IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NOVA SCOTIA
(FAMILY DIVISION)
Citation: MacEachern v. MacEachern, 2011 NSSC 215
Date: 2011-06-03
Docket: 1206-5384
Registry: Sydney
Between:
Kevin Alexander MacEachern
Applicant
v.
Maria Delire MacEachern
Respondent
Judge: The Honourable Justice Kenneth C. Haley
Heard: January 11, 2011; February 22, 2011; March 22, 2011 in Sydney, Nova Scotia
Counsel: Alan J. Stanwick, counsel for the Petitioner
Andrea Rizzato, counsel for the Respondent
By the Court:
[1] The Petitioner, Kevin Alexander MacEachern, hereinafter called the “Petitioner”, is requesting a divorce from Maria Delire MacEachern, hereinafter called the “Respondent”, pursuant to Section 8(1) of the Divorce Act alleging breakdown of the marriage.
[2] The parties were married on October 12, 1974 at Mount Carmel Church in New Waterford, Nova Scotia, and separated on January 31, 2007. The parties had three children during the marriage, all of whom are grown and no longer dependent upon either the Petitioner or the Respondent.
[3] This matter came before the court on January 11; February 22; and March 22, 2011. Written submissions were filed with the court on April 15, 2011. The Exhibits before and considered by the court were as follows:
Exhibit #1 - Petition for Divorce
Exhibit #2 - Certificate of Marriage
Exhibit #3 - Petitioner’s Exhibit Book
Exhibit #4(a) - Petitioner’s Supplementary Exhibit Book
Exhibit #4(b) - Petitioner’s Supplementary Exhibit Book #2
Exhibit #5 - Respondent’s Exhibit Book
Exhibit #6 - Receipts from Kevin Hogan for plumbing
Exhibit #7 - Copy of cheque draft from Insurance Company
Exhibit #8 - Letter from Investors Group
Exhibit #9 - Investors Group documentation re Kevin & Maria MacEachern
Exhibit #10 - Investors Group documentation re Maria MacEachern
Exhibit #11 - Investors Group documentation re Kevin MacEachern
Exhibit #12 - Letter from A.A. Munro Insurance Agency
Exhibit #13 - Answer & Counter-Petition
Exhibit #14 - Respondent’s Supplemental Exhibit Book
Exhibit #15 - Notes of Maria MacEachern
Exhibit #16 - Letter from Canada Pension re Mr. MacEachern
FACTS AND EVIDENCE
[4] The Petitioner and the Respondent were married for nearly thirty-three (33) years. The parties resided at 2791 Lingan Road, Lingan, Nova Scotia, until their separation on January 31, 2007. The Respondent has continued to reside in the matrimonial home since the date of separation. The Petitioner rents an apartment in New Waterford at a cost of $700.00 per month. The matrimonial home is located on land that was acquired by the Petitioner by deed dated June 19, 1974. The title remains in the Petitioner’s name. The parties built a house on the property in 1983 with money inherited by the Respondent from her father. There is no mortgage associated with the matrimonial home. The parties have agreed that for the purposes of the division of the matrimonial home, if it is not to be sold, it should be valued at one hundred and twenty-three thousand dollars ($123,000.00).
[5] The parties had three children of the marriage: twins, Jocelyn MacEachern and Deidra MacEachern, whose date of birth is February 16, 1982, and Andrea MacEachern whose date of birth is March 16, 1980. All three children are of the age of majority and are no longer dependent upon the parties. Deidra MacEachern appeared and gave evidence at the trial in this matter.
[6] The Respondent was a stay-at-home mother, working outside of the home only sporadically. There was no dispute in the evidence of the parties that the Respondent was primarily responsible for the care of the children and for the maintenance of the matrimonial home. Also the Respondent was primarily responsible for the banking and payment of bills during the marriage.
[7] The Respondent’s date of birth is June 4, 1952. The Respondent is 58 years of age, soon to be 59. The Respondent has worked some part-time and seasonal work in the past, and in particular when the bills piled up. She has had seasonal employment on a fish farm. She worked at the Coast Guard College as a cook’s helper. However, she was not able to continue to work in that position as she needed her Grade 12 to continue in that position, and she does not have that level of education. Her highest level of education is Grade 11, and she is bilingual.
[8] The Respondent also worked at a pharmacy in New Waterford, but was not able to continue in that position because she had to walk from Lingan to New Waterford. When she took cabs it would cost her sixteen dollars ($16.00) per shift. Further, the Respondent had difficulty in this position because she is hard of hearing, and had difficulty communicating with customers at times, although she is not alleging a disability in this regard.
[9] The Respondent reports her health is poor. She suffers from hearing loss, diabetes and diabetic related complications, allergies and high cholesterol, although the Court was not provided with any medical evidence in support of same.
[10] The Respondent says her prospects for full-time employment are minimal based on her health, age, and level of education. She presently has periodic employment with a catering service, Triple D’s Catering in New Waterford. Her total income from that catering employment for 2010 was five hundred and ninety-five dollars ($595.00). The only sources of income that the Respondent has are the income she earns catering, and the amount she receives in spousal support from the Petitioner.
[11] Based on the evidence at trial, it appears that the Respondent received money from her mother and stepfather by gift and inheritance. That money was invested with Investors Group. Jim Ferguson, the parties’ financial advisor with Investors Group, gave evidence at the trial with regard to the parties’ investments. Based on the evidence of Mr. Ferguson it is clear that any money that the Respondent was gifted or inherited had been completely consumed by 2002, five years prior to the parties’ separation, and had an overall maximum value of $278,000.00.
[12] According to the evidence of the Respondent, the Respondent’s parents had also purchased a policy of life insurance for the Petitioner with London Life. That life insurance policy is found at Tab 11 of Exhibit 5.
[13] The Petitioner paid spousal support in the amount of nine hundred dollars ($900.00) from February 2007 to August 2010, with the exception of two months. The Respondent gave evidence that in August 2008 she was planning to take a trip to the Magdalene Islands with her daughters. Based on her limited financial means, she requested of the Petitioner that he repay money that the Respondent had paid for his mother’s funeral expenses in the amount of one thousand dollars ($1,000.00). The Petitioner gave the Respondent one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) in cash at that time. The Respondent believed that money was the repayment she had requested and expected to receive her usual spousal support amount, being nine hundred dollars ($900.00) that month. However, the Petitioner did not pay any other money that month. Further, both the Respondent and the Petitioner gave evidence that in December 2007, the Petitioner paid bills at the matrimonial home rather than paying spousal support.
