Cite as: Imperial Life Financial v. Langille, 1997 NSSC 111
1997
S.H. No. 143373
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NOVA SCOTIA
BETWEEN:
Imperial Life Financial
Applicant
-AND-
Hilda Langille
Respondent
DECISION
HEARD:
At Halifax, Nova Scotia before the Honourable Justice
Michael MacDonald in Chambers
DATE HEARD:
December 19th, 1997
ORAL DECISION:
December 19th, 1997
WRITTEN RELEASE
OF DECISION:
January 23rd, 1998
COUNSEL:
David B Ritcey, a.c., for the Applicant
Jerome Langille, for the Respondent
MACpONALD. J. (Orally):
This application raises a very interesting access to justice issue. Can an
insured's claim for disability benefits be prosecuted in Small Claims Court on a piecemeal
basis so as not to exceed that Court's monetary jurisdiction?
The facts are quite simple. The applicant issued a policy of insurance to the
respondent.
It provided for disability benefits of $796.00 monthly in the event of the
respondent becoming disabled as defined in the policy. The respondent became disabled
and claimed accordingly. The applicant paid the benefits for almost two years, up to and
including June of this year. At that time, the applicant ceased paying because it felt that
the respondent was no longer disabled according to the tenns of the policy. In October of
this year, the respondent commenced a Small Claims Court action claiming $3,980.00
representing the five months from July to November of 1997.
The applicant asserts that this claim, although technically falling within the
monetary jurisdiction of the Small Claims Court, is an abuse of that Court's process.
Specifically. the applicant feels the claim in reality involves an amount well in excess of
the Small Claims Court's monetary jurisdiction if it is to be calculated over time. In other
words, to allow the respondent to prosecute her claim in a piecemeal basis in Small Claims
Court would unjustifiably deny the applicant the benefit of the more detailed Supreme
Court process. Mr. David Ritcey, counsel for the applicant, explains the problem succinctly
in paragraph 8 of his Affidavit:
-2
THAT the Applicant wishes to exercise its rights
under the Nova Scotia Civil Procedure Rules including the
Rules with respect to discovery of documents, discovery
of witnesses, the opportunity for a further independent
medical examination ifdeemed necessary (an independent
medical examination already having been performed by
Dr. R.A. Yabsley, orthopaedic surgeon, of Halifax) as well
as all other Rules which may apply to this type of action.
The resolution of this claim to a great extent involves a process of statutory
interpretation. Specifically it involves an interpretation of s.9 of the Small Claims Court
Act dealing with that court's jurisdiction:
A person may make a claim under this Act
(a)
seeking a monetary award in respect of
a matter or thing arising under a contract or
a tort where the claim does not exceed five
thousand dollars inclusive of any claim for
general damages but exclusive of interest;
The issue from an interpretational point of view is whether or not the
,
reference to "claim" as stated in s.9 refers to the respondent's actual claim as may be
advanced from time to time, or does it mean the total potential claim.
To resolve this issue I am guided by the provisions of subsection 9(5) of the
Interpretation Act, (1989) R.S.N.S. as amended:
-3
Interpretation of enactment
(5)
Every enactment shall be deemed remedial
and interpreted to insure the attainment of Its objects by
considering among other matters
(a)
the occasion and necessity for the
enactment;
(b)
the circumstances existing at the time
it was passed;
(c)
the mischief to be remedied;
(d)
the object to be attained;
(e)
the
former
law,
including
other
enactments
upon
the
same or similar
subjects;
(f)
the consequences of a
particular
interpretation; and
(g)
the history. of legislation on the subject.
As in any exercise of statutory interpretation, the Court should take a
purposeful approach.
In other words, the Court should identify the purpose of the
provisions in question. In the case at bar, this leads me to an analysis of the objects of the
Small Claims Court generally.
Our Small Claims Court serves an extremely useful purpose within the
administration of civil justice in this province. It provides an informal and inexpensive forum
for the resolution of claims within a limited monetary value. It provides access to justice
for those who might not otherwise afford it. It makes perfect sense to have claims involving
-4
smaller amounts of money processed in an efficient manner without the expense of
extensive pre-trial proceedings.
That being said, one must not forget the benefits of our Supreme Court pre
trial process. That process provides for liberal discovery procedures designed to enhance
settlement and/or narrow the issues. Therefore, it too serves a very significant purpose
within the administration of civil justice.
Thus in approaching this issue, I must balance or consider the goals of each
judicial regime. In so doing, I conclude that the reference to "claim" in s.9 of the Small
Claims Court Act, supra, must refer to "claim" in the global sense.
The legislators
obviously felt that extensive pre-trial procedures could be avoided (so as to secure greater
access to justice) provided the amount at stake was reasonably modest.
In this case the amount at stake is not modest but very high. Its potential
value far exceeds the monetary limit of the Small Claims Court.
To circumvent the
discovery process by allowing daims like this to go forward on a piecemeal basis in Small
Claims Court would represent a potential disservice to both sides and would be contrary
to the stated purpose of the Small Claims Court Act.
Therefore, I feel that to allow this claim to proceed in Small Claims Court
would be an abuse of that Court's process. In reaching this conclusion, I am persuaded
- 5
by the reasoning of Saunders, J., in Paul Revere Life Insurance Company v. Herbin
(1996), 149 N.S.R. (2d) 200. In that case my learned colleague addressed an almost
identical factual situation seeking identical relief. Beginning at paragraph 20, the Learned
Trial Judge concluded:
I accept counsel"s submission on behalf of
the insurer that the very rationale for the
establishment of the Small Claims Court was
that small claims would be quickly and
inexpensively adjudicated.
