sexual integrity as a stranger. The betrayal of trust involved increases the moral culpability of the offender. In this case, Ms. G, as a newcomer to Canada, struggling with adapting to a strange environment, while bringing up two young sons, with few social supports, should have been able to seek support and safety from her husband. He not only failed to provide that, but he made her life miserable.

[43] The Crown has recommended a sentence of 42 months custody, after taking into account the principle of totality. That is at the high end of the range for such offences. The defence recommendation is 24 months custody, after considering restraint, collateral consequences, and credit for conditions on remand. Both agree that the sexual assault is the most serious of the offences.

[44] Mr. McGuigan on behalf of Mr. G pointed to the decision in *R. v. Fardy*, 2024 NSSC 211. In that case Justice Arnold provided a list of sexual assault sentencing decisions that illustrate the broad range of sentences imposed for that offence. The case involved several offences against three complainants. R.B. was Mr. Fardy's partner when the sexual assault occurred. During consensual sexual intercourse he demanded that R.B. perform oral sex on him. He stood by the bed with his penis in her face and thrust toward her, implying that he wanted oral sex. When she refused, Mr. Fardy told her that she had to because she was his girlfriend. She refused. After several minutes of struggling he forced R.B. to the floor. He was convicted of both assault and sexual assault. Given Mr. Fardy's age

at the time, his ability to abide by strict release conditions and his efforts at rehabilitation, the sentence was set at 10 months.

[45] In *Fardy* the sentence was based on an incident in which Mr. Fardy attempted to force the victim to perform oral sex. In this case, Ms. G was forced to perform oral sex several times, against her will, by her husband of 18 years and during a time when she was particularly vulnerable.

[46] In *R. v. S.F.M*, 2022 NSSC 90, Associate Chief Justice Duncan sentenced the offender on two counts of sexual assault and one count of assault. The complainant was the offender's wife. Throughout the course of the marriage there were a number of instances in which the offender ignored the clear communication of a lack of consent or was willfully blind to the lack of consent on the part of the complainant to sexual intercourse. It was his view that he had the right to have sexual intercourse with her and she had an obligation to engage in that activity. He was engaged in a form of coercive intimidation. It was not possible to assess the number of times that this had taken place but A.C.J. Duncan said that he was comfortable in concluding that it was greater than 10 times over the four year marriage. The fact that it was a pattern of criminal behaviour over an extended period of time in a domestic relationship was a "salient factor" in assessing the sentence.

[47] On the second count the evidence was that the complainant engaged in consensual oral sex with the offender and saw that act in a different light than intercourse which was physically painful. The complainant testified that there was a single act of oral sex just after she had delivered a baby. She did not want to perform oral sex on the offender. He persisted. He had their baby in his arms and she agreed to perform oral sex on him in order to get him to turn the baby over to her.

[48] The offender in that case had a criminal record for domestic violence.

[49] He had been subject to a court ordered release for four years and there was no indication that he had failed to comply with the terms.

[50] A.C.J. Duncan observed,

> I agree with the dichotomy that exists between a person who lives an apparently law-abiding and positive public life while committing serious crimes in the privacy of their own home. That is one of the hallmarks of domestic violence that makes

> it so difficult to detect, that hinders reporting of complaints, and ultimately provides significant challenges for the courts in sentencing. (para. 68)

[51] The criminal conduct in that case was described as defining a "deeply flawed part of his world view" (para. 72). The offender had done positive things in his life. He pursued his education. He did not stop pursing positive lifestyle choices even in the face of negative consequences for his criminal conduct. He was a community volunteer. An Impact of Race and Cultural Assessment allowed the court to take into account the context of intergenerational discrimination.

[52] The total sentence imposed in that case was three years and three months. The sentence on the first count of sexual assault was 3 years and three months and on the second count 18 months, concurrent to the sentence on the first count. A third count of assault resulted in a sentence of 30 days, concurrent to the other sentences.