[14] In August 2010 the Petitioner unilaterally decided to reduce the amount of spousal support that he was paying to the Respondent to seven hundred fifty dollars ($750.00) per month, just four (4) months prior to trial.
[15] The Petitioner was born on February 8, 1946, and is now 65 years of age. The Petitioner was employed as a unionized sheet metal worker until the summer of 2001 when he suffered herniated discs in his back as a result of a work-related incident. From 2001, when he was injured, the Petitioner did not return to work as a unionized sheet metal worker.
[16] The Petitioner did not receive CPP Disability Benefits until 2005, when according to his income tax information, which is found at Tab 1 of Exhibit 3, the Petitioner received CPP Disability Benefits in the amount of thirty-five thousand nine hundred twenty dollars ($35,920.00). He also received an additional five thousand one hundred sixty-six dollars ($5,166.00) in regular CPP Benefits, and two thousand three hundred thirty-one dollars ($2,331.00) in other pension and superannuation.
[17] By the time the Petitioner received his CPP lump sum and periodic disability payments in 2005, the parties had very little income. The parties were, by then, living an extremely frugal lifestyle. Both parties gave evidence that when the CPP lump sum came in, the parties had debts owing which they paid, including money to the Department of Community Services for a power bill that they had covered.
[18] According to the bank account statement for the parties’ joint bank account, which is found at Tab 5 of Exhibit 5, the amount that was deposited after bills were paid from the CPP lump sum was sixteen thousand nine hundred eighty dollars and eighty-nine cents ($16,980.89) on February 7, 2005.
[19] In 2005 the Petitioner also received two lump sum payments from Workers’ Compensation Benefits totalling sixty-five thousand one hundred three dollars ($65,103.00). These payments are detailed in statements from Workers’ Compensation, which are found at Tab 10 of Exhibit 3. Specifically a payment was made for the period from January 22, 2002 until April 30, 2004 in the amount of forty thousand fifty-three dollars and ninety cents ($40,053.90) from the Workers’ Compensation Board to the Petitioner on October 17, 2005. Additionally the Petitioner received a payment for the period from April 30, 2004 to December 21, 2005 in the amount of twenty-four thousand six hundred ninety-one dollars and sixty-nine cents ($24,691.69) from Workers’ Compensation on December 22, 2005. The Petitioner also received periodic payments from Workers’ Compensation in the amount of one thousand five hundred fifty-three dollars and sixty-four cents ($1,553.64) per month from January 2006 onward. Thus the Petitioner received an additional twenty-one thousand seven hundred fifty dollars and ninety-six cents ($21,750.96) in Workers’ Compensation Benefits until the parties’ separation. The periodic payments from Workers’ Compensation for 2006 are detailed in a statement, which is found at Tab 10 of Exhibit 5.
[20] The Petitioner admitted that he did not tell the Respondent that he had received lump sum payments or periodic payments from Workers’ Compensation prior to their separation. He testified, “She is not the greatest person to handle money”.
[21] Daughter, Deidra MacEachern, also confirmed that the Respondent did not know that the Petitioner had received monies from Workers’ Compensation prior to the parties’ separation. The lump sum payments and the periodic payments from Workers’ Compensation were being deposited into an account in the Petitioner’s name, of which the Respondent was not aware. The statements for part of the relevant period for this account are found at Tab 11 of Exhibit 3. The Respondent was, however, aware that the Petitioner was in receipt of his union pension and CPP Disability payments, including the CPP lump sum paid in 2005.
[22] The Petitioner is no longer eligible for Workers’ Compensation Benefits. Currently the Petitioner receives income from the following sources:
Canada Pension Plan - $ 480.69 per month
Old Age Security - $ 524.23 per month
Company Pension (one-half) - $ 142.10 per month
TOTAL - $ 1,147.02
[23] Deidra MacEachern further testified that she supported her father’s decision not to tell the Respondent about these funds, because of her “spending habits”, and involvement in “pyramid or money making schemes”.
[24] At the time of separation the balance of the Petitioner’s bank account at the New Waterford Credit Union was twenty-four thousand four hundred thirty-eight dollars and two cents ($24,432.02).
[25] Deidra MacEachern further supported the Petitioner’s contention that most of these monies were spent on payment of bills, and maintenance for the matrimonial home. The Respondent takes issue with this position, and provided the Court with photos (Exhibit 14, Tab 3), showing the house in need of repairs. The Court notes in this regard the photos were taken in 2008, and appear inconsistent with the appraisal pictures (Exhibit 5, Tab 6).
[26] The parties also own a vacant property at 1239 Stirling Road, Stirling, Nova Scotia. The tax assessed value of that property is one thousand nine hundred dollars ($1,900.00). The parties have no interest in retaining this property.
[27] The parties had household contents in the matrimonial home. Those contents were not appraised. There is a dispute between the parties regarding the value of these items. The parties agreed that the Petitioner took a number of items from the matrimonial home. The bulk of the furniture and the major appliances remained in the home. However, the Respondent gave evidence that none of the contents of the matrimonial home were new or in particularly good shape. The Petitioner valued the property at five thousand to ten thousand dollars ($5,000.00 to $10,000.00), while the Respondent suggests the value to be $500.00.
[28] The parties had an older model Chevrolet Lumina van. The Respondent gave evidence that the van only continued to operate until approximately eight months after the parties separation. She indicated that it would have cost more to fix it than it was worth. The Respondent gave evidence that she could not even sell the van for parts until shortly before the trial. The Petitioner disputed the condition of the van. However, there was no appraisal of the value of the van, which the Respondent testified she sold for one hundred dollars ($100.00).
[29] The Petitioner is making a claim for compensation for the loss of seven deer heads and one fox taxidermy pieces which he left in the matrimonial home. The Respondent confirmed that these items were no longer in the matrimonial home. However, she denied that she removed them from the matrimonial home, and sold them. There is no appraisal evidence with regard to the value of these items, which the Petitioner valued at two thousand four hundred dollars ($2,400.00).
[30] The Petitioner agreed that his private pension should be equally divided between the parties.
[31] Additionally there are a number of matrimonial debts. In particular, there is a debt which originated with TD Bank. According to the evidence of the Respondent, that debt was incurred for the construction of a greenhouse which surrounds the pool located at the matrimonial home. That debt was purchased by a collection agency, Activ Kapital Acquisitions Inc. As of December 2010, the outstanding balance of that account was twenty-nine thousand seven hundred seventy-seven dollars and twelve cents ($29,777.12).
