SUPREME COURT OF Nova Scotia
Citation: Stanton v. Stanton, 2025 NSSC 342
Date: 20251028
Docket: Dig, No. 492562
Registry: Digby
Between:
Stanley Stanton
Plaintiff
v.
Brian Stanton, Michael Stanton and Crystal (Stanton) Tessier
Defendants
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Judge: |
The Honourable Justice Muise |
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Heard: |
By correspondence |
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Submissions: |
Final Written Submission August 29, 2025 |
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Counsel: |
Jason Cooke, KC, for the Plaintiff Jacques Tynes, for the Defendants |
By the Court:
INTRODUCTION
[1] I heard the trial of the within action over four days. The Plaintiff, Stanley Stanton, sought removal of a fish house converted to a cottage, and other materials of the Defendants, from his lands, damages for trespass, general damages, punitive damages, and a permanent injunction. The Defendants, Brian Stanton, Michael Stanton and Crystal (Stanton) Tessier, defended and counterclaimed, based on alleged adverse possession, lost modern grant or proprietary estoppel, seeking a declaration of ownership and a right-of-way by prescription, damages for trespass, intimidation and nuisance, as well as a permanent injunction and punitive damages. The Plaintiff defended against the counterclaims.
[2] In Stanton v. Stanton et al., 2025 NSSC 22, I determined that the Plaintiff had proven all the claims he advanced and granted him remedies in all categories requested. I dismissed all the Defendants’ counterclaims.
[3] The parties were unable to agree on costs and filed written submissions on the issue.
[4] This is my decision on costs following trial.
POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES
[5] The Plaintiff seeks lump sum costs and disbursements totalling $112,526.29 for the following reasons:
• Civil Procedure Rule 77.08 gives a judge discretion to “award lump sum costs instead of tariff costs”.
• Costs “should afford substantial contribution to the parties’ reasonable fees and expenses” which is intended to be more than 50% and less than 100% of reasonable legal fees incurred: Armoyan v. Armoyan, 2013 NSCA 136, para 16.
• If tariff costs do not provide substantial contribution “it is preferable not to increase artificially the ‘amount involved’, but rather, to award a lump sum”: Bennett v. Pettipas, 2023 NSSC 322, para 12, item 10.
• His legal costs total $133,818.75 and there is no “amount involved”. Therefore, tariff costs would not represent substantial contribution.
• In cases involving the types of issues which had to be determined in the case at hand, courts appear to rely on their discretion to award lump sum costs. Examples include the following: Freeman v. Ponhook Lodge, 2024 NSSC 1; Laamanen v. Cleary, 2017 NSSC 153, aff’d 2018 NSCA 12; and Roode v. Johnston, 2019 NSSC 22.
• Despite the absence of an “amount involved” the issues at stake were important to the parties, making the case at hand “exactly the type of case that the discretion to award a lump sum amount in the Civil Procedure Rules was intended to address”: Freeman, supra, para 22.
• Some of the factors to consider in determining the appropriate quantum of lump-sum damages, listed at paragraph 23 of Freeman, include: the substantial contribution principle itself; the actual legal fees and disbursements incurred; their reasonableness in the circumstances; the complexity of the matter; the number of trial days; the importance of the issues to the parties; and settlement offers.
• The case at hand was complex because:
o It involved the multiple issues and claims noted in the introductory paragraph to this decision.
o It encompassed, in addition to the trial itself, an interim injunction hearing and an interlocutory injunction hearing.
o “The Parties prepared for a judicial settlement conference that did not proceed because the Defendants refused to consider moving the Fish House”, the removal of which was ultimately ordered by the Court.
o The Parties had to prepare to examine 16 witnesses, even though only 11 appeared to testify.
o The trial involved the extended family of the parties as well as community members.
o It required evidence of a long history of property ownership and use.
o Numerous exhibits were presented.
• The case “was of significant importance to each Party”.
• He presented the Defendants with a Formal Offer to Settle, after the matter was set down for trial but before the finish date. It was not accepted. This Court’s decision was no better for the Defendants than what they would have received had they accepted that offer. Therefore, CPR 10.09(2)(c) provides that this Court may increase a costs award by 50%.
• In Freeman, Laamanen and Roode, which dealt with matters similar to those in the case at hand, lump sum costs ranging between 75% and 78% of actual legal expenses were awarded. 75% to 78% of his actual legal expenses produces a substantial contribution range from $100,364.06 to $104,378.63. He is requesting the high end of that range.