[53] This case involves a long-term relationship in which the victim was particularly vulnerable. There were multiple incidents of nonconsensual oral sex, which traumatized Ms. G. She lived in fear. Having regard to those circumstances, as well as the caselaw provided by counsel and the comprehensive review of caselaw set out by my colleague Justice Arnold in *Fardy*, the appropriate sentence for sexual assault is 3 years, or 36 months.

**Count 4: Assault by Choking Ms. G**

[54] Mr. G was found guilty of assaulting Ms. G by choking her. Assault by choking has been made a separate offence. That reflects the seriousness of it and the potential for long lasting consequences to the victim. It is also a feature of intimate partner violence. It can be seen as a way of demonstrating and exercising dominance. It is an offence that requires a sentence that expresses denunciation of the behaviour and reflects society's refusal to countenance it.

[55] A sentence of 6 months incarceration is required.

**Counts 1 and 7: Assault on Ms. G**

[56] Mr. G was convicted of two counts of assaulting Ms. G. The common assaults took place in the home. Mr. G pulled Ms. G's hair, kicked her and struck her with his hands on several occasions. On one occasion he held her face close to

the electrical element of a stovetop. On another occasion he pushed on her eyeballs with his thumbs. The children were often present.

[57] There was a pattern of ongoing abusive behaviour. It was not a one-time loss of self-control. Ms. G was injured and sustained bruises from the assaults. She was embarrassed to go to work. As Justice Brothers noted in *R. v. Norton*, 2025 NSSC 122, the offender had time to "step away, to reflect and consider his actions and the harm he caused before committing another offence. He did not do so. Instead, he continued to inflict violence on his partner…" (para. 45).

[58] The common assaults were also part of an ongoing pattern of behaviour. They made Ms. G feel trapped and helpless. There was nowhere for her to turn. She said that she could not even cry. They had the added feature of demeaning her in front of the two sons. Once again, rather than reconsidering his behaviour, Mr. G continued to inflict it on Ms. G as if it were his right to do so.

[59] A sentence of 3 months is required on each of the two counts for a total of 6 months.

**Count 10: Assault Against the Younger Son**

[60] Mr. G was found guilty of having struck his younger son on several occasions. Ms. G was afraid to intervene for fear it would make things worse for him. The older brother noted that his brother was beaten more often than he was.

[61] Both boys expressed how being beaten by their father had affected them. They were at the time 10 years old and 12 years old. They had seen their mother assaulted and witnessed each other being assaulted. When Ms. G and the boys fled to a shelter, Bryony House, the younger boy said that it was, "Amazing. That's like the time I became free." They remained in fear that their father would take them back to India.

[62] They are both now approaching adulthood. They will never recover a "normal" childhood. Not surprisingly they have no relationship with their father having spent years in fear of him.

[63] The proper sentence for the assault on the younger son is 4 months incarceration.

**Count 12: Assault with a Weapon Against the Younger Son**

[64] The younger son was beaten several times with a wooden spoon, spatula or cooking implement of some kind. Once again this was a repeated behaviour. There is no evidence to indicate how severe those beatings were. They amounted to an assault using a weapon but there is no evidence that would suggest the level of force used.

[65] It was however, again, part of a pattern of behaviour that kept Ms. G and the two boys under Mr. G's physical control.

[66] The proper sentence for that offence is 4 months.

**Count 11: Assault Against the Older Son**

[67] The older son said that he had been assaulted so many times that he lost count. He said "We got used to it." The evidence about the exact nature of the assaults was somewhat less specific than it was regarding the assaults on his brother. There was nothing to indicate that the assaults were particularly severe.

[68] The proper sentence with respect to that count is 2 months incarceration.

**Count 13: Assault with a Weapon Against the Older Son**

[69] The older son recounted being hit by a wooden stick as well. That was also repeated many times. The proper sentence for that offence is 2 months.

**Concurrency**

[70] The most serious of the charges is the sexual assault. The sentence on that charge, Count 14, is 36 months. The second most serious charge is assault by choking. That is unrelated to the sexual assault charge, and the sentence of 6 months should be served consecutive to sentence on Count 14.