[32] As well there was a Bank of Nova Scotia line of credit which was purchased by CBV Collection Services Ltd., and then transferred to Nor-Don Collection Network which, as of December 23, 2010, the outstanding balance was one thousand eight hundred thirty-two dollars and eight-three cents ($1,832.83), (Exhibit 5, Tab 8).
[33] Finally there was a Bank of Nova Scotia Visa card debt which was purchased by CBV Collection Services Ltd., and transferred to Nor-Don Collection Network in the amount of twenty-two thousand four hundred twenty-nine dollars and thirty-two cents ($22,429.32) as of December 23, 2010, and a Visa bill in the amount of seven thousand nine hundred twenty-three dollars and eight-five cents ($7,923.85), (Exhibit 5, Tab 9).
ISSUES
[34] The following issues must be determined by the Court:
1. Have the grounds for divorce been established?
2(a) Is the Respondent entitled to receive prospective spousal support?
2(b) If so, in what amount? Should it be paid periodically or in a lump sum?
2(c) Is the Respondent entitled to receive spousal support on a retroactive basis, and if so, in what amount?
3. Should the Respondent retain beneficiary status under the Petitioner’s life insurance policy?
4(a) How should the matrimonial property, including all assets and liabilities, be divided?
4(b) What assets and liabilities fall under the definition of matrimonial property for the purposes of division?
5. Is the Petitioner entitled to a claim for occupation rent?
6. Is the Petitioner entitled to reimbursement for post-separation expenses paid, and labour provided in relation to the matrimonial home and vehicles?
ANALYSIS AND APPLICABLE LAW
Issue 1
[35] The Court finds that all the requirements and procedural aspects of the Divorce Act have been proven. The marriage has been proven through provision of the marriage certificate and marked as Exhibit 1. Also, the grounds for divorce as alleged in the Petition for Divorce marked as Exhibit 2 have been proven to the satisfaction of this Court.
[36] The parties have stated there is no possibility of reconciliation with each other, and therefore I find that there is no possibility of reconciliation between the parties, as required by Section 10 of the Divorce Act.
[37] As such the divorce will be granted, and an Order will issue on the ground that there has been a permanent breakdown of the marriage, in that the respective spouses have been living separate and apart since January 31, 2007, and have lived apart for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the determination of this divorce.
Issue 2
[38] The Respondent is seeking spousal support from the Petitioner in accordance with his income on an indefinite and retroactive basis. The Petitioner submitted he does not have the ability to pay any such order, either prospectively or retroactively.
[39] The authority for an Order of spousal support is found in Section 15 of the Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.).
[40] Section 15.2(4)(a)-©, (5) & (6)(a)-(d) of the Divorce Act, supra, requires the Court to consider the condition, means and circumstances of each spouse and provides that a spousal support Order should address four statutory objectives:
15.2(1) Spousal Support Order - A Court of competent jurisdiction may, on application by either or both spouses, make an order requiring a spouse to secure or pay, or to secure and pay, such lump sum or periodic sums, or lump sum and periodic sums, as the Court thinks reasonable for the support of the other spouse.
(4) Factors - In making an order under subsection (1) or an Interim Order under subsection (2), the Court shall take into consideration the condition, means, needs and other circumstances of each spouse including:
(a) the length of time the spouses cohabited;
(b) the functions performed by each spouse during cohabitation; and
(c) any order, agreement or arrangement relating to support of either spouse;
(6) Objectives of spousal support order - an order made under subsection (1) or any Interim Order under subsection (2) that provides for the support of a spouse should:
(a) recognize any economic advantages or disadvantages to the spouses arising from the marriage or its breakdown;
(b) apportion between the spouses any financial consequences arising from the care of any child or the marriage over and above an obligation for the support of any child of the marriage;
(c) relieve any economic hardship of the spouses arising from the breakdown of the marriage; and
(d) in so far as practicable, promote the economic self sufficiency of each spouse within a reasonable period of time.
[41] The words of Justice McLaughlin in Bracklow [1999] S.C.J. No. 14 at paras. 30-31 are instructive:
(30) The mutual obligation theory of marriage and divorce posits marriage as a union that creates interdependencies that cannot be easily unravelled. These interdependencies in turn create expectations and obligations that the law recognizes and enforces...
(31) The mutual obligation view of marriage also serves certain policy ends and social values. First, it recognizes the reality that when people cohabit over a period of time in a family relationship, their affairs may become intermingled and impossible to disentangle neatly. When this happens, it is not unfair to ask the partners to continue to support each other (although perhaps not indefinitely). Second, it recognizes the artificiality of assuming that all separating couples can move cleanly from the mutual support status of marriage to the absolute independence status of single life, indicating the potential necessity to continue support, even after the marital “break”. Finally, it places the primary burden of support for a needy partner who cannot attain post-marital self-sufficiency on the partners to the relationship, rather than on the state, recognizing the potential injustice of foisting a helpless former partner onto the public assistance rolls.
[42] Justice L’Heureux - Dube in Moge v. Moge [1992] 3 S.C.R. 813, [1992] S.C.J. No. 107 directed that spousal support must strive to achieve some equitable sharing upon the dissolution of the marriage. At paragraph 73, she stated:
“The doctrine of equitable sharing of the economic consequences of marriage or marriage breakdown upon its dissolution which, in my view, the Act promotes, seeks to recognize and account for both the economic disadvantages incurred by the spouse who makes such sacrifices and the economic advantages conferred upon the other spouse.”
[43] In this case, it is the Respondent’s position that she is entitled to spousal support both on a compensatory and non-compensatory basis. The parties were married for approximately thirty-three (33) years. During their marriage the Respondent gave birth to, and was primarily responsible for three daughters, including a set of twins. The Petitioner was the primary bread winner for much of their marriage. The Respondent’s work outside of the home was only to supplement the family income.
[44] The Respondent has very little income outside of the spousal support that the Petitioner has been paying. She clearly has a need for support.
[45] The Respondent has a Grade 11 education. She gave evidence at the trial in this matter that she attempted to obtain her GED, but failed the test. Also, retraining of any sort would be difficult having regard to the Respondent’s age, 58, and her poor health. Based on the Respondent’s limited skills and limited previous employment, it is submitted that it is extremely unlikely that she will become economically self-sufficient. Thus, it is the Respondent’s position that she is, indeed, entitled to spousal support. The Petitioner submits the contrary, and argues the Respondent is employable, however, she has not been sufficiently diligent in pursuing job opportunities to become self-sufficient.