• His disbursements, inclusive of taxes, are in the amount of $6647.66.
• He is also requesting $1500 for the interlocutory injunction motion heard August 7, 2020.
• The sum of those amounts totals the $112,526.29 requested in costs and disbursements.
[6] The Defendants submit I should only order tariff costs not exceeding $12,000 plus reasonable disbursements for the following reasons:
• Under CPR 77.06(1) tariff costs are the default position unless the court orders otherwise.
• Party and party costs are intended to be a contribution towards costs, not an indemnity, and they “should not operate in a punitive or confiscatory fashion”.
• “Tariff costs remain the baseline against which costs must be assessed”: Bennett, supra, para 12, item 7.
• “Lump sum awards are not to be used to artificially inflate recovery in cases where the tariff provides an adequate and fair contribution”.
• Lump sum awards are only appropriate in exceptional circumstances, and are reserved for complex or commercial disputes, “where the tariff would be manifestly inadequate to reflect the resources expended and the stakes involved”: Freeman, supra.
• No exceptional circumstances exist in the case at hand.
• The case at hand is “not a complex commercial matter involving significant monetary stakes. It is a family property dispute, involving competing claims to the use and ownership of a long-standing structure and surrounding land. … [I]t is the very type of litigation that the tariff system was designed to address: proceedings of a nonmonetary character where proportionality and predictability are paramount.”
• Freeman and the other similar cases relied upon by the Plaintiff “involved circumstances wholly unlike the present one”.
• The plaintiff is effectively seeking indemnification of his legal costs.
• The costs award he requests is “disproportionate to the nature of the litigation”.
• Although offers to settle are relevant under CPR 77.07(2), “the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal in Cleary v. Laamanen, 2018 NSCA 12, confirmed that settlement offers must always be considered in light of proportionality and fairness.”
• “Costs consequences are not intended to punish a party for advancing bona fide claims or defences. In this case, the Defendants proceeded to trial on genuine questions of adverse possession, estoppel, and nuisance. They did not act abusively or needlessly protract the proceedings.”
• CPR 77.02 (1) directs the court to make an order for costs that “will do justice between the parties”.
• CPR 77.04 “recognizes that poverty and financial hardship may justify relief from liability for costs where the risk of such an award would be a serious impediment to the litigation”.
• Ms. Tessier, “who bore the financial responsibility for these proceedings, is presently under a consumer proposal and is homeless. Brian Stanton and Michael Stanton have no assets and are of very low income. To impose a six figure costs award against individuals in these circumstances would be punitive and unjust, undermining access to justice and contrary to the very principles Rule 77 is designed to uphold.”
• The contribution sum sought by the Plaintiff indicates that he has significant resources and capacity to fund the litigation. That “weighs heavily against any argument that tariff costs would be unfair or insufficient in his case.”
• Since the central issues in the trial were nonmonetary the “amount involved” is to be “determined having regard to the complexity of the proceeding, and the importance of the issues”: Introduction to Tariffs, item ( c ).
• The lowest scale of the lowest amount involved in Tariff A should be used, and $2000 per day for each of the four days of trial should be added, resulting in total tariff costs of $11,000.
• The hearing of the interlocutory injunction motion took less than a full day, resulting in a Tariff C range of costs of $750-$1000.
• Therefore, the total costs award in this case should be in the range of $11,750-$12,000.
• There are no exceptional circumstances in the case at hand warranting lump sum costs.
ANALYSIS
[7] I agree with the Defendants that, when determining party and party costs, the tariff amounts are the default position unless the court orders otherwise, and that party and party costs are intended to be a contribution, not an indemnity. More specifically, as noted by the Plaintiff, relying on Armoyan, they are meant to provide a substantial contribution, meaning more than 50% but less than 100% of the successful party’s reasonable legal fees, with the appropriate percentage varying depending on the circumstances of the case.
[8] However, as noted at paragraph 18 of Armoyan, the circumstances of the case must make it such that it “bears no resemblance to the tariff’s assumptions”. Some of the factors which, alone or in combination, may justify departure from the tariffs include:
• the absence of an “amount involved”;
• the importance of the issues at stake;
• the complexity of the case;
• the effort required;
• a rejected settlement offer;
• pre-hearing processes;
• unsettled questions of law;
• conduct or misconduct of a party or their lawyer;
• the need for and presence of multiple lawyers; and,
• the presence of expert witnesses. [Armoyan, supra, para 18; Sandra Richards v. Robert Richards et al., 2013 NSSC 269, para 6.]