[71] The two assault charges with respect to assaults on Ms. G address a series of assaults that are part of the same pattern. They are also related to the choking incident and those two 3 months sentences should be served concurrent to each other and concurrent to the sentence on Count 4, assault by choking.

[72] The sentences relating to sexual assault and various other assaults on Ms. G total 48 months. With the sentences on the assaults being served concurrent to the sentence for choking the total time to be served is 3 years and 6 months.

[73] Counts 10 and 12 related to assaults against the younger of the two boys. The sentence for the ongoing repeated assaults is 4 months and the sentence for assault with a weapon is 4 months. Those are closely related and should be served consecutive to the other sentences and concurrent to each other.

[74] Counts 11 and 13 relate to assaults on the older son. The sentence for the common assaults is 2 months and the sentence for the assault with a weapon is two months. Those are closely related and should be served consecutive to the other sentences and concurrent to each other.

[75] The sentence time to be served in total is 4 years.

**Totality**

[76] The Court of Appeal in *R. v. Probert*, 2021 NSCA 82, and *R. v. Adams*, 2010 NSCA 42, addressed the issues of concurrency and totality. The judge must set the fit sentence for each offence. The judge must then decide whether any of those sentences should be served concurrently. The judge then takes a final look at the aggregate sentence and only if that aggregate exceeds what is just and appropriate should there be a reduction to reflect the principle of totality.

[77] In Mr. G's case the aggregate sentence is 4 years after the application of concurrency. The issue is whether that aggregate sentence is fair and appropriate having regard to the moral culpability of Mr. G. The question is whether the several counts when added together result in a sentence that is just too harsh. It is not.

[78] The sentences have taken into account the fact that Mr. G will be removed from Canada and is a first-time offender, with glowing character references from his family in India. But his level of moral culpability is high. He betrayed the trust of his wife and two sons. They have suffered a form of trauma that will remain with them for the rest of their lives. His crimes were not, like some, a mistake in judgement, a foolish plan, or a lapse of self-control. Each time he assaulted one of his family members, he had already had the chance to reflect on what he had done the time before. His younger son may have felt like getting away from him was "freedom" but none of the members of the family who experienced the abuse that they suffered will ever be entirely free from the consequences of it.

**Remand Credit**

[79] Mr. G was apprehended in Montreal on August 23, 2023, and spent 2 days in custody before being released. He was again remanded into custody on June 25, 2024, on other matters and these charges had a significant impact on the remand. He has remained in custody since then.

[80] The time in custody from June 25, 2024 to September 23, 2025, is 456 days. To that should be added 2 days from his time in remand in 2023 for a total of 458 days. If he is given credit of 1.5 days for each day served that equates to 687 days.

**Summary**

[81] Mr. G is sentenced to the following:

Count 14, s. 271 – 36 months

Count 4, s. 267(c) – 6 months consecutive (to Count 14)

Count 1, s. 266 – 3 months concurrent (to Count 4)

Count 7, s. 266 – 3 months concurrent (to Count 1)

Count 10, s. 266 – 4 months consecutive (to other sentences)

Count 12, s. 267(a) – 4 months concurrent (to Count 10)

Count 11, s. 266 – 2 months consecutive (to other sentences)

Count 13, s. 267(a) – 2 months concurrent (to Count 11)

[82] Mr. G is sentenced to a total of 4 years. That would be 1,460 days without regard to leap years. He has been in custody from June 25, 2024 to September 23, 2025 and two days in 2023, which is a total of 458 days. Credit for remand should be given at one and a half days for each day served, which is a total of 687 days. To complete a 4 year term of imprisonment the calculation would be 1,460 days, less remand credit of 687 days, so the go forward sentence is 773 days, or 2 years and 43 days.

**Ancillary Orders**

[83] The ancillary orders sought by the Crown will be granted. Those are an order of prohibition from communication with Ms. G and the two boys, a primary

DNA order, a lifetime weapons prohibition, and an order under the Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) for a period of 20 years.

Campbell, J.