[46] Based on the Petitioner’s evidence, it does not appear that he is disputing the Respondent’s entitlement to spousal support. Rather, the Petitioner’s primary argument with regard to spousal support appears to be with regard to his ability to pay support.
[47] The Petitioner turned 65 on February 8, 2011. As of this date his monthly WCB Benefit terminated. His monthly CPP Benefit was reduced from approximately $620.88 per month to $480.69 per month. The Petitioner was entitled to receive Old Age Security (OAS) benefits as of March, 2011. He receives $524.23 monthly. The Petitioner is not entitled to an OAS supplement because of his previous year’s income. Including his Company Pension, the Petitioner’s present total income is $1,289.11. The Respondent is entitled to one-half of the Petitioner’s monthly pension, so his total monthly income will drop to approximately $1,147.01 per month, or $13,764.14 annually. The Respondent calculates the Petitioner’s income will be in the fifteen thousand dollar ($15,000.00) range for 2011.
[48] Upon review and assessment of the evidence, the Court finds that the Respondent is indeed entitled to spousal support from the Petitioner. That being said, the difficulty remains as to how to calculate the appropriate quantum given the current financial circumstances of the Petitioner.
[49] The Court is of the view that the Respondent is capable of rejoining the work force, although to what extent is not known. She has reported some medical issues, however there is no evidence before the Court to suggest that the Respondent is incapable of working. It appears that to date the Respondent has simply made a choice not to do so, and she will have to be more diligent in this regard.
[50] A Court should try to ensure that the form, duration, and amount of support promotes and not discourages a payee’s self-sufficiency, insofar as it is realistic in the circumstances. Upon marriage breakdown a dependent spouse has an obligation to make reasonable efforts to achieve self-sufficiency. A Court should decide what employment is reasonably available to the dependent spouse, attribute income appropriate to such employment, and reassess needs and entitlement. A Court may award limited term support to bring home to a dependent spouse his or her obligation to make reasonable employment efforts at the expiry or limited term, the onus is then upon the dependent spouse to explain what efforts he or she has made, and why support should continue.
[51] The Court finds that the Respondent has an obligation to work toward becoming self-sufficient, and as a result the Court will award her spousal support, but not on an indefinite basis as requested.
[52] The Petitioner has limited means, however a Court should be cautious in finding that a spouse is not able to pay support where there is evidence of need.
[53] In the case of Gallant v. Gallant (2000) Carswell, B.C., 1246, the British Columbia Supreme Court did order the payor spouse to pay $500.00 per month for ten months of the year, despite making $14,400.00 per annum. Similarly in Robichaud v. Robichaud (2004) Carswell, para. 729, the Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench ordered a spousal award of $250.00 per month based upon a $12,944.00 annual salary.
[54] In an effort to balance the obvious need of the Respondent, and the Petitioner’s reduced income, the Court finds that an appropriate spousal award is $250.00 per month to be paid for a six-year period, at which time the Respondent should have either obtained self-sufficiency, and/or will be age 65 and eligible for Pension Benefits. The payment will commence on June 1, 2011, and terminate on June 1, 2017.
[55] The Respondent is bilingual, and has the ability to work, and to be retrained. She cannot and should not expect the Petitioner to support her on an indefinite basis to meet her ongoing needs. Under the existing circumstances she must make a reasonable effort to obtain self-sufficiency.
[56] I have considered the submissions of the Respondent’s counsel regarding quantum and find the suggested range of $571.00 to $682.00 per month on an indefinite basis to be extreme, and not a realistic account of the Petitioner’s financial circumstances.
[57] Further, I have considered the Respondent’s submission regarding the quantum of a lump sum and retroactive support, and find that to make such an award would cause undue hardship on the Petitioner, who clearly does not have the ability to pay such an Order.
[58] The Petitioner voluntarily paid spousal support in the amount of $900.00 per month for the majority of the separation period, only having been reduced to $750.00 in the summer of 2010. It is the Court’s view he has met his spousal obligations since the date of separation, and to bring this application before the Court at this time is not appropriate. As a general rule, a dependent spouse is expected to institute support proceedings, and not sit back to later seek retroactive support. Unfortunately, the Petitioner’s current ability to pay cannot adequately address the Respondent’s needs, but that should not form a basis for retroactive support.
[59] In large measure, this couple finds themselves in this untenable situation, due to their combined gross financial mismanagement during the marriage. As a couple they chose to live beyond their means, and paid no attention to where their money was going. Together they did not manage their money in a responsible and prudent manner. This is a sad result after 33 years of marriage, however the Court must address the present reality, which the parties created for themselves, and which may have some diverse and real repercussions for both the Petitioner and Respondent, as they try to move forward living separate and apart.
Issue 3 - Secured Order
[60] A Court should only make a secured Support Order if there is a risk the payor will not honour his or her obligations. I see no such evidence of same in this instance, and thus reject the Respondent’s request that she be maintained as beneficiary on the Petitioner’s life insurance policy.
Issue 4 - Matrimonial Property
Matrimonial Home
[61] The parties agree the appraised value of the matrimonial home to be $123,000.00. The home is not encumbered by a mortgage, and therefore the equity in the home, or the net proceeds after sale, will be shared equally by the Petitioner and Respondent, depending upon whether or not the Respondent elects to remain in the home.
Stirling Property
[62] The parties agree this property should be sold, and have the proceeds divided equally. The assessed value of this property is $1,900.00.
Household Furniture
[63] The parties disagree as to the value of the household furnishings. They are very far apart on their respective estimates of value (i.e. $500.00 vs. $5,000.00 to $10,000.00). Obviously the furniture has some value, but no appraisal has been provided to the Court.
[64] Based upon my reviewed photographs of the home and the furniture therein, I am prepared to set the furniture value at $4,000.00. If the parties would prefer a professional evaluation, I encourage them to do so, but in any event the furniture valuation will be shared by the parties on a 50-50 basis.
Deerheads
[65] The Deerhead issue became quite contentious. They were present in the home at the date of separation, and apparently went missing in February 2010. The Court has some suspicions as to whether or not they were sold by the Respondent; but the evidence is not sufficiently clear, convincing, and cogent for the Court to make such a finding on a balance of probabilities, as defined by C.R.) V. McDougall (2008), SCC, 53.