[9] In the case at hand, there was no monetary “amount involved” and no evidence from which the value of the relief sought could properly be determined. However, the issues in the trial were clearly of great importance to both sides. For the Defendants, their ability to continue having and using the “Fish House”, converted into a cottage by Ms. Tessier, at that location, depended on the determination of the issues. The issues were perhaps of greatest importance to the Plaintiff because, due to the difficulties he was having with Ms. Tessier and her associates, their determination impacted his use and enjoyment of pieces of land and a building to which he held paper title and which, in comparison with the cottage in issue, were relatively large.
[10] As stated in Freeman, supra, at paragraph 22, cases with “no amount involved, but important issues … at stake for the parties” are “exactly the type of case that the discretion to award a lump sum amount in the Civil Procedure Rules was intended to address”.
[11] So, these two factors alone could justify departing from the tariffs and using a lump sum approach.
[12] In relation to the Defendants advocating for the “rule of thumb” approach to determining an “amount involved”, I highlight and agree with the comments in Laamanen v. Cleary, supra, at paragraph 8, citing Henneberry v. Compton, that the “rule of thumb” approach is only to be used as a “last resort”, such as where there is no evidence of the actual legal fees incurred. In the case at hand there is evidence of the Plaintiff’s actual legal fees. Therefore, it is unnecessary to use the “rule of thumb approach”.
[13] Further, there are additional factors militating in favour of departing from the tariffs and using the lump sum approach, including those which follow.
[14] I agree with the Plaintiff that the case was complex because:
• there were a multitude of issues and claims to be addressed including unlawful occupation, adverse possession, lost modern grant, proprietary estoppel, prescriptive easement, trespass, intimidation and nuisance; and,
• there was a long history of property ownership and use to canvas, including through oral evidence and presentation and interpretation of historical documents.
[15] There was significant effort required because of the complexity factors, the need to prepare to examine 16 witnesses and to actually examine 11 of them; the involvement of many extended family and community members bringing into play issues that might otherwise have been seen as collateral; and the need to present numerous exhibits.
[16] The prehearing processes, in addition to the usual disclosure/discovery process, included an interim injunction hearing, an interlocutory injunction hearing, and preparation for a judicial settlement conference that did not proceed because the Defendants refused to agree to a measure that was ultimately ordered by the Court.
[17] The Plaintiff presented the Defendants with a formal offer to settle after the setting down of the trial and before the finish date. The Defendants did not accept that offer. The ultimate result following trial was no better for the Defendants than if they had accepted the offer. Leaving aside the issue of costs and disbursements, it was very close to the Court’s ultimate determination.
[18] The failure to accept that offer is obviously relevant to whether lump sum costs should be awarded and, if so, what quantum of lump sum costs is appropriate. However, in relation to the Plaintiff’s submission that CPR 10.09(2)(c) gives this Court discretion to increase the costs award by 50%, I note that the provision relates specifically to costs awarded “in an amount based on the tariffs”. Therefore, it does not directly apply to a lump sum costs award.
[19] The Plaintiff had two lawyers. However, the lead lawyer conducted the case for him. Apart from the complexity factors and the number of witnesses and exhibits, there was no indication why a second lawyer might be required. The second lawyer might have been billed out at a lower rate and ultimately saved the Plaintiff legal expenses overall, or perhaps not billed out at all. However, there is no detailed statement of account from which to determine that. The Defendants’ sole lawyer appeared to manage fine.
[20] I agree with the Plaintiff that the Freeman, Laamanen and Roode cases dealt with matters similar to those in the case at hand. Lump sum costs ranging between 75% and 78% of actual legal fees were awarded in those cases.
[21] In Freeman the main issue was whether the defendant had the right to invite the public to use its right-of-way over the plaintiff’s property. Two settlement offers were made, one only a few days before trial. Neither was a formal offer to settle. However, both were more favourable to the defendant than the court’s decision. Therefore, though they did not have the same costs implication as a formal offer to settle, they were “a consideration”.
[22] In Laamanen, the central issue was whether the applicants had the right to widen the roadbed over their deeded right-of-way. They were granted the relief they sought except for general damages and injunctive relief on the basis that such injunctive relief would be redundant. The respondents had rejected a formal offer to settle that was more favourable to them than the court’s ultimate decision. That settlement offer was considered to be a significant factor in assessing costs.