Naturally, such
claims are heard without access to the usual
pretrial procedures, productions, discovery
of parties and discovery of experts, as would
be accommodated under our own Civil
Procedure Rules.
This case is anything but a small claim.
Having found as I do that there is a real
potential for this claim to lead to repeated
and
identically
issue-based
claims
approaching half a million dollars, it seems to
me that the Legislature could hardly have
intended the statute to apply to cases such
as this.
And continuing at paragraph 24, he states:
I also agree with the submission of counsel
for the insurer that a nice question involving
res judicata arises here. I have been referred
to the judgment of Roscoe, J. (as she then
was) in Big Wheels Transport and Leasing
Ltd. v. Hanson et al. (1990), 102 N.S.R. (2d)
371; 279 A.P.R. 371 (T.O.).
Based on the
conclusions she came to in that case, it may
well be that if the Small Claims Court
adjudicator found that Mr. Herbin were totally
-6
disabled, then in subsequent proceedings,
Herbin might well argue that the issue of his
disability had been resolved, and barring any
change in his medical condition, that the
issue having been decided, was res judicata.
The result and consequences of such a
finding to the defendant insurer would be, to
say the least, profound.
However, there remains a fundamental issue. Should this court be granting
declaratory relief for alleged abuses of another court?
This issue was addressed head-on by Gruchy, J., in Royal Insurance
Company of Canada v. Legge where the learned trial justice after referring to the decision
of Saund~rs, J., in Paul Revere, noted at paragraph 12:
am
however
concerned
about
the
jurisdiction of this court to interfere with the
process of the Small Claims Court.
And at paragraph 14, Gruchy, J., continued:
I have concluded that the declaration and
stay sought by the applicant herein would
have the same effect as an injunction against
the respondent prohibiting the trial of the
action. The Small Claims 'Court, however, is
a
tribunal
clearly
established
by
the
Legislature with its own authority.
In my
view it has status similar to that of an
administrative or domestic tribunal to which
this court owes curial deference.
The
relationship between such tribunals and this
court was explored by the Nova Scotia Court
of Appeal in Ripley v. Investment Dealers
-7
Association et al and McFetridge v. Nova
Scotia Barristers' Society.
Then, continuing at paragraph 18 he notes:
The Small Claims Court is not supervised by
the Supreme Court, other than by prerogative
remedies or judicial review.
This court's
relationship to the Small Claims Court is as
an appellate tribunal only. The Nova Scotia
Legislature removed from the jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court the subject matter of
actions properly taken pursuant to the Small
Claims Court Act. It appears premature to
interfere in the process of a matter being
conducted by a duly constituted court. It is
.not for this court, at this stage, to decide
whether the subject matter of the action is
beyond the monetary limits of that court.
That court must judge for Itself the questions
concerning the monetary value of the claim.
And then, in addressing specifically the decision of Saunders, J., in Paul Revere, Gruchy.
J. t
concluded at paragraph 20:
I recognize that in concluding this application
must
be
dismissed
I
am
reaching
a
.c onclusion opposite to that of my learned
and respected confrere, Justice Saunders, in
his oral decision in Revere (Paul) Life
Insurance Co. v. Herbin.
I take comfort,
however, In that Justice Saunders did not
address the question of the jurisdiction or
authority of this court. I can only conclude
that the precise subject which causes me
concern was not raised or argued before him.
r,
-8
With respect to my learned colleague, I disagree with Gruchy, J.'s conclusion
that the Small Claims Court has exclusive jurisdiction for claims falling within its monetary
jurisdiction. I know of no legislation or subsequent case law that takes away the Supreme
Court's jurisdiction for all claims of this nature regardless of the amount involved. I refer
specifically to the decision of Chief Justice Glube of this Court in Haines, Miller &
Associates Inc. v. Voss (1996), 158 N.S.R. (2d) 389 wherein she concluded that the
Supreme Court has jurisdiction concurrent to that of the Small Claims Court for claims
involving an amount that would have ordinarily fall within the jurisdiction of the Small
Claims Court.
I do agree, however, with Gruchy. J., that this Court should pay (and in fact
has historically paid) significant deference to the Small Claims Court. In fact the legislation
imports such deference in that appeals to this Court are limited to matters involving (a)
errors of law; (b) excesses of jurisdiction; or (c) denials of natural justice.
Yet. regardless of the process, this court will ultimately be called upon to
resolve this issue. In other words, whether this Court deals with the narrow legal issue now
(by way of pre-emptive declaratory relief) or eventually by way of an appeal, the matter will
eventually have to be decided by this Court.
-9
Therefore, for purely pragmatic reasons, I see no purpose in having the
parties take a circuitous route to this forum. This Court has concurrent jurisdiction over this
issue and the ability to control its own process. I am prepared to deal with this matter
today and to grant the relief requested by the applicant.
In so doing, I agree with the
conclusion of Saunders, J., in Paul Revere where at paragraph 25 he states:
Finally, I agree it is no answer to say that the
defendant always has the right to appeal to
this court, which might include a claim of
breach of natural justice. In the words of Ms.
Smith, such would be hollow relief in this
case. An appeal is limited by statute to one
of stated case and neither the plaintiff nor the
defendant would have had the opportunity to
avail
themselves
of
the
rights
and
protections afforded the parties in a Superior
Court under our Civil Procedure Rules.
This Court has the inherent jurisdiction to
protect its own integrity and prevent an
abuse of process.
For all of the above reasons, I will sign the Order in the fonn presented to me
by counsel.
J.
Halifax, Nova Scotia
You are being directed to the most recent version of the statute which may not be the version considered at the time of the judgment.