[66] The matter of value provided to the Court is a “guesstimate” provided by the Petitioner, and on balance I am not prepared to factor these items into the property division formula, since the evidence surrounding same is equivocal and unsubstantiated.
[67] As a result no value is assigned, and they will not be taken into account for property division purposes.
Lumina Van
[68] Once again the evidence regarding the valuation of this item is in conflict. The van was left in the possession of the Respondent on separation. The Petitioner says the van was in good working order, and had new tires. The Respondent testified the van broke down in September 2007, and deteriorated in the yard until recently sold for parts for $100.00.
[69] In the end I will divide the proceeds of sale equally between the parties, as there is insufficient evidence to establish any value otherwise.
Pension
[70] The Petitioner agrees to split his Company Pension with the Respondent. The pension should be divided at source, or otherwise the sum of $284.19 per month will be divided equally between the parties on a monthly basis.
Petitioner’s Savings Account - Workers’ Compensation Lump Sum Benefit
[71] The evidence discloses that there was a savings account held by the Petitioner at the New Waterford Credit Union, in the amount of $24,435.42 at the date of separation, namely January 21, 2007.
[72] The Petitioner agrees this is a matrimonial asset, and subject to equal division with the Respondent.
[73] Further it is the Respondent’s position that neither the Workers’ Compensation lump sums, which were received by the Petitioner in October 2005 and December 2005, nor the continuing periodic payments from Workers’ Compensation were disclosed to the Respondent during their marriage, nor were they used for family purposes. The Petitioner and Deidra MacEachern confirmed that the Respondent did not have any knowledge of the Workers’ Compensation payments prior to separation.
[74] The total amount received by the Petitioner in Workers’ Compensation benefits prior to separation was eighty-four thousand nine hundred forty-two dollars and eighty-one cents ($84,942.81).
[75] It is the Respondent’s position that as a result of the failure on the part of the Petitioner to disclose the existence of this money, he had the opportunity to save it, invest it, or dispose of it without the Respondent’s input. The Petitioner claimed in his evidence that he had used these funds for matrimonial purposes. It is the Respondent’s position that no monies from those payments were expended on the family or the household. As such, it is the Respondent’s position that the Workers’ Compensation Benefits are matrimonial property, and are therefore subject to an equal division in the amount of $42,471.40.
[76] The Petitioner also agrees that these lump sum payments are matrimonial assets. The Petitioner received these payments on October 17, 2005 and December 22, 2005 respectively. The payments were received prior to separation.
[77] This account was quite controversial throughout the course of the trial. The Respondent claimed she was neither aware of the existence of the account, nor the Petitioner’s use of the funds. The Petitioner acknowledged this to be the case, but testified the monies in the account were used to pay bills, maintenance and repairs for the house, such as appliances, kitchen counter top, general house repairs including pool house improvements.
[78] The Petitioner testified he has no hidden accounts, and nothing hidden away as feared by the Respondent. Daughter, Deidra MacEachern, corroborated her father’s evidence in this regard stating: “He is a good man protecting his family and property”. Both the Petitioner and his daughter had expressed concerns about the Respondent’s financial management during the course of the marriage, and felt it prudent not to disclose this information to the Respondent.
[79] I accept the Petitioner’s evidence in this regard as being credible, and I find that the Respondent’s suspicions about the Petitioner’s alleged mis-use of these funds to be groundless; not credible; and without proof.
[80] Therefore, in terms of the lump sum claim by the Respondent, I reject same, and find that the monies were used for joint matrimonial purposes during the marriage.
[81] Thus, the balance in the account as of the date of separation will be divided equally, namely, $24,435.42.
Investors’ Group Investments
[82] The evidence in this trial disclosed that there were monies invested by the Respondent with Investors Group. Based on the evidence of the Respondent, and of Jim Ferguson, the parties invested all of the monies that the Respondent was given or inherited from her mother and stepfather with Investors Group. It is the Respondent’s position that based on the source of these funds, they are not matrimonial property within the meaning of the Matrimonial Property Act, and therefore are not subject to division.
[83] The Respondent further submits that based on the definition of matrimonial assets in s. 4 of the Matrimonial Property Act, gifts or inheritances from the Respondent’s mother and stepfather would not be considered matrimonial assets. In this case the Respondent was unable to definitively indicate what these funds were used for. Without evidence to the contrary it would appear that nothing took these funds out of the gift/inheritance category. Thus, the investments with Investors Group should be exempt from the matrimonial property division in this case.
[84] The Petitioner submits the contrary, arguing that had the Respondent kept the investments at the Investors Group separate and in her name only, they would have retained their characterization as an inheritance and would have been exempt from characterization as a matrimonial asset. It is further submitted, however, that the Respondent did not take such steps. On the contrary, the Respondent placed the bulk of the investments, in the range of $250,000.00, in the names of both herself and the Petitioner. These investments were held jointly by the parties, and division is sought on the amount of $125,000.00.
[85] The reality is that these funds no longer exist, and the account was closed in May 2002.
[86] The evidence is clear that the Petitioner was aware of the existence of this investment account, and the genesis of same by virtue of the Respondent’s parents legacy. The Petitioner was aware that the Respondent primarily controlled this money, as she had done in the usual course during the marriage.
[87] The Respondent testified that the investment money was spent on “family stuff”, such as vehicles and children, education, tax bills, and oil bills. She testified, “whatever we needed, whatever we wanted...we got”.
[88] Investors’ Agent, Jim Ferguson, testified that although the account was held jointly, only one party’s redemption request was required to release the money, and the Respondent was the one who primarily exercised this option. Redemptions varied from $2,000.00 to $20,000.00.
[89] The Petitioner is of the view that the Respondent lost “a lot of money”, due to her involvement in “pyramid or money making schemes”. He may be right, as the Respondent did not deny her involvement in same, however she testified she did not lose more than $5,000.00. Mr. Ferguson corroborated in his evidence that the Respondent participated in such schemes, but had no information about whether losses were incurred.
[90] Once again, the Court is faced with allegations of financial mismanagement with no clear, convincing, and cogent evidence to establish, on the balance of probabilities, how and where this money was spent, and whether or not there was a singular or mutual benefit to the parties. The Petitioner was well aware of, or indifferent to, the spending patterns of the Respondent. He testified, “I don’t know where it went”.