[23] In Roode, the issues were whether the plaintiff’s right-of-way by prescription extended to the beach and whether the plaintiff had acquired title to a property based on adverse possession. The plaintiff was successful. He had presented the defendant with what appeared to be a formal settlement proposal that was equivalent to the court’s decision, except for a provision for vehicles.
[24] I disagree with the Defendants’ submissions that these decisions involved “circumstances wholly unlike the present one” and that lump sum awards are reserved for complex or commercial disputes. The Freeman case cited by the Defendants does not support this latter submission.
[25] As in those cases, the issues in the case at hand related to whether real property rights had been acquired by adverse possession. However, there was a greater number of issues and claims to address in the case at hand. The Plaintiff was completely successful on all issues and claims. The Defendants were completely unsuccessful on all issues and counterclaims. The Defendants did not accept the Plaintiff’s formal offer to settle made between the setting down of trial and the finish date, which offer to settle was slightly more favourable to the Defendants than the Court’s decision. The case at hand also involved a nuisance counterclaim. Considering these comparator points, there is at least as much reason to award lump sum costs at a similar rate in the case at hand.
[26] It is obvious that the tariff amount suggested by the Defendants, even if increased by 50% to account for the formal offer to settle, would not provide adequate or fair contribution towards the Plaintiff’s legal expenses.
[27] For the foregoing reasons I find that it is appropriate to award lump sum costs in the circumstances of the case at hand and now turn to considering the appropriate quantum.
[28] Freeman, at paragraph 23, states:
There are a number of factors to consider in determining an appropriate lump sum amount that would do justice between the parties. They include, but are not limited to: the substantial contribution principle, which dictates that recovery should generally be more than 50% and less than 100% of incurred reasonable fees; the actual fees and disbursements incurred by the successful party and their reasonableness in the circumstances of the matter; the complexity of the matter and the number of days of trial or hearing; the importance of the issues to the parties; and the factors set out in Rule 77.07 (2), including any formal or informal written settlement offers, the conduct of a party affecting the speed or expense of the proceeding, etc.
[29] In relation to the substantial contribution principle, I highlight that, though the Plaintiff has provided evidence of his total legal fees with the law firm who took over after the injunction motions, he has not provided a detailed breakdown of those legal fees. On that point, the following words at paragraph 22 of Freeman are helpful:
Plaintiffs’ counsel has provided their detailed statements of account setting out actual fees and disbursements incurred. This is important information for the court to have in cases where there is no amount involved. It allows the court to assess the reasonableness of actual fees, thereby removing any burden on the court to assign artificial amounts based on highly subjective factors.
[30] In the case at hand, I am left to subjectively gauge what reasonable legal fees ought to be in the circumstances.
[31] Similarly, as there is no detailed breakdown of disbursements, I am left to subjectively gauge whether the amount presented appears reasonable in the circumstances.
[32] The actual legal fees invoiced and paid were $133,818.75. The disbursements, inclusive of taxes, were $6647.66.
[33] Considering the number of claims, issues and witnesses, the nature of the case including that it was partly based on events that occurred many decades ago, that the hearing took 4 days and that there was preparation for a settlement conference that did not proceed, I am satisfied that $110,000 in legal fees is reasonable. Without a detailed breakdown, I cannot assess whether the remaining $23,818.75 was reasonable.
[34] In land disputes the parties are sometimes arguing over relatively inconsequential effects, such as someone’s travel path over a driveway being inches too wide. In this case, the presence of Ms. Tessier and her associates made it very difficult for the Plaintiff to freely use his own property that he had paid for and obtained legal title to. So, the outcome was of great importance to him and, thus, it was understandable that he would be ready to spend as much money as he needed to ensure his rights were vindicated. The Defendants did not have as much at stake. Their father had not paid anything and had used the “Fish House” for a long time, albeit at the pleasure of the legal owner. Ms. Tessier had expended significant sums to renovate it. However, because it was relatively small and on posts, it could be easily moved to another location.
[35] The Plaintiff gave the Defendants opportunity to save everyone the expense of going to trial by way of a formal offer to settle delivered in advance of the finish date. However, they forced him to go through the significant legal expense of a trial to have his property rights respected and ended up in no better a situation than if they had accepted the offer. As in the other cases dealing with formal offers to settle, that is a significant factor in assessing the appropriate quantum of costs.