[91] Whether or not the investment account is a matrimonial asset or not is immaterial to the Court’s decision. The funds no longer exist, and the account was closed five years prior to the date of separation.
[92] The evidence is not sufficiently clear, convincing, and cogent to establish how the money was used or misused, on a balance of probabilities.
[93] Under the circumstances the Court rejects the Petitioner’s submission in this regard, and will not factor this non-existent asset into the property division formula.
DEBTS
[94] The following are the outstanding debts owed jointly by the parties: 1. Bank of Nova Scotia line of credit held by Nordon Collection Network, balance $1,832.83. 2. Bank of Nova Scotia Visa card held by Nordon Collection Network, balance $22,429.32. 3. Scotia Visa, balance $7,923.85.
[95] The following debt is held in the name of the Respondent only: 4. TD Bank loan held by Activ Kapital Acquisitions Incorporated, balance $29,772.12.
[96] The Petitioner agrees items 1, 2, and 3 are matrimonial debts, and agrees to pay fifty percent (50%) of his share. He disputes that he should contribute to debt #4 for reasons the Court will later comment upon.
[97] The Respondent submits if the Court determines that the matrimonial debts should be shared equally between the parties, it is the Respondent’s position that the present balance of those debts be considered, rather than the separation date balances, as all of the additional amounts that have been added since the date of separation are directly as a result of the non-payment of the debt. There were no additional funds withdrawn or purchases made post-separation. The Respondent submits debt #4 should be included as a matrimonial debt.
DEBT #4 - TD CANADA TRUST - LINE OF CREDIT
[98] The evidence at the hearing was that this debt was incurred to pay for a more expensive covering on the greenhouse, which had been replaced after being damaged by wind. There was insurance on the greenhouse, and a cheque in the amount of $11,383.42 was received to cover the cost of replacement. Essentially the greenhouse was restored to what it was prior to the wind damage, including the same covering. The Petitioner testified that it was the Respondent that wanted the more expensive covering. The Petitioner stated that the more expensive covering was installed.
[99] The Petitioner testified that he thought that the Respondent paid the cost of the more expensive covering out of the investments from Investors Group. In fact, there was a withdrawal of $20,000.00 from the Investors Group by the Respondent on July 24, 2001; however this money was not used to purchase the expensive covering. The Respondent testified that she does not know what she used the money for. The TD Canada Trust debt was in the amount of $20,000.00, and originated in August, 2001. This debt is in the name of the Respondent only. The Petitioner testified that he had no knowledge of this debt. He stated that he had never done business at TD Canada Trust.
[100] The Respondent testified that both she and the Petitioner wanted the more expensive covering. She further testified that the Petitioner knew of the TD Canada Trust line of credit that was used to purchase the expensive covering.
[101] The parties both acknowledge they visited together another residence in the area with a summer pool house upgrade they were considering.
[102] They both also acknowledge they had discussions with a representative from Halifax Seed, who ultimately visited their home on Lingan Road regarding the necessary materials.
[103] This debt, again, reflects the lack of financial management by the parties. It is apparent from the evidence that $20,000.00 was requisitioned from the Investors Account to pay for the upgrade both parties wanted for the pool house.
[104] The Petitioner testified he believed that the $20,000.00 redemption from Investors Group on July 24, 2001 (Exhibit #9) was to be used for this purpose. The Respondent testified that was not the purpose of the Investors’ withdrawal, but when questioned about what the $20,000.00 was used for, the Respondent testified she did not remember, stating “that was a long time ago”.
[105] Surprisingly, the TD line of credit is taken out in the Respondent’s name only a few weeks later in the same principal amount of $20,000.00. It appears to the Court that the $20,000.00 Investors’ withdrawal is simply unaccounted for, which justifies the concerns the Petitioner had about the Respondent’s ability to manage the family’s financial affairs, and why he did not disclose the Workers’ Compensation Account to the Respondent.
[106] I have given this matter much consideration, and the conduct of the Respondent in this matter is very concerning to the Court, and questionable, given her mismanagement of the Investors’ account. Nevertheless, I am satisfied that the improvements made to the pool house are reflected in the overall matrimonial property valuation to the benefit of both parties. Clearly the Petitioner has or will receive a benefit from the pool house renovation, and this cannot be discounted in determining the equity of the matter.
[107] In Ellis v. Ellis, 1999 CarswellNS 124, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal dealt with the classification of debts. At paragraph 31 the court discussed the test for classification of debt:
“Matrimonial debt is not a term defined in the Matrimonial Property Act. The only reference to debts in the Act is in s. 13 which directs that a judge, in determining whether an equal division of assets would be unfair or unconscionable, may take into account “the amount of the debts and liabilities of each spouse and the circumstances in which they were incurred”. Our courts have developed a policy of classifying debts as “matrimonial” or otherwise as an aid to deciding which party should bear responsibility, or receive credit in the division of assets. In Bailey v. Bailey (1990), 98 N.S.R. (2d) 9 (N.S.T.D.), Roscoe, J., as she then was wrote at p. 14:
...in determining which, of all of the debts listed by the parties in this action, should be allowed as matrimonial debts, I must consider whether they were incurred for the benefit of the family unit, whether they are ordinary household debts and if they were incurred after the separation, whether they were necessary to meet basic living expenses or preserve matrimonial assets and the overall consideration is whether the debts were reasonably incurred.
[108] In this case, based on the evidence, the TD Line of Credit was incurred for the construction of a green house structure, which surrounded the family pool located on the grounds of the matrimonial home. Thus, it is clear that this was a debt incurred for the benefit of the family unit. The debt will therefore be attributed to both parties equally.
Issue 5 - Occupational Rent
[109] The Petitioner has filed a claim for occupational rent. In Carmichael v. Carmichael (2005) NSSC 318, Justice Forgeron awarded occupation rent. After conducting an extensive review of the relevant case law, Forgeron, J. concluded at pages 25-30 (paras 55-64):
“[55] Occupation rent has been awarded by Nova Scotia courts where there are no children of the marriage: Mailman v. Mailman (1991), 107 N.S.R. (2d) 33 (S.C.); or when the occupying spouse does not have the care of the children: Comeau v. Comeau 1997 CarswellNS 405 (T.D.); when the occupying spouse has frustrated the sale of the property, does not have the care of the child of the marriage, and where there was no mortgage on the home: Stoodley v. Stoodley, supra; and where the nonoccupying spouse has lost interest on her share of the capital which was tied up in the matrimonial home: Nauss v. Nauss 2002 CarswellNS 56 (S.C.).
[56] I have determined that it is appropriate to award occupation rent to Ms. Carmichael for several reasons. First, there were no children of the marriage and thus each party had a presumptive equal need for the equity in the home.
[57] Second, the home was not encumbered by a mortgage. In addition, Mr. Carmichael has received full credit for all interest payments and debt payments which he made post separation.
[58] Third, after leaving Baddeck in approximately October 2000, Ms. Carmichael had to pay rent for accommodations which I find were far inferior to those occupied by Mr. Carmichael in the matrimonial home. Further while in Baddeck Ms. Carmichael was required by economics to live with her mother and thus lost some of her independence. As such, these accommodations were likewise inferior to those found in the matrimonial home and utilized by Mr. Carmichael.
[59] Fourth, Mr. Carmichael has had the use of the mortgage free home during the extensive period of separation from December 199 until to date - approximately 71 months. This was of substantial financial benefit. In contrast, Ms. Carmichael has forfeited her equity in the home for 71 months. This was of substantial financial benefit. In contrast, Ms. Carmichael has forfeited her equity in the home for 71 months. Given Ms. Carmichael’s financial circumstances this was a result which she could ill afford.
[60] Fifth, I find that the improvements made by Mr. Carmichael after separation were minimal in nature from a financial perspective. Mr. Carmichael was diligent in saving receipts, bank account statements and financial particulars from 199 onward. He did so as he was aware that such would be required for the eventual divorce hearing in the event settlement could not be achieved. However no such receipts were provided in relation to the household improvements which Mr. Carmichael made. During cross examination Mr. Carmichael admitted that his actual financial expenditure for the repairs and renovations was limited.
[61] The amount of occupation rent which I would have otherwise ordered to have been paid by Mr. Carmichael is tempered for three reasons. First there was a substantial delay by Ms. Carmichael in seeking redress. It was Mr. Carmichael who eventually commenced the divorce. Ms. Carmichael did not even file an Answer until June 2005. This factor is mitigated to some extent given the financial difficulties which Ms. Carmichael was experiencing.
[62] Second, Mr. Carmichael attempted to contact Ms. Carmichael after separation to discuss the resolution of the issues, but Ms. Carmichael did not respond. Mr. Carmichael could not act unilaterally with the sale or transfer of the home.
[63] Third, the matrimonial home was not vacant and Mr. Carmichael did pay for the taxes, insurance and other maintenance costs. Because he is a carpenter, Mr. Carmichael was able to effect repairs and renovations at little financial cost, but his labour must nonetheless be recognized.
[64] In light of these factors, I am ordering the payment of occupation rent in the amount of $200 per month for a period of 36 months and not the 71 months which have passed since separation. Thus the total due to Ms. Carmichael is $7,200 and this shall form part of the equalization payment. In the event Mr. Carmichael is unable to obtain financing, and the matrimonial home is to be sold, Mr. Carmichael shall continue to pay Ms. Carmichael occupation rent in the amount of $200 per month commencing January 1, 2006 and continuing on the first day of each month thereafter until the matrimonial home is sold or Mr. Carmichael vacates the home, which first occurs.”
[110] In O’Regan v. O’Regan (2009) NSSC, 181, Justice Forgeron awarded occupation rent. In so doing, Forgeron, J. stated at pages 22-24 (paras 50-54):
“[50] In Carmichael v. Carmichael (2005) 238 N.S.R. (2d) 195 (S.C.), this court made an award of occupation rent where the husband occupied the matrimonial home, where there were no dependent children, and where the home was not encumbered by a mortgage. The competing factors to be balanced were reviewed at paras. 50 to 55. Since the decision was rendered, occupation rent has been refused in F.(B.D.) v. F.(R.V.) 2008 NSSC 236 (S.C.) By MacDonald J. And approved in Goodwin v. Goodwin, 2009 NSSC 109 (S.C.) by O’Neil J.
[51] The fact that Mr. O’Regan did not immediately made a claim for occupation rent is not fatal to his position as his claim was clearly understood by the time of trial and Ms. O’Regan had time to present her case given the months over which this case was heard: Mosher v. Mosher (1995) 140 N.S.R. (2d) 40 (C.A.).
[52] I find that Mr. O’Regan has proven on a balance of probabilities that this is a case where the payment of occupation rent is appropriate for the following reasons:
a) The matrimonial home was not encumbered by a mortgage. Ms. O’Regan was only required to pay property taxes, water rates, and insurance. In contrast, Mr. O’Regan paid rent.
b) Ms. O’Regan did not expend significant sums on the upkeep of the home after separation.
c) There were no under age children living in the home after Mr. O’Regan left. The home was not needed for the benefit of children.
d) Mr. O’Regan’s interest in the home has been outstanding since May of 2005. The home was the only significant asset of the marriage and, thus, Mr. O’Regan has been denied his share of its use for over 4 years.
[53] The quantum of the occupation rent, however, must be tempered for the following reasons:
a) Neither party can be blamed for the difficulty in scheduling trials in a system where priority is assigned to child protection matters because of legislative time restraints.
b) Ms. O’Regan did expend some monies on the residence, including the acquisition of an oil tank. She did effect some minor and cosmetic repairs.
c) Had Mr. O’Regan not engaged in inappropriate conduct, the parties may have been able to occupy the matrimonial home together.
d) Mr. O’Regan delayed advancing his claim for occupation rent.
[54] Approximately 48 months have elapsed. I will award occupation rent for 12 of those months. The home is worth approximately $57,500. Based upon Mr. O’Regan’s rent and the other factors stated, I award a lump sum of $2,400 in occupation rent.
[111] The Court accepts the rationale for occupation rent as was outlined above by Justice Forgeron in the Carmichael and O’Regan cases.
[112] In this case, the Respondent occupied the matrimonial home from the date of separation. The Petitioner paid rent. There are no dependent children. The home was not needed for the benefit of children. The home is not encumbered by a mortgage. The Petitioner’s interest in the home has been outstanding since January 31, 2007. The home is the only significant asset and, thus, the Petitioner has been denied his share of its use for over 4 years.
[113] The Petitioner’s claim must be tempered, however, for the reasons submitted by the Respondent, namely:
(1) There is no evidence that the Petitioner was ousted from the matrimonial home.
(2) There is no evidence that the Respondent’s conduct made it necessary for the Respondent to leave.
(3) The Petitioner did not plead occupation rent in his pleadings, and although not fatal, must be considered by the Court.