[36] The Defendants submit that the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal in Cleary v. Laamanen, 2018 NSCA 12, “confirmed that settlement offers must always be considered in light of proportionality and fairness”. However, there is no such confirmation in any of the three paragraphs in that case which deal with costs, and the Defendants have not explained what it is about the settlement offer in the case at hand which would make it disproportionate or unfair to consider it as an important factor militating in favour of a lump sum amount which provides a higher rate of contribution to actual legal expenses.
[37] Ms. Tessier solicited support from a community group. Some of the members of that group were guests of hers during a party which resulted in the Plaintiff and his family being blocked for hours, subjected to insults and threats, and the police being called. That event was the subject of significant examination and cross-examination, including of Ms. Tessier’s associates who she had called as witnesses in support of her position. The involvement of those additional witnesses added to the time and expense needed for trial. Some of them were confrontational and argumentative on the witness stand, and Ms. Tessier, along with the main instigator in that event, Lindsay Trask, were less than forthright in their evidence in relation to it, further exacerbating the increase in costs and trial time.
[38] The Defendants raise impecuniosity as a factor which they say should result in costs being limited to the tariff amounts as CPR 77.04 “recognizes that poverty and financial hardship may justify relief from liability for costs where the risk of such an award would be a serious impediment to the litigation”.
[39] CPR 77.04 does permit a party to “make a motion for an order that the party is to pay no costs in the proceeding”. However, CPR 77.04(2) specifically states that the motion “must be made as soon as possible after either of the following occurs: (a) the party is notified of a proceeding the party wishes to defend or contest; (b) a claim made by the party is defended or contested.”
[40] The pleadings closed in March 2020. The evidence in the trial was completed in May 2024. Yet, the Defendants waited until their cost submissions dated August 29, 2025, to raise issues of impecuniosity.
[41] CPR 77.04 provides a mechanism for a motion to be made by a “party who cannot afford to pay costs and for whom the risk of an award of costs is a serious impediment to making, defending, or contesting a claim”. As the Defendants have already completed the making, defending and contesting of all claims in this matter, a costs award at this point does not create such an impediment.
[42] As noted in Canadian Residential Inspection Services Ltd. v. Swan, 2013 NSSC 226, at paragraph 26: “The purpose of Rule 77.04 is not to afford a losing party the opportunity, post-trial, to seek exemption from a costs award.”
[43] The comments in Swan which follow at paragraphs 27 to 32 are also directly applicable to the case at hand:
[27] The Rules’ policy is to provide access by the poor to the judicial system. Discretion to apply Rule 77.04 might be entertained where the financial imbalance between the parties may prevent a poor litigant with a legitimate and reasonable claim from receiving justice. The policy was not intended to give an unfair advantage to one party over another.
[28] I adopt entirely the analysis of my colleague Justice Wright in MacBurnie v Haltern Container Terminal Limited Partnership, 2011 NSSC322. Justice Wright notes that costs are an important element of the litigation process. Their purpose is to indemnify a successful party, to encourage settlement, to stop frivolous actions, to discourage unnecessary steps and to facilitate access to justice. These purposes are undermined when a party has an exemption from costs exposure.
[29] Because of the imbalance that a cost immunity order would create, the Court should exercise its discretion to grant such an order only as an extraordinary remedy where it is fully satisfied that to deny costs immunity would effectively deny the applicant’s access to justice. That is to say, the two criteria specified in Rule 77.04 should be stringently applied and where there is a comprehensive body of evidence adduced in support.
[30] In this case Swan has produced no evidence, let alone substantial evidence, of his financial circumstances, the first of the two criteria listed in Rule 77.04.
[31] The timing of the request for exemption affects the second criteria. The Plaintiff has been put through lengthy pre-trial processes and a six-day trial without notice that the Defendants may seek exemption from a costs award if the Defendants lost.
[32] The case law outlines the requirement for full disclosure of the financial circumstances of the party who seeks an exemption under Rule 77.04. The Defendants have produced no evidence to support this criterion.
[44] The Defendants submit that Ms. Tessier is presently under a consumer proposal and is homeless, while the Stanton brothers have no assets and are of very low income. However, they provide no evidence in support of those assertions.