[114] I find the requested amount of $400.00 per month is fair, given the quality, size and location of the home, and will reduce the requested 51 months to 36 months, for the reasons above-noted, resulting in $14,400.00 which will be factored into the equalization payment in favour of the Petitioner.
Issue 6 - Miscellaneous Expenses Incurred By Petitioner In Relation To Matrimonial Home Post-Separation.
The Respondent has had exclusive possession of the matrimonial home since the date of separation. It is submitted that in such circumstances it should be the sole obligation of the occupier to pay all expenses associated with the home. It is further submitted that these expenses should include such things as property taxes, fire insurance, power bills, phone bills, cable and internet bills, and the upkeep and maintenance of the home. The evidence adduced at the hearing showed that the Petitioner paid the aforementioned expenses in whole or in part since the date of separation. Therefore, it is submitted that the Petitioner should be compensated or reimbursed for the payment of these expenses.
[115] Evidence of the following expenditures were provided to the Court:
|
(1) Property taxes - Matrimonial Home |
$3,910.42 |
|
(2) Property taxes - Stirling property (21.11 X 4 years) |
$84.44 |
|
(3) Fire Insurance - |
$3,482.00 |
|
(4) Power Bills |
$488.40 |
|
(5) Phone Bills |
$300.58 |
|
(6) Cable |
$135.48 |
|
(7) Maintenance and Upkeep of Home |
$2,830.96 |
|
TOTAL: |
$11,232.28 |
[116] The Petitioner submits that reimbursement in the amount of $11,232.28 should come from the Respondent’s share of the net equity in the matrimonial home. The evidence of the Petitioner is that he has spent significant time since the date of separation performing work on the matrimonial home. It is submitted that this evidence was corroborated by the evidence of Deidra MacEachern , the evidence of the Respondent, and the documentation submitted into evidence wherein the Respondent make specific requests of the Respondent to perform work on the home. The Petitioner submits that the sum of $25,000.00 is fair and reasonable compensation for the labour he performed on the home. This compensation is sought based upon the application of the equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment and it is submitted that it should be taken from the Respondent’s share of the net equity of the home.
[117] The Respondent submits that no credit should be given to the Petitioner for the time he spent in relation to the maintenance of the maintenance of the matrimonial home post-separation because there was inadequate evidence as to the extent of this time or how it should or could be quantified. With regard to the expenses paid, it is the Respondent’s position that these expenses should be broken down into two categories: consumption expenses and capital expenses.
(a) PROPERTY TAXES
[118] To categorize the expenses into consumption and capital expenses is a reasonable approach, and one which the Court will adopt. When assessing the Petitioner’s claim in this regard, it is important to classify the relationship that existed between the parties at the time.
[119] For instance, the Petitioner has been successful in his claim for occupational rent. Is it, therefore, reasonable for the Petitioner to claim property tax reimbursement when, in fact, a landlord/tenant relationship essentially exists between the parties. It would be usual, in the court’s view, for a tenant’s rent payment to include property tax. Therefore, I decline to include the property taxes in the requested reimbursement.
(b) Stirling Property
[120] The reasons noted above are not applicable to the Stirling property taxes. As a matrimonial asset the parties should share in any expense to maintain the property, so I will award the Petitioner one-half of the requested amount, namely, $42.22.
(c) FIRE INSURANCE
[121] Fire insurance is required to ensure the respective interests of the parties in the matrimonial home are protected. Although this expense is complicated by the landlord/tenant relationship between the parties currently, the Court finds it is better classified as a capital expense, and therefore the expense of same should be shared equally by the parties. The Petitioner is, therefore, awarded $1,741.00 to reimburse him one-half of the fire insurance expenses.
(d) POWER BILLS
(e) PHONE BILLS
(f) CABLE BILLS
[122] The Court finds these expenses to be consumed for the benefit of the Respondent only, and therefore she should be responsible for one hundred percent of the costs. The Court will order the Respondent to reimburse the Petitioner $488.40 plus $300.58, and $135.48 totalling $924.46 for these expenditures.
9. HOME MAINTENANCE AND UPKEEP
[123] These expenses were incurred to maintain the value of the home, and for the benefit of both parties. Thus, the amount will be shared equally, and the Respondent will reimburse the Petitioner the sum of $1,415.48.
[124] The total adjusted amount which the Respondent must reimburse to the Petitioner is, thus, $4,123.16, and not the amount claimed of $11,232.28.
[125] Regarding the $25,000.00 labour claim, the Court finds the evidence in this regard was not sufficiently clear, convincing, and cogent to make such an award on a balance of probabilities.
[126] It is nonetheless clear to the Court, the Petitioner did provide some labour services to the matrimonial property post separation, thus, he will be awarded $2,500.00 for his efforts in this regard.
CONCLUSION
[127] The Petitioner’s and Respondent’s recollection as to their respective spending habits was both frail and/or non-existent. Unfortunately the action of the Respondent regarding her general mismanagement of funds, and in particular her suspicious activities with the Investors Account, caused the Petitioner to personally monitor his Workers’ Compensation monies without the Respondent’s knowledge and/or involvement.
[128] It is clear that the parties had grown apart well before the date of separation, and jointly and severally set into motion, a series of financial decisions that has now come back to haunt them both as they try to move forward on their own.
[129] It is apparent both parties have lived beyond their means and did not pay attention to or manage their money in a responsible and prudent manner. At the end of the day both have to accept equal responsibility in having achieved their respective difficult financial circumstances, and the best this Court can do is to finalize and put an end to what is left of a financially disastrous marriage, and to hopefully allow the parties to move forward as best they can under the circumstances that they have unfortunately created for themselves, as a result of financial inattention and/or mismanagement.
[130] I have scrutinized the entirety of the evidence with care; considered the respective submissions of counsel, and conclude as follows:
1. The division is granted.
2(a)(b) Spousal Support in favour of the Respondent is ordered in the amount of $250.00 per month commencing on June 1, 2011, to be paid for a six year period, with said payment terminating on June 1, 2017.
2(c) There shall be no Order for retroactive spousal support.
2(d) The Court will not issue a security Order against the Petitioner.
3. Division of assets as summarized in this Judgment.
4. Occupational rent payable to the Petitioner is set at $14,400.00.
5. Reimbursement of expenses to the Petitioner as summarized in this Judgment.
6. Each party shall bear their own costs.
Order Accordingly.
J.