[45] The Plaintiff has been put through the pretrial processes and a four-day trial with no notice that the Defendants would seek a partial exemption from costs due to impecuniosity. If he had had such notice, he could have taken steps accordingly. It is unfair to spring it upon him now, when he can no longer take those steps.
[46] There has been a weakening of the once stringent rule that inability to pay was irrelevant to the assessment of costs. However, the bulk of the cases in which there has been an elimination or reduction of a party’s liability for costs have been where an unsuccessful plaintiff (as opposed to a defendant) was unable to pay costs. That is consistent with the purpose behind exemption from costs, which is to ensure that plaintiffs not be foreclosed from pursuing legitimate claims because the defendants have deep pockets and will expend significant amounts in legal resources. As noted, that is not the situation here. The Defendants have already defended the claims of the Plaintiff and advanced their own counterclaims.
[47] Nevertheless, the financial position of a party is a relevant consideration in the assessment of costs following a proceeding.
[48] It became obvious during the proceeding that Ms. Tessier was the driving force behind the litigation. The other two defendants, her brothers, simply went along with it. They presented their evidence in a relatively forthright manner, perhaps because they had little financial stake in the matter. In contrast, Ms. Tessier presented her evidence in a much more guarded and obtuse manner, perhaps because she had expended significant funds to renovate the fish house into a cottage.
[49] However, my decision following trial gave her the opportunity to remove the cottage in question. I do not know what happened with the cottage. However, she could have placed it on another property or sold it. If she had sold it, she would have some funds to help contribute towards a costs award.
[50] The impecuniosity factor represented in the case at hand is the only material feature providing any level of distinguishment from the Freeman, Laamanen and Roode cases.
[51] In light of the fact that it has been brought up for the first time long after the Defendants have already defended the Plaintiff’s claims and advanced their own counterclaims, it is unsupported by evidence, and, even if they are impecunious at this point, they may subsequently acquire significant wealth, the impecuniosity factor advanced ought not result in a major reduction in the appropriate percentage of actual legal costs to award as lump-sum costs.
[52] The Defendants have submitted that this was a family dispute. The Plaintiff and the Defendants are distantly related. However, characterizing this case as a dispute amongst family is inaccurate and does not have any impact on costs.
[53] I conclude that, in the circumstances of this case, it is appropriate to award 70% of actual legal expenses.
[54] Absent a detailed breakdown of those legal expenses, I have estimated them to be $110,000. Therefore, lump-sum costs of $77,000 are appropriate.
[55] The Defendants have not commented on the specific amount requested for disbursements. Considering the need to serve three defendants, the volume of documentation that had to be prepared, copied, filed and distributed, the likely costs of the discovery process, and there having been no indication that any expert report has been obtained, I find that disbursements, inclusive of taxes, of about $4,600 appears reasonable. If the figure the Plaintiff provided includes travel, meals and accommodations for out-of-town counsel, I would have to disallow those amounts in any event as it has not been established that retention of local counsel would not be appropriate for some “good and valid reason”: Wall v. Haney, 2007 NSSC 153, para 17.
[56] The Defendants contest the Plaintiff’s request for $1500 in costs of the interlocutory injunction motion. However, the order emanating from the interlocutory injunction motion already provides that “the Plaintiff shall have costs in the cause in the amount of $1,500”. Therefore, those costs have already been determined. The Defendants have not provided any basis to revisit them.
[57] These costs and disbursement amounts, in the circumstances, will do justice between the parties. They flow fairly and naturally from the circumstances of the case, the Plaintiff having been completely successful in proving all the claims he advanced, and the Defendants having failed to establish any of their claims. They do not “operate in a punitive or confiscatory fashion”.
[58] If the Defendants are impecunious, it would not serve any purpose to allow them time to pay.
ORDER
[59] For the foregoing reasons, I order the Defendants to forthwith pay the Plaintiff a total of $83,100 in costs and disbursements following trial, which includes applicable taxes on disbursements.
[60] Amongst the Defendants, Ms. Tessier was the main driving force behind the litigation and the cause of it becoming as protracted as it was. Her wrongful actions were the genesis of the litigation. However, her two brothers, supported it by agreeing to be joined as defendants. Therefore, Ms. Tessier shall be severally liable for the full amount of $83,100, and jointly liable, along with Brian Stanton and Michael Stanton, who are also jointly and severally liable for $16,500 of the full amount.
[61] I ask Counsel for the Plaintiff to prepare the Order.
Muise